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ABSTRACT 
 
The concept of target leverage has attracted increasing attention in the 
literature of capital structure.  Earlier studies focus primarily on the existence of 
leverage targets, but recently the emphasis has moved to the importance of 
maintaining these targets.  With a growing body of evidence indicating that firms are 
adjusting toward these targets, this thesis undertakes empirical investigations into 
whether or not firms pursue target leverage and, if so, why some firms adjust more 
rapidly than others.  Addressing the issues of maintaining target leverage has the 
potential to enrich our understanding and development of capital structure 
heterogeneity, and to make a distinct contribution to the literature on corporate 
financing decisions.  The empirical analysis undertaken here covers two different 
markets: Australia and the United States of America (US).   
 
The empirical findings of this dissertation may be found in Chapters 5 and 6.  
In Chapter 5, I undertake an empirical investigation of leverage adjustment 
behaviour by examining Australian firms whose structure is disrupted through a 
major corporate event.  If trade-off theory holds, then firms which find themselves 
further from their targets should adjust faster.  The analysis confirms this prediction.  
Furthermore analysis of each firm’s level leverage adjustment rates identifies 
profitability, cash balances, firm size and being overleveraged as important drivers of 
the speed of leverage adjustment (SOA). 
 
With a large strand of US evidence supporting heterogeneity in SOA, Chapter 
6 examines whether or not the differential levels of leverage are related to the SOA 
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using a sample of US firms.  I consider that a firm’s leverage level is itself a 
determinant of both its speed of adjustment and the importance or relevance of the 
influences on leverage adjustment.  I find that the level of a firm’s leverage affects 
the speed of its adjustment towards its target debt level.  Further, the characteristics 
which lead firms to adjust more quickly (or slowly) to these targets are conditional on 
their level of leverage.  The firm-specific characteristics driving high and low 
leveraged firms are different from those affecting firms with medium levels of 
leverage.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1 Background and motivation 
 
There are three preeminent theories of capital structure: trade-off theory, 
pecking order theory and market timing model.  Trade-off theory postulates that 
firms have optimal leverage ratios that balance the marginal tax benefits of debt 
financing against the marginal costs of financial bankruptcy.  Firms therefore seek to 
achieve a target mix of debt and equity.  They act to minimize short-term deviations 
from these targets.  Pecking order theory argues that, due to asymmetric information 
between managers and investors, firms adopt a hierarchical order of financing 
preferences and that internal financing is preferred over external financing (Myers 
and Majluf 1984; Myers 1984).  The market timing model states that firms tend to 
issue equity when the cost of equity is low, or when market values are relatively 
higher than the book values or previous market values.   
 
Capital structure literature has been dominated by pecking order and trade-off 
theories.  Although pecking order theory gained attention in the 1990s, a number of 
studies have found that pecking order financing hierarchy can also be generated from 
frictions other than the adverse selection models of Myers and Majluf (1984), for 
instance, firms appear to adhere to the pecking order’s financing hierarchy due to the 
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presence of transaction costs (Shyam-Sunder and Myers 1999; Altinkilic and Hansen 
2000), agency costs (Jensen and Meckling 1976), and corporate taxes (Stiglitz 1973).  
I will discuss this further in Chapter 3.   
 
A number of studies support trade-off theory and this is discussed further in 
Chapter 2.  One group of studies investigates whether the security issuance and 
repurchase decisions of firms are consistent with the idea that firms have leverage 
targets (see, e.g., Martin and Scott 1974; Taub 1975; Taggart 1977; Hovakimian, 
Opler, and Titman 2001).  They find that firms tend to make financing decisions that 
move them towards their target leverages.  Another group of studies employs the 
partial adjustment model to examine the speed with which firms adjust toward their 
target leverages and finds that, when firms deviate from their target leverages they 
seek to achieve those targets (see, e.g., Fama and French 2002; Flannery and Rangan 
2006; Kayhan and Titman 2007). 
 
The speed of leverage adjustment (SOA) towards these targets has recently 
become a topic of debate.  The estimates of SOA could be biased in favour of the 
target adjustment behaviour.  A number of studies (Shyam-Sunder and Myers 1999; 
Chang and Dasgupta 2009) argue that the fact that a firm’s leverage ratios are limited 
between zero and one can lead to mechanical mean reversion and hence the 
estimated SOA is biased.  Chang and Dasgupta (2009) find that the estimated SOAs 
from the partial adjustment model are indistinguishable from estimates derived using 
randomly-generated inputs.  Hence, studies using the partial adjustment model which 
support the notion that firms have leverage targets have become controversial.   
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The primary objective of this thesis is to quantify the magnitude of SOAs in 
two different markets: Australia and the US.  The motivations for this thesis are 
threefold.  Firstly, it examines whether or not firms pursue target leverage by 
utilizing a recent technique introduced by Hovakimian and Li (2011) to address 
potential biases in estimating the SOA.  Hence, the estimated SOAs in this thesis are 
unaffected by the econometric issues that bedevil previous analyses.   
 
Secondly, although many studies have attempted to address the question of 
whether or not firms pursue target leverage, most of them are based primarily on US 
(see, e.g., Flannery and Rangan 2006) and United Kingdom (UK) data (see, e.g, 
Ozkan 2001).  There is little empirical research on trade-off theory in Australia has 
been so far conducted.1  A recent Australian study in this area is presented by Koh, 
Durand, and Watson (2011), who provide evidence to support the theory that firms 
have leverage targets.  It is therefore important to extend the current literature and 
contribute to the ongoing general debate on the validity of the trade-off theory of 
capital structure in Australia.   
 
Thirdly, previous studies have generally assumed that firms adjust at a 
homogeneous rate (see, e.g., Fama and French 2002; Flannery and Rangan 2006; 
Kayhan and Titman 2007; Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender 2008).  A limitation of 
these studies is that they do not consider that firms facing different leverage 
adjustment costs may take different paths toward their target leverages.  Recent US 
studies find that transaction costs (see, e.g., Leary and Roberts 2005; Strebulaev 
2007), firm-specific characteristics (see, e.g., Drobetz and Wanzenried 2006; 
                                                             
1  Published studies include Allen (1991), Cassar and Holmes (2003), Deesomsak, Paudyal, and 
Pescetto (2004) for Australian firms. 
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Hanousek and Shamshur 2011; Dang, Kim, and Shin 2012), financial 
deficits/surpluses (Byoun 2008) and cash flow and financial constraints (Faulkender 
et al. 2012) are all associated with the costs and the benefits of leverage adjustments.  
This thesis contribute to the literature of capital structure by considering whether or 
not a firm’s leverage level is itself a determinant of both its SOA and the importance 
or relevance of particular influences on leverage adjustment.   
 
 
 
1.2 Structure of thesis and overview of findings 
 
This thesis consists of seven chapters including this one.  Chapter 2 reviews 
the international and Australian literature related to trade-off theory and serves as a 
refined introduction to the empirical analyses in Chapters 5 and 6.  Chapter 2 first 
provides an overview of early empirical studies examines and uses discrete choice 
models of debt versus equity to examine whether or not firms have leverage targets.  
It then discusses empirical studies which employ partial adjustment models.  A 
concise discussion of dynamic trade-off theory is presented in the next section, 
followed by a detailed discussion of the evidence of mean mechanical reversion.  
The modified partial adjustment model proposed by Hovakimian and Li (2011) is 
subsequently discussed.  The last section reviews the literature for evidence of 
heterogeneous speed of leverage adjustment.     
 
Chapters 3 and 4 present critical reviews of literature that examines firms’ 
financing behaviour with regard to pecking order theory and market timing model.  
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Pecking order theory is not examined in this thesis because pecking order financing 
hierarchy can also be generated from assumptions other than the original motivation 
of adverse selection costs outlined in Myers and Majluf (1984).  For this reason, 
exploring the validity of pecking order theory may not be helpful to the overall 
argument.   
 
The empirical analyses are presented in Chapters 5 and 6.  In Australia, 
researchers have found support for pecking order theory (see, e.g., Gatward and 
Sharpe 1996; Suchard and Singh 2006).  Given that empirical research on trade-off 
theory in Australia is very limited,2 Chapter 5 examines whether Australian firms 
pursue target leverage by considering firms whose structures are disrupted by major 
corporate events: merger and acquisition activity (M&A).  The capital structure of a 
firm engaging in M&A will most probably deviate from its target leverage due to 
financing transactions necessitated by the acquisition.  A US study by Harford, 
Klasa, and Walcott (2009) provides evidence that, following debt-financed 
acquisitions, firms actively adjust toward their target leverages by reversing more 
than 75 percent of the acquisition effect within five years.  Hence the empirical 
design of leverage changes surrounding M&A allows me to provide insights into the 
leverage rebalancing of Australian firms. 
 
The preliminary analysis indicates that the sources of net equity issue, net 
debt issue and retained earnings are noticeably different in the acquisition year from 
the years surrounding M&A.  This supports my conjecture that acquisitions act as a 
shock to the capital structure of the acquirers.  Conditioning the sample on the basis 
                                                             
2  Empirical studies such as Cassar and Holmes (2003), Deesomsak, Paudyal, and Pescetto 
(2004), Koh, Durand and Watson (2011).  Koh, Durand and Watson (2011) find that firms 
have leverage targets.   
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of financing methods to pay for the acquisition, the results show that acquirers issue 
debt subsequent to equity-financed transactions, which appears to be consistent with 
trade-off theory.  In the next stage of analysis, the speed with which acquirers adjust 
toward their target leverages is estimated.  Using the modified partial adjustment 
model in Hovakimian and Li (2011), firms appear to actively rebalance their leverage 
ratios by incorporating 42 percent, 49 percent, and 63 percent of the leverage 
deviation, for cash, stock and mixed acquirers, respectively, immediately following 
the acquisition.  More importantly, the estimated SOAs are higher than the rates 
reported in Koh, Durand, and Watson (2011), indicating the importance managers 
place on maintaining the target leverage.  This is consistent with my expectation that 
the firms in the sample experience shocks and therefore adjust more quickly than the 
average firm in the market would.   
 
Given the evidence that some acquirers adjust more quickly than others, the 
next stage of the study analyses how firm-specific characteristics can explain 
variations in leverage adjustment rates.  The estimation of leverage adjustment rates 
is designed to measure the reaction speed of an individual firm in adjusting to its 
target leverage, which allows consideration of subtleties determining the SOAs of 
individual firms.  After controlling the effects of market timing and acquisition 
waves, the results indicate that, the size of the firm, its cash reserves and its 
profitability play key roles in leverage adjustment.  Furthermore, the results also 
show that these firm-specific characteristics affect the adjustment rates differently 
depending on whether a firm is over- or underleveraged.  The firm-specific 
characteristics provide evidence supporting the hypothesis that acquirers adjust more 
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quickly to their target leverages when they are overleveraged.  Overall, the results 
confirm that when adjusting leverages, firms are cognizant of their target leverages. 
    
Using a comprehensive database of US firms, Chapter 6 considers the 
heterogeneity in the SOAs toward the target leverage and examines whether a firm’s 
leverage level is itself a determinant of both its SOA and the importance of the 
effects on leverage adjustment.  I adopt a sample-splitting approach to sort firms into 
deciles each year according to their leverage ratios in that fiscal year.  According to 
trade-off theory, high leverage ratios are associated with high financial costs (Kraus 
and Litzenberger 1973).  If firms have substantial debt relative to their assets, their 
financial distress costs potentially outweigh the interest tax shield benefits of debt.  
Firms with high leverage face higher levels of financial distress costs and greater 
agency conflicts issues than those with low leverage.  Such firms are under pressure 
to decrease their leverage ratios, thus implying more incentive for them to undertake 
leverage adjustment toward the target leverage.   
 
The preliminary analysis confirms my conjecture that the estimated SOAs 
vary with each firm’s leverage levels.  Firms with high leverage adjust toward their 
target leverages by adjusting, on average, between 7.15 percent and 17.06 percent of 
the deviation from their target leverages each year.  In contrast, firms with low 
leverage move toward their target leverages by adjusting, on average, only between 
3.16 percent and 4.21 percent of the leverage deviation each year.  Thus, accounting 
for firms’ leverage levels provides new evidence that the SOA is conditional on the 
degree of financial distress costs facing the firm.  Firms appear to be keener and 
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adjust at faster rates when they are under pressure to reduce their financial distress 
burden.   
 
However, the estimated SOAs do not incorporate information about how firms 
manage their leverage ratios over time.  The next stage of analysis examines the 
evolution of leverage for the cross-section of firms by predicting leverage ratios 
based on their estimated SOAs, which allows me to provide some insights into 
whether or not firms with high (low) leverage decrease (increase) their leverage 
ratios to approach their target leverages, as predicted by trade-off theory.  The level 
of convergence on the predicted leverage ratios, firms adjusting towards their target 
leverages by design, does not appear to be random.  The results show that firms with 
high (low) leverage reduce (increase) their leverage ratios in the short run.  In 
particular, firms with high leverage appear to be more inclined to lower their 
leverage ratios compared to firms with low leverage.  Therefore, the results 
highlight the fact that the estimated SOAs play an important role in explaining the 
convergence of leverage ratios.   
 
Given that there is no information about what, other than high or low leverage, 
drives firms to adjust their leverage ratios, I then investigate the impact of firm-
specific characteristics on leverage variation between firms with different levels of 
leverage.  The results show that when considering levels of leverage, the effects of 
firm characteristics are asymmetric.  Hence it highlights the importance of 
considering the level of leverage when considering capital structure theories.  For 
instance, both high and low leveraged firms tend to utilize higher profitability to 
reduce their leverage ratios.  This is consistent with pecking order theory (Titman 
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and Wessels 1988).  On the other hand, firms with medium leverage increase their 
debt.  This is consistent with trade-off theory.  Further, the effects of market-to-book 
ratio are stronger for high leveraged firms than low leveraged firms; firms issue more 
debt, when market valuations are high, when they are relatively more leveraged 
compared to when they are less leveraged.  Previous studies tend to ‘lump in’ an 
undifferentiated group rather than analyse sub-samples based on their leverage.  This 
study reveals that such an approach misses nuances in the data.   
 
Chapter 7 presents a summary of major empirical findings.  The chapter also 
provides overall conclusions from this thesis and discusses directions for future 
research.  
 
 
 
1.3 Contribution to the literature 
 
The research presented in this thesis makes several contributions to the 
literature of capital structure.  The thesis utilizes a new measure of the partial 
adjustment model introduced by Hovakimian and Li (2011) which addresses biases 
commonly found in estimating the SOA.  Therefore, this thesis presents estimates 
without they being plagued by econometric issues.   
 
I find that managers place importance on maintaining target leverage: firms 
experience shocks and therefore adjust faster than the average firm in the market.  To 
the best of my knowledge, Chapter 5 is the first to estimate the average speed with 
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which firms adjust toward their target leverage in the context of Australia M&A 
activity.  A further contribution is that the analysis in this thesis validates the trade-
off model in a more refined environment than similar studies which estimate the 
adjustment speed across all firms.  This thesis is able to provide new analysis on 
leverage adjustment rates for individual firms and to link the rates to their individual 
characteristics.  By utilizing firm-specific characteristics commonly used to explain 
capital structure, the leverage adjustment rate model allows me to draw inferences 
about the motivations of firms to restructure capital.   
 
Chapter 6 analyses whether the variations in levels of leverage are related to a 
firm’s SOA and its influences on leverage adjustment.  The findings indicate that 
adjustment speeds are due to heterogeneity in the levels of leverage.  I further 
investigate whether or not firm-specific characteristics have effects on the variation 
leverage ratios.  Thus this thesis highlights the loss of important information in 
extant capital structure studies when firms are lumped in an undifferentiated group.  
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CHAPTER 2  
 
TRADE-OFF THEORY 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
A firm’s capital structure is the way it finances its assets through a 
combination of various financing choices.  Modigliani and Miller (M&M) 
irrelevance theorem asserts that, under perfect capital market assumptions, a firm’s 
capital structure does not affect its value. 3   Regardless how a firm finances its 
operations, the value of the firm is invariant to its financing policy.  However, M&M 
irrelevance theorem does not accurately explain the real world when the assumptions 
are violated.  Hence a number of capital structure theories have been introduced to 
show that capital structure does matter in the presence of capital market frictions and 
imperfections: they are trade-off theory, pecking order theory, and the market timing 
model.   
 
Due to the existence of market imperfections such as transaction costs, 
subsequent research focuses on what motivates the financing decisions of a firm.  
What factors influence these decisions?  To answer these questions, academics have 
undertaken empirical tests of capital structure theories and provided mixed results.  
In the context of existing literature, the three models have produced successes, 
                                                             
3  A perfect capital market is a market in which there are no transaction costs, bankruptcy costs, 
taxes, or asymmetric information (Modigliani and Miller 1958). 
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failures and still more challenges.  Each model has successfully explained the 
variation in observed capital structure, the choice of different funding sources and the 
association between a firm’s leverage and its characteristics.  However, none has 
succeeded in fully capturing the variations in capital structure or financing decisions.  
This thesis provides an in-depth overview of empirical capital structure research on 
trade-off theory (Chapter 2), pecking order theory (Chapter 3), and market timing 
model (Chapter 4) to highlight the successes and failures of each model. 
 
According to the trade-off theory of capital structure, firms have leverage 
targets.  Each firm chooses its target leverage by balancing the various benefits and 
costs of an additional dollar of debt (Modigliani and Miller 1963; Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Myers 1977; Jensen 1986).  The benefits of debt include the interest 
tax shield 4 and the reduction of problems with free cash flow.5  The costs of debt 
include potential bankruptcy costs 6  and conflicts between stockholder and 
bondholder agencies. 7   According to trade-off theory, the greater the financial 
distress costs or the greater the agency problems that firm has to deal with, the less 
debt the firm can afford to undertake.  The empirical implication is that the firms’ 
leverage ratio should exhibit mean reversion to the target leverage as they undertake 
leverage adjustment toward their target leverages. 
                                                             
4  Modigliani and Miller’s (1963) model with corporate taxes suggests that the value of a 
leveraged firm is equal to the value of an unleveraged firm plus the present value of the 
interest tax shield (the tax rate times the face value of the debt outstanding).  Firms can 
deduct their interest payments because interest payments on debt are tax deductible.  Hence, 
adding debt to a firm’s capital structure can increase its value by lowering the government’s 
tax claim on the firm’s cash flows.   
5  Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986) find that debt acts to discipline the 
management and force them to pay out their free cash flow. 
6  When cash flows in a high leveraged firm are low, it is very likely to fail to make interest and 
principal payments than a low leveraged firm.  Hence, high leverage could cause firms to 
default on their debts, which in turn, could force them into bankruptcy. 
7  Myers (1977) suggests that stockholders have an incentive to undertake riskier projects and 
pay larger dividends to expropriate wealth from the bondholders.   
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The following example illustrates a firm’s target adjustment behaviour.  
Consider two firms, both Firm X and Y, which are comparable in all other ways 
except for their leverage levels.  Furthermore, assume that Firm X has a higher 
leverage ratio than Firm Y.  Firm X therefore faces a higher level of financial distress 
cost and greater agency conflict issues than Firm Y.  When Firm X’s financial 
distress costs outweigh the interest tax shield benefits of its debt, Firm X should 
adjust its leverage to a lower level not only to reduce its financial distress costs, but 
also, and more importantly, to maximize its value.  Firm X is said to exhibit target 
adjustment behaviour if the gap between its actual and target leverages is gradually 
removed over time.   
 
There are two views of trade-off theory: the static trade-off model and the 
dynamic trade-off model.  Static trade-off theory suggests that firms choose their 
capital structures by a single period of trade-off between the benefits and the distress 
costs of debt financing (Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim 1984).8  Given the fact that firms 
often survive for more than a single period, dynamic trade-off theory recognizes the 
role of time and identifies a number of aspects that have been ignored in static trade-
off theory, such as the presence of adjustment costs and the expectation of future 
investment opportunities.  A detailed discussion of dynamic trade-off theory is 
presented in Section 2.4. 
 
The concept of target leverage has attracted increasing attention in capital 
structure literature.  Earlier studies focus primarily on the existence of leverage 
targets.  Research designs in previous studies vary from the discrete choice models of 
                                                             
8  Studies of static trade-off theory include Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), Brenna and 
Schwartz (1978), Castanias (1983), Ross (1985), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers (1977), 
Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984). 
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debt versus equity (see, e.g., Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman 2001) to partial 
adjustment models (see, e.g., Fama and French 2002).  The new emphases are on the 
importance of choosing an appropriate estimation method for a dynamic panel model 
of corporate leverage (Flannery and Hankins 2013), such as the modified adjustment 
models (Hovakimian and Li 2011), long differencing (LD) estimator (Huang and 
Ritter 2009), generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator (Antoniou, Guney, 
and Paudyal 2008).  
 
This chapter provides a literature review of the developments and empirical 
tests related to trade-off theory, which serves as a refined introduction to the 
empirical analyses presented in Chapters 5 and 6.  The following section provides an 
overview of studies that examine whether or not the issuance and repurchase 
decisions of firms are consistent with the idea that firms have leverage targets (see, 
e.g., Marsh 1982; Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman 2001).  Section 2.3 discusses a 
group of studies that use partial adjustment models to investigate the average speed 
at which firms adjust toward their target leverages (see, e.g., Fama and French 2002; 
Flannery and Rangan 2006).  
 
 
 
2.2 The choice of debt versus equity 
 
If maintaining leverage close to a target is important, a firm should select the 
form of financing that will offset the gap between actual and target leverages.  Firms 
should either repurchase equity or issue debt when they are below the target leverage 
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and issue equity or retire debt when they are above the target leverage.  This section 
discusses empirical studies that investigate whether the security issuance and 
repurchase decisions of firms are consistent with the idea that firms have leverage 
targets. 
 
Research examining the financing decisions between the choice of debt and 
equity can be traced to Baxter and Cragg (1970), Martin and Scott (1974), Taub 
(1975), Taggart (1977), and Marsh (1982) 9.  Baxter and Cragg (1970) examine the 
choice between types of securities when firms resort to long-term capital markets.  
They find that a firm’s financing choices are not entirely random and claim that an 
optimal financial structure, which would vary between firms, does exist.  Taggart 
(1977) finds that firms are concerned with their debt capacity.  If debt issues lead to 
an excessive level of debt, equity issues will be simulated as a countermeasure.  
MacKie-Mason (1990) focuses on the effects of tax on firms’ financing decisions.  
He provides evidence that firms with high marginal tax rates are more likely to issue 
debt.  When firms have nearly exhausted their investment tax credits they appear to 
reduce the probability of debt issuance.  On the other hand, firms with high tax loss 
carry-forwards are less likely to issue debt because they are less likely to be able to 
deduct interest.   
 
As noted by Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001), firms should make 
financing decisions that move them towards their target leverages.  Using a discrete 
                                                             
9  Marsh (1982) is one of the very first studies focusing on the financing choices.  Consistent 
with trade-off theory, he finds that, in a sample of UK data, firms which are below their long 
term debt targets are more likely to issue debt whereas firms with greater bankruptcy risk are 
more likely to issue equity.  His results show that, although they deviate from these targets in 
the short run in response to capital market conditions, firms tend to maintain long term target 
leverage. 
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choice model, Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) provide evidence that the gap 
between actual and target leverages is the dominant economic factor in determining 
whether a firm repurchases equity or retires debt.  Consistent with trade-off theory, 
underleveraged firms tend to repurchase equity and overleveraged firms tend to retire 
debt, which will in each case move their leverage ratios toward their targets.   
 
Korajczyk and Levy (2003) find that the deviations from target leverage 
explain a larger percentage of security issuance choices for financially constrained 
firms than for financially unconstrained firms.10  Their findings are consistent with 
trade-off theory.  Financially constrained firms may find it expensive to issue 
securities that would move them toward their target leverage because they have 
restricted access to capital markets.  Hence, financially constrained firms are less 
likely than financially unconstrained firms to deviate from their target leverage and 
their issue choice is more sensitive to deviations from target leverage.  Furthermore, 
Frank and Goyal (2004) find that the leverage deviations from target leverage affect 
debt adjustment and, more importantly, adjustments are undertaken (in order to 
move) toward the target leverage.11 
 
Leary and Roberts (2005) find that if a firm experiences a positive shock on 
its leverage, or its leverage has been accumulating or is relatively high, the firm is 
more likely to reduce its leverage ratio.  Using a sample of initial public offering 
(IPO) firms, Alti (2006) finds that firms go public when the market is hot.  In the two 
years following the IPO, firms issue debt to reverse the effects of market timing on 
                                                             
10  A firm is defined as financially constrained if it does not have sufficient cash to undertake 
investment opportunities and if it faces severe agency costs when accessing financial 
markets.  A firm is defined as financially unconstrained if it does not meet these criteria.   
11  Frank and Goyal (2004) employ a Vector Autoregression (VAR) framework in which debt 
and equity adjustments are analysed separately rather than in the form of a leverage ratio. 
Page 17 TRADE-OFF THEORY 
 
Page 17 
 
their leverage.  Using a sample of firms with investment grade ratings, de Jong, 
Verbeek, and Verwijmeren (2011) find that underleveraged firms repurchase equity 
to move toward their target leverages.12   
 
This section reviews the empirical studies which examine whether or not the 
issuance and repurchase decisions of firms are consistent with the idea that firms 
have leverage targets.  Another group of studies examine the average speed with 
which firms adjust toward their target leverage using the partial adjustment model 
(see, e.g., Fama and French 2002; Flannery and Rangan 2006).  This is discussed 
further in Section 2.3.   
 
 
 
2.3 Leverage adjustment to target leverage  
 
Rather than looking at the choice of debt versus equity as discussed in the 
previous section, a large strand of studies has been dedicated to investigating the 
validity of trade-off theory by focusing on how fast firms move toward their target 
leverages.  For instance, a firm’s leverage may temporarily deviate from its target 
leverage due to a shock to asset values or a short-term market timing opportunity.  If 
firms have leverage targets, there should be evidence that they return towards the 
target leverage following such shocks.  The speed with which firms adjust toward 
their target leverage is likely to be higher for those further away from their target 
leverages, known as Speed of leverage Adjustment (SOA).  Therefore, the SOA 
                                                             
12  de Jong, Verbeek, and Verwijmeren (2011) limit their sample to firms with investment grade 
ratings because it reduces the probability that the firms are constrained by their debt capacity. 
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demonstrates the existence of leverage targets and, importantly, quantifies the 
importance of maintaining target leverage.  Using partial adjustment models, the 
existing literature has provided mixed results on the SOA toward the target leverage.  
This thesis focuses discussion on recent empirical studies, paying attention to 
alternative estimation techniques of partial adjustment models that lead to differences 
in estimated SOAs.   
 
Using data on US firms, Spies (1974), Taggart (1977), Jalilvand and Harris 
(1984), and Auerbach (1985) are among the early studies that use the partial 
adjustment models, which takes variants of the following specification:  
 
 
Levi,t = α + βXi,t-1+ εi,t                                                                       [2.1] 
 
 
Where: 
α = The intercept;  
Levi,t = The leverage ratio for firm i in year t; 
Xi,t-1 = A vector of observable capital structure determinants for firm i in year t; 
β = The coefficients of Xi,t-1; 
εi,t = The residual term. 
 
 
Levi,t - Levi,t-1 = α + λ(Lev*i,t – Levi,t-1) + εi,t                                      [2.2] 
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Where: 
Levi,t-1 = The leverage ratio for firm i in year t-1; 
Lev*i,t = The target leverage proxy for firm i in year t; 
λ = The average speed of adjustment to the target leverage. 
 
The examination of target adjustment behaviour can be complicated because 
a firm’s target leverage is unobservable and a proxy for target leverage has to be 
used.  Equation [2.1] is designed to provide a target leverage proxy for firm i in year 
t.  According to trade-off theory, a firm’s target leverage is supposed to be the result 
of trading off the costs and benefits of debt.  Equation [2.1] estimates the target 
leverage as the predicted value of a vector of observable capital structure 
determinants, X in year t-1.  The underlying determinants of capital structure 
employed to provide an estimate of target leverage for each firm include asset 
tangibility, firm size, growth opportunities, profitability, industry effects, available 
tax shield and uniqueness. 13  The capital structure determinants employed in this 
thesis are discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.   
 
Equation [2.2] is the partial adjustment model which is designed to capture 
how well the temporary deviations from the target leverage predict changes in the 
leverage ratio.  Lev*i,t is the predicted target leverage obtained from Equation [2.1].  
The main coefficient of interest is λ, which captures the SOA toward the target 
leverage over a year.  In the absence of frictions, for instance information 
asymmetries, transaction costs and other adjustment costs, firms should fully adjust 
toward their target leverages and hence λ should equal one.  However, in the 
                                                             
13  These capital structure determinants have been considered by Titman and Wessels (1988), 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), Fama and French (2002), and others.   
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presence of adjustment costs (a discussion of costly leverage adjustments is 
presented in Section 2.4), firms may not fully adjust their leverage continuously from 
year t-1 to the target leverage in year t, therefore λ should not be equal to one.  
Furthermore, the larger the λ, the faster the SOA will be toward the target leverage.   
 
Taggart (1977) and Jalilvand and Harris (1984) find significant adjustment 
coefficients, which they interpret as support for target adjustment behaviour. 14  
Taggart (1977) finds long term debt adjustment speed is around 13 percent per year, 
which implies that on average firms move toward their target leverage by adjusting 
13 percent of the gap between actual and target leverages each year.  Jalilvand and 
Harris (1984) use the average of leverage over three years to estimate target leverage, 
and allow the SOA to vary between firms and over time depending on firm size and 
capital market conditions.  They find that a firm adjusts about 37.36 percent per year 
towards its target level of long term debt.  Auerbach (1985) shows that the firms in 
his sample adjust 30.4 percent per year towards the target level of long term debt.      
 
Note that previous studies are limited to small samples: 108 firms in Jalilvand 
and Harris (1984) and 143 firms in Auerbach (1985).  Fama and French (2002) 
examine firms’ target adjustment behaviour with a sample of more than 3000 firms.  
Their study implements the approach of Fama and MacBeth (1973) (FM (1973)) in 
that the partial adjustment model is estimated annually on cross-sectional data and 
the time-series standard errors of the average SOA are used to draw inferences.15  
Fama and French (2002) state that average SOA from FM’s (1973) captures the same 
                                                             
14  Taggart (1977) and Jalilvand and Harris (1984) utilize Generalized Least Squares (GLS) 
technique to estimate several equations at once when contemporaneous disturbances across 
the equations may be assumed to have non-zero correlation.   
15  In FM’s (1973) approach, the t-statistics are based on the time-series standard error of the 
average SOA. 
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information as the SOA from a panel regression.  Large annual cross-sections can 
reduce the variation in the year-by-year SOA and lower the standard errors of the 
average SOA.16  Fama and French (2002) find that statistically significant estimated 
SOAs are low, between 7 percent and 10 percent per year for dividend payers and 
between 15 percent and 18 percent per year for non-dividend payers, indicating that 
firms adjust at a snail’s pace toward their target leverages.  Such slow adjustment 
speeds suggest that convergence toward target leverage is not a high priority.  Hence 
maintaining a close to target leverage does not fully explain the variation in firms’ 
leverage.   
 
Similarly, Kayhan and Titman (2007) also find that firms have leverage 
targets but slow rates of adjustment.  Their estimated SOAs imply that firms manage 
to close between 35 percent (based on market leverage) and 41 percent (based on 
book leverage) of the gap between the actual and target leverages over a five year 
period.  Although cash flows, investment needs and stock prices realizations lead to 
significant deviations from target leverage, underleveraged (overleveraged) firms 
tend to increase (reduce) their leverage over the subsequent 10 years.  Titman and 
Tsyplakov (2007) find an estimated SOA of 7.1 percent per year, which is within the 
range of the empirically estimated SOAs reported in Fama and French (2002) and 
Kayhan and Titman (2007). 
 
A number of studies (see, e.g., Flannery and Rangan 2006) employ a one-step 
approach to estimating SOA by substituting Equation [2.1] for Equation [2.2] and 
obtaining the following reduced-form partial adjustment model:  
                                                             
16  The standard errors of the average SOA are also robust with respect to heteroscedasticity.   
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Levi,t = α + λβXi,t-1  + (1- λ) Levi,t-1 + εi,t                                                                 [2.3] 
 
 
Flannery and Rangan (2006) employ alternate estimation methods for the 
partial adjustment model in Equation [2.3] and show that their estimated SOAs are 
robust across various estimation methods.  Their primary leverage measure is a 
firm’s market leverage.  Using the FM (1973) approach, firms appear to adjust 
toward their target leverages by adjusting 13.3 percent of the gap between actual and 
target leverages within a single year.  At this rate, a firm takes approximately five 
years to close half the gap between its current and target leverages.17  Given that the 
FM (1973) approach potentially ignores the panel characteristics, Flannery and 
Rangan (2006) estimate panel regressions with unobserved fixed effects. 18   The 
estimated SOA increases to 38 percent per year when fixed effects are included.  
This estimated SOA implies that a firm can offset on average more than half its 
leverage gap in less than two years. 19   They also find estimated SOAs of 36.1 
percent 20 , 38 percent 21 , 34.4 percent 22 , and 36.4 percent 23  using alternative 
                                                             
17  The calculation of half-life is ln(0.5)/ln(1-λ), the time required to reduce the leverage 
deviation between actual and target leverages to be halved.  The estimated SOA in Flannery 
and Rangan (2006) is 13.3 percent per year.  Hence, the calculation is ln(0.5)/ln(1-0.133).  
Firms close half of the leverage gap in approximately five years.      
18  Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) suggest that firm fixed effects can control for 
unobserved, time-invariant differences across firms.  Therefore, if firms have relatively stable 
and unobserved variables affecting their target leverages, panel regressions with unobserved 
fixed effects are more appropriate than FM’s (1973) approach.  
19  The calculation of half-life is ln(0.5)/ln(1-0.38), given the estimated SOA is 38 percent.  
Hence, firms close half of the leverage gap in approximately one and a half year.      
20  Flannery and Rangan (2006) apply FM’s (1973) approach to demeaned data.  In demeaned 
data, each variable in the partial adjustment regression is transformed into a deviation from 
that firm’s mean value. 
21  Flannery and Rangan (2006) estimate a revised panel model, which includes a separate 
dummy variable for each year in their sample. 
22  Given the correlation between a panel’s lagged dependent variable and the regression’s error 
term can bias the estimated SOA, Flannery and Rangan (2006) estimate an instrumental 
variables model by substituting a fitted value for the lagged dependent variable, using the 
lagged book leverage and lagged capital structure determinants as instruments. 
23  To address the issue that leverage is bounded between zero and one, Flannery and Rangan 
(2006) estimate the IV model for firms with the middle 50% of leverage ratio. 
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estimation methods.  Given that their estimated SOAs are far faster than those 
estimated by Fama and French (2002), they conclude that the adjustment toward 
target leverage do dominates most of the variations in firms’ leverages.   
 
Similarly, Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) show that firms manage to 
adjust toward their target leverages by adjusting between 13 percent and 17 percent 
(based on pooled OLS estimation) or between 36 percent and 39 percent (when firm 
fixed effects are incorporated in the estimation) of the gap between actual and target 
leverages per year.  These closely match the estimates presented in Fama and French 
(2002), Kayhan and Titman (2007) and Flannery and Rangan (2006). 
 
Furthermore, Huang and Ritter (2009) show that the dynamic panel model 
with firm fixed effects may produce biased SOAs in which many firms have only a 
few years of data (i.e., a short time dimension).  Econometric techniques have been 
derived to reduce the short panel bias.  Huang and Ritter (2009) employ a long 
differencing (LD) estimator, Flannery and Rangan (2006) and Dang, Kim, and Shin 
(2012) utilize an instrumental variable (IV) model estimator, while Ozkan (2001), 
Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal (2008) and Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) use 
a system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator.   
 
Anderson and Hsiao (1982) suggest that the IV estimation technique produces 
a consistent estimate if the error term is not serially correlated in the regressions.  
The IV estimation uses a second lagged variable (i.e., Levi,t-2) as an instrument for the 
first difference of the lagged dependent variable (i.e., ΔLevi,t-1) where it is correlated 
with the change in independent variable (Levi,t-1 - Levi,t-2) but not with the change in 
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error terms (εi,t - εi,t-1) (Ozkan 2001).  Flannery and Rangan (2006) employ a IV 
estimator with the lagged market leverage ratio as an instrument for the lagged book 
leverage ratio.  However, Ozkan (2001) compares the Arellano and Bond’s (1991) 
GMM and IV estimates and finds that the estimate under IV is less efficient than the 
GMM estimates.  They find that IV has a larger variance than that associated with 
the GMM, revealing that a loss in efficiency compared to the GMM estimates.   
 
To avoid the short time dimension bias, several authors have turned to the 
GMM estimator.  Arellano and Bond (1991) propose a GMM first-differenced 
estimation technique.  They first-difference the panel data to remove the time-
invariant fixed effect and deploy lagged dependent variable levels as instruments for 
the first difference of the lag.  They show that the lagged dependent variable’s values 
(in levels) constitute instruments for the first-differenced variable, provided that the 
residuals are free from second-order serial correlation (Flannery and Hankins 2013).  
For instance, Ozkan (2001) estimates in first differences where Levi,t-2 and further 
lags are used as instruments.  They carry out the Arellano and Bond’s (1991) 
difference GMM estimation and finds SOAs of above 50 percent per year.   
 
However, Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest that if the lagged dependent 
variables are serially correlated they contain little information about the first-
differenced variable.  Furthermore, they propose system GMM estimation and prove 
that when lagged first-differenced and lagged levels instruments are included in the 
regression it can substantially reduce the finite sample bias by exploiting the 
additional moment conditions in this approach.  Hence the lagged first-differences 
are informative instruments for the endogenous variables in levels equation.  This is 
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the procedure used by Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) and Antoniou, Guney, 
and Paudyal (2008).  Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) employ Blundell and 
Bond’s (1998) system GMM estimator and find that firms appear to adjust between 
22 percent and 25 percent per year.  Similarly, Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal (2008) 
investigate how firms operating in capital market-oriented and bank-oriented 
economies determine their capital structures using the system GMM estimator.  
Although the estimated SOAs vary across different countries, Antoniou, Guney, and 
Paudyal (2008) confirm the existence of target leverage.24   
 
Hahn, Hausman, and Kuersteiner (2007) propose a LD estimator for highly 
persistent series of data.  In the LD estimator, the model takes a multi-year difference 
rather than a one year difference.  Hahn, Hausman, and Kuersteiner (2007) show that 
the LD estimator is less biased than the system GMM estimator when the dependent 
variable is highly persistent.25  Huang and Ritter (2009) implement the LD technique 
and find that firms appear to slowly re-balance the effects of shocks on their 
leverages.  The estimated SOAs are 17 percent per year for book leverage and 23.2 
percent per year for market leverage, respectively.  These estimates suggest that it 
takes between three and four years for a firm to remove half the effect of a shock on 
its book and market leverage.26  Huang and Ritter (2009) also show the LD estimator 
of Hahn, Hausman, and Kuersteiner (2007) is less biased than the OLS estimator. 
 
                                                             
24  French firms appear to adjust 39.35 percent per year while Japanese firms only manage to 
adjust 11 percent per year to achieve their target leverage.   
25  Hahn, Hausman, and Kuersteiner (2007) show that combined multi-period differencing with 
longer lagged instrument choices can produce less biased estimated than the first-differenced 
GMM and system GMM estimators. 
26  The calculation of half-life for estimated SOA of 17 percent is ln(0.5)/ln(1-0.17) = 3.72 
years.  The calculation of half-life for estimated SOA of 23.2 percent is ln(0.5)/ln(1-0.232) = 
2.63 years.   
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Elsas and Florysiak (2011) propose an estimator designed to be unbiased in 
the context of unbalanced dynamic panel data with a fractional dependent variable 
(DPF estimator) to account for the mean mechanical effect.  A discussion of mean 
mechanical reversion is presented in Section 2.5.27  They find an estimated SOA of 
26 percent per year, which is in neighbourhood of the estimated SOA (based on 
system GMM estimation) in Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008). 
 
Note that the estimated SOAs in this section vary between 7 percent and 
39.35 percent, implying that the estimated SOAs vary in response to the alternative 
estimation techniques of the partial adjustment model.  This clearly indicates the 
potential importance of choosing an appropriate estimation method for the partial 
adjustment model.  Chang and Dasgupta (2009) suggest that one of the reasons for 
this disparity in estimated SOAs is the fact that the leverage ratios are bounded 
between zero and one.  More importantly, they show that the findings in Kayhan and 
Titman (2007) and Flannery and Rangan (2006) could be affected by mechanical 
mean reversion.  I discuss this further in Section 2.5. 
 
 
 
2.4 Dynamic trade-off theory 
 
As discussed in the preceding section, even if firms do have leverage targets 
they move towards them slowly.  Consequently they are likely to deviate from their 
target leverages most of the time.  Academics argue that static trade-off theory lacks 
                                                             
27  The DPF estimator is a doubly-censored tobit estimator, which relies on a latent variable 
approach to account for the fractional nature of leverage ratio (leverage ratio is bounded 
between zero and one). 
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a comprehensive consideration of capital structure dynamics (that is, traditional 
market frictions such as transaction costs).  The dynamic trade-off model considers 
that the role of time requires specification of aspects that have been ignored in static 
trade-off theory, such as the presence of adjustment costs and endogenous 
investment.28  As documented in Section 2.3, the notion of the estimated SOA is 
closely associated with the partial adjustment model which implicitly assumes that 
the leverage ratios are driven by target adjustment behaviour where in each period a 
firm undertakes financing decisions to offset deviation from its target leverage.  
However, this may not always be the case.  Firstly, in the presence of costly 
adjustment a firm’s financing behaviour is driven by the comparison between the 
benefits and costs of adjusting toward its target leverage, as in Fischer, Heinkel, and 
Zechner (1989).  Secondly, a firm’s financing decisions also depend on both current 
and anticipated financing margins (Hennessy and Whited 2005).  In Section 2.4.1 
and Section 2.4.2, I discuss the evidence of capital structure adjustment which, 
coupled with the presence of adjustment costs and anticipated financing margins, 
may prevent firms from constantly maintaining leverage ratios close to their target 
leverages. 
 
 
 
2.4.1 Implications of adjustment costs 
 
A number of studies have found evidence that transaction costs are 
potentially important in financing policy.  Fama and French (2005) suggest that there 
                                                             
28  In static trade-off theory, a firm’s capital structure is determined by a single period trading 
off between the tax benefits and the distress costs of debt financing.   
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are various ways to issue equity, and these are associated with different levels of 
transaction costs.  In general, the transaction costs faced by firms issuing securities 
are different from the transaction costs associated with repurchasing those same 
securities.  Thus, it is likely that firms face different transaction costs at different 
points in time.  
 
Assuming that adjustment costs do not exist in the markets, firms can 
continuously adjust their leverage ratios toward the target leverage, hence leverage 
deviations should reverse rapidly when leverage ratios are above or below the firm’s 
target leverage.  However, firms may not react accordingly in the presence of such 
costs.  A growing body of literature cites transaction costs as the reason why firms do 
not instantly adjust toward their target leverages (Goldstein, Nengjiu, and Leland 
2001; Strebulaev 2007).  Firms have to face the transaction costs of adjusting toward 
their target leverages and therefore they adjust relatively slowly.  As a result, 
approaching target leverage can involve long waiting times (as documented in 
Section 2.3), an idea proposed by Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989) and, more 
recently, consistent with the findings of Leary and Roberts (2005). 
 
As Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989) and Leland (1994) demonstrate, 
shocks to asset value and recapitalization are costly and may prevent firms from 
adjusting continuously towards their target leverages.  The effect of adjustment costs 
is seen most clearly during the period of financing inactivity.  Firms wait until the 
adjustment benefits outweigh the costs before recapitalizing, which resulting in 
short-term deviations from their target leverages.  They undertake adjustments only 
when the benefits of doing so exceed the costs of reducing the deviation from target 
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leverage, and they remain inactive when they are within the optimal range.  These 
studies suggest that firms choose to have optimal ranges of leverage rather than 
optimal levels of leverage. 
 
Goldstein, Nengjiu, and Leland (2001) observe that when firms have the 
option to increase their leverage in the future, they will opt for lower leverage 
initially and wait until the firm’s value rises to a level where it is optimal to exercise 
that option.  Similarly, Ju et al. (2005) demonstrate that moderate deviations away 
from target leverage have only a very small impact on a firm’s value.  Therefore, in 
the presence of transaction costs it may be optimal for firms to let their leverages 
deviate from target leverage by substantial amounts.  Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) 
and Leary and Roberts (2005) find that issuance costs consist of both fixed and 
convex variable costs.  Leary and Roberts (2005) further find that, in the presence of 
adjustment costs, firms appear to make leverage adjustments infrequently and when 
they do adjust their leverages move toward an optimal range rather than a specific 
target leverage.    
 
Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006) and Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev 
(2010) present costly adjustment models that can account for the dynamic 
relationships between leverage and macroeconomic characteristics.  After accounting 
for adjustment costs they find that macroeconomic conditions affect both the pace 
and the size of leverage adjustment rates: firms adjust their leverage ratios more 
often and by smaller amounts in boom times than in recessions.  Byoun (2008) finds 
that firms making the most adjustment toward their target leverages are 
overleveraged firms with financial surpluses, implying that the adjustment cost of 
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reducing debt from above-target leverage is lower than the cost of issuing debt with 
below-target leverage.  Using a sample of M&A transactions, Harford, Klasa, and 
Walcott (2009) find that, after accounting for adjustment costs, acquirers reverse 
more than 75 percent of the acquisition effect within five years after large 
acquisitions.  Faulkender et al. (2012) find that leverage adjustments are more likely 
to be undertaken when adjustment costs are shared with transactions related to the 
firm’s operating cash flows.  On the other hand, the SOA appears to be slower when 
the adjustment cost is offset only by the benefits of approaching target leverage.   
 
This section provides an overview of previous research evidence that 
adjustment costs may prevent firms from undertaking instant financing decisions that 
move them toward their target leverages.  Furthermore, Mauer and Triantis (1994) 
and Hennessy and Whited (2005) find that a firm’s financing decisions depend not 
only on its initial investment decisions, but also on its current and anticipated 
financing margins.  I discuss this further in Section 2.4.2. 
 
 
 
2.4.2 Endogenous investment models 
 
M&M irrelevance theorem asserts that under perfect market assumptions a 
firm’s corporate financing and investment decisions are separable.  Since then, one 
of the central questions has been whether there is a relationship between financing 
and investment decisions when market assumptions are violated.  Mauer and Triantis 
(1994) study the interaction between investment and financing decisions within a 
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framework where the firm has the flexibility to dynamically manage both decisions 
dynamically over time.  They find that financial policy has a minimal effect on the 
firm’s initial investment decisions and its subsequent operating decisions.  Hennessy 
and Whited (2005) find that a firm’s financing decision also depends on its current 
and anticipated financing margins.  Although they do not find support for the 
existence of target leverage, they find a negative correlation between leverage and 
lagged profitability that is inconsistent with static trade-off theory. 29  Furthermore, 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2010) find that firms may temporarily deviate 
from their target leverages by issuing debt to fund investment opportunities 
where equity issuance and cash holdings are costly. 
 
Strebulaev (2007) shows that the cross-sectional relationships between 
leverage ratios and firm characteristics can be different when firms are changing 
their leverage (that is, using observation at refinancing points).  Consistent with 
Hennessy and Whited (2005), Strebulaev (2007) and Alti (2006) find negative 
relationships between profitability and leverage.  A more profitable firm tends to 
have performed well in the past, which will lower its observed leverage ratio by 
increasing its future profitability and therefore its value. 30   Tsyplakov (2008) 
incorporates the time-to-build feature in a dynamic model of capital structure and 
finds that when productive capacity takes time to build up, firms tend to stockpile 
their retained earnings (build up internal equity) until it is the right time to buy 
physical capacity.  While firms are in the process of retaining their earnings, this 
                                                             
29  According to static trade-off theory, more profitable firms can decrease their expected costs 
of distress and find valuable interest tax shields.   More profitable firms therefore take on 
more debt, resulting in a positive relationship between profitability and leverage. 
30  When a firm experiences an increase in profitability, the financing frictions may prevent it 
from adjusting its leverage.  Concurrently, these frictions also increase that the value of the 
firm’s unexercised options.  Therefore, its leverage ratio is a decreasing function of 
profitability.  
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shows as an increase in profit-reducing leverage.  When firms purchase the physical 
capacity this shows as a decrease in profit-increasing leverage.   
 
Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 provide an overview of prior research evidence that a 
firm’s financing decision depends not only on the adjustment costs, but also on the 
financing benefits and costs that the firm anticipates in the next period.  These factors 
also play a role in determining the speed with which firms adjust their target 
leverage.  However, the SOA toward these targets has recently become a topic of 
debate.  The estimated SOAs could be biased in favour of the target adjustment 
behaviour due to mean mechanical reversion.  I discuss this further in the following 
section. 
 
 
 
2.5 Mechanical mean reversion 
 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Chang and Dasgupta (2009) argue that 
the fact that firms’ leverage ratios are limited between zero and one can lead to 
mechanical mean reversion, hence the estimated SOA is biased.  For instance, a firm 
with a leverage ratio of 0.85 needs to issue securities to fund its financial deficit, the 
choice of equity and debt are equally weighted.  Such a firm should issue equity 
rather than debt to reduce its leverage ratio to a lower level, and after the equity 
issuance the leverage ratio should be lower than 0.85.  Given the leverage ratio is a 
fraction between zero and one, a firm with high (low) leverage may appear to be 
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mean-reverting in the absence of target adjustment behaviour.  Therefore, the SOA at 
which reversion to a target remains contentious in the literature.   
 
Chang and Dasgupta (2009) question whether evidence of mean reversion in 
leverage is conclusive evidence of target adjustment behaviour.  Using simulated 
data in which firms randomly choose between debt and equity to fund their financial 
deficits, they find that the estimated SOAs from the partial adjustment model are 
indistinguishable from estimates derived using randomly-generated inputs.  In other 
words, simulated data produces a SOA which is similar to the SOA reported in the 
literature, therefore, the evidence of active target adjustment could be due to the fact 
that leverage ratio is bounded between zero and one. 
 
Previous studies find support for the argument that leverage ratios may 
exhibit mean reverting behaviour for various reasons.  Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999) find that the partial adjustment model appears to produce significant positive 
SOA when underlying behaviour is purely based on the pecking order’s financing 
hierarchy (a detailed discussion of pecking order theory is presented in Chapter 3).31  
Kayhan and Titman (2007) suggest that the relationship between changes in leverage 
and leverage deficit could be spurious.  They explain that a firm with zero leverage 
cannot reduce its leverage anymore; such a firm can only increase its leverage.  Since 
the leverage ratio must be bounded between zero and one, this could result a 
mechanical relationship between the leverage deficit and future changes in leverage.  
Chen and Zhao (2007) further support the mean reversion view by showing that the 
                                                             
31  When the fluctuations in the capital expenditures are positively correlated, free cash flows 
vary over the business cycle, dividends are assumed to be ‘sticky’ in the short term, and the 
financing costs are higher for equity than for debt, leaving variation in earnings and 
investment to be absorbed largely by debt.   
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leverage ratio of a firm tends to revert mechanically to mean, even though the firm’s 
financing preference might not be consistent with the target adjustment behaviour.  
Hovakimian and Li (2011) insert a random target leverage proxy into the partial 
adjustment model but find a statistically significant SOA toward the target leverage.  
Given that the random target leverage proxy does not relate to the true target 
leverage proxy, this suggests that the estimated SOA is mainly driven by mean 
reversion rather than reversion toward a target.  Hovakimian and Li (2011) propose a 
methodology to control the possibility of mechanical mean reversion.  I discuss this 
further in the following section.        
 
 
 
2.6 Modified partial adjustment model 
 
 Hovakimian and Li (2011) employ simulation experiments and find that bias 
in favour of the target adjustment behaviour can be minimized by using target 
leverage estimated from historical fixed firm effects regressions, and including target 
leverage and lagged leverage ratio in the second stage regressions separately.  
Furthermore, they exclude very high leverage ratios of 0.8 to avoid biases arising 
from the mechanical mean reversion of leverage ratios in extreme cases. 
 
Following Hovakimian and Li (2011), the first stage is a historical fixed firm 
effects regression to estimate a proxy for the target leverage based on a list of 
underlying capital structure determinants, which takes the following form: 
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Levi,t = α + βXi,t-1+ νi + εi,t                                                                     [2.4] 
 
 
For each firm, the target leverage is estimated by running annual regressions 
of leverage in year t on capital structure determinants in year t-1 that are related to 
the trade-off between the costs and benefits of debt and equity.  νi refers to firm fixed 
effects.  In Hovakimian and Li (2011), the capital structure determinants are firm 
size, asset tangibility, market-to-book ratio, research and development expenses, 
industry median leverage ratio, profitability, and depreciation. 32   The capital 
structure determinants employed in this thesis are discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.  
Target leverage (Lev*i,t) is given by 
 
 
Lev*i,t = ?̂?Xi,t-1                                                                                       [2.5] 
 
 
Equation [2.5] states that Lev*i,t is the predicted target leverage obtained from 
Equation [2.4].  The second stage is to include the target leverage proxy, Lev*it, and 
the lagged leverage ratio, Levi,t-1 as separate regressors in Equation [2.2] and hence 
obtain the modified partial adjustment model in Equation [2.6].  
 
 
Levi,t – Levi,t-1 = α + λ1Lev*i,t + λ2Levi,t-1 + εi,t+1                                   [2.6] 
 
                                                             
32  These variables are discussed on page 35 in Hovakimian and Li (2011). 
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Equation [2.6] corrects for the mechanical mean reversion found by Chen and 
Zhao (2007) and Chang and Dasgupta (2009) by including a specific proxy for the 
target leverage.  Equation [2.6] provides two potential estimates of SOA: λ1 and (1 - 
λ2).  As noted by Chang and Dasgupta (2009) and Hovakimian and Li (2011), the 
statistical significance of (1 - λ2) may be due to the presence of mechanical mean 
reversion.33  A positive λ1 represents a leverage adjustment speed that is moving 
toward the direction of the target leverage, whereas a negative λ1 indicates a leverage 
adjustment in the opposite direction of the target leverage.  Considering the levels of 
adjustment speed, a high estimate of λ1 implies that firms, on average, undertake a 
relatively more rapid adjustment. 
 
This section discusses the modified partial adjustment model in Hovakimian 
and Li (2011) which controls for the possibility of mechanical mean reversion.  
Hovakimian and Li (2011) find an estimate SOA of 8.8 percent and assume that all 
firms adjust at the same rate toward target leverage.  However, a growing body of 
evidence indicates that firms adjust at heterogeneous speed toward these targets; I 
discuss this further in the following section.        
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
33  Hovakimian and Li (2011) and Chang and Dasgupta (2007) demonstrate that the coefficient 
on the lagged leverage ratio in Equation [2.2] is likely to represent mechanical mean 
reversion.  Hovakimian and Li (2011) show that the mechanical mean reversion makes the 
coefficient on the lagged leverage ratio a strong predictor and remains statistically significant 
even with a random target leverage proxy.  
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2.7 Heterogeneous speeds of leverage adjustment 
 
As discussed in Section 2.3, many empirical studies (see, e.g., Fama and 
French 2002; Flannery and Rangan 2006) have found supportive evidence of target 
adjustment behaviour by showing the estimated SOA is significantly different from 
zero.  These studies do not explore cross-sectional differences and assume that all 
firms adjust at the same rate.  The dynamic trade-off theory, however, implies that 
firms facing differential firm-specific adjustment costs may follow different paths 
toward their target leverages.  It is therefore likely that estimated SOAs are 
heterogeneous across firms.  A number of studies (see, e.g., Dang, Kim, and Shin 
2012; Faulkender et al. 2012) raise the important issue of speed of adjustments.  
They address cross-sectional heterogeneity in adjustment speeds and claim that such 
heterogeneity is driven by an economical concept: adjustment costs.   
 
Empirical studies have suggested that the differential adjustment costs with 
regard to a broad set of firm characteristics and positions relative to their target 
leverages are important factors linking the heterogeneous adjustment process toward 
the target leverage.  For instance, the speeds with which firms adjust toward target 
leverage are associated with their cash flows, financial constraints and market timing 
considerations (Faulkender et al. 2012), firm-specific characteristics (Drobetz and 
Wanzenried 2006) and gap between actual and target leverages (Byoun 2008). 
 
A number of studies provide evidence that the tendency to adjust toward the 
target leverage for overleveraged firms is higher than for underleveraged firms.  
Drobetz and Wanzenried (2006) are consistent with Byoun (2008) in finding that 
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estimated SOAs are higher both for overleveraged firms with financial surpluses and 
underleveraged firms with financial deficits.  Elsas and Florysiak (2011) analyse 
cross-sectional heterogeneity in SOAs.  They find evidence for heterogeneity in 
adjustment speeds, where the estimated SOA is highest for firms with high default 
risk or expected bankruptcy costs, and where the opportunity costs of deviating from 
the target leverage are high.  This is consistent with the predictions of trade-off 
theory.  However, their findings show that those highly overleveraged and highly 
underleveraged firms appear to adjust fastest and at a similar pace.  Warr et al. 
(2012) provide a different perspective by finding that underleveraged and 
overleveraged firms adjust their leverage at statistically significant different rates.  
They suggest that equity mispricing plays an important role by varying the cost of 
undertaking leverage adjustments; firms with overpriced equity adjust more rapidly 
toward their target leverage than firms with underpriced equity because they find it 
cheaper to issue equity when their equity is overvalued.  Warr et al. (2012) also find 
that when firms have a cash surplus and their equity is undervalued, the cost to 
repurchase equity is lower, firms in this situation appear to move quickly toward 
their target leverage by repurchasing equity. 
 
Focusing on the characteristics of firms, Fama and French (2002) find that 
dividend payers tend to adjust more slowly than those not paying dividends.  Titman 
and Tsyplakov (2007) find that the estimated SOA for value-maximizing firms is 
higher than for equity-maximizing firms.  The value-maximizing firms always 
appear to move toward their target leverages when the net increase in their values 
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after adjustment is greater than their transaction costs.34  Faulkender et al. (2012) 
find that in the group of overleveraged firms, firms that pay dividends or have credit 
ratings tend to adjust faster than those which do not pay dividends.  Faulkender et al. 
(2012) and Flannery and Rangan (2006) both provide evidence that larger firms 
adjust excess leverage more slowly, and this is consistent either with the cost of 
excess leverage being smaller for larger firms or with the external pressures for 
larger firms being less intense than for smaller firms.  Drobetz and Wanzenried 
(2006) also find that firms with higher growth opportunities appear to adjust more 
quickly.   
 
Dang, Kim, and Shin (2012) suggest that firms with large financing deficits, 
large investment or low earnings volatility tend to adjust more quickly than those 
with the opposite characteristics.35  They also note that the tendency to adjust toward 
the target leverage is stronger in financially distressed firms.  Such firms have 
incentives to lower their leverage and, more importantly, to avert bankruptcy in order 
to reduce the costs of financial distress and deviating from the target leverage.  
McMillan and Camara (2012) investigate differences in the SOAs between 
multinational and domestic firms based in the US.  Their results indicate that 
domestic firms adjust more quickly on average than their multinational counterparts, 
especially when they are overleveraged.   
 
Dudley (2012) finds that large investment projects provide firms with 
opportunities to adjust at a low marginal cost, hence they appear to move toward 
                                                             
34  Equity-maximizing firms are firms that invest to offset depreciation only when their leverage 
ratios are very low, and otherwise invest nothing.  They appear to be slow to reduce the size 
of their debt when their distress trigger are high 
35  Dang, Kim, and Shin (2012) use a sample of UK firms. 
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their target leverages during periods of large project investment.  Faulkender et al. 
(2012) conjecture that the cost of adjusting leverage depends not only on transaction 
costs, but also on the firm’s incentive to access capital markets.36  Consistent with 
this, they find that the cost of accessing capital markets influences leverage 
adjustment.  Firms with high absolute cash flows and high absolute leverage 
deviations appear to make larger leverage adjustments than firms which have similar 
leverage deviations but bear-zero cash flow realizations.   
 
After this discussion of the characteristics of firms, I turn to the 
macroeconomic factors affecting heterogeneous adjustment speeds.  Drobetz and 
Wanzenried (2006) note that the estimated SOAs appear to be higher during 
economic booms than during recessions.  Using international data, Antoniou, Guney, 
and Paudyal (2008) find that firms do have leverage targets but the speed at which 
they adjust their leverage toward the target leverage varies between countries. 37  
Öztekin and Flannery (2012) suggest that the capital structure decisions of a firm 
relate to the environment and traditions in which it operates, hence firms in different 
countries have different adjustment speeds.   
 
 
 
 
                                                             
36  When firms face profitable investment opportunities, they may choose to raise capital 
through debt and equity issue.  When firms routinely generate cash, they may choose to 
repurchase equity, retire debt, or pay dividends to shareholder.  Therefore, any sort of capital 
market access can be used to adjust their leverage toward the target leverage, if firms wish to 
do so.   
37  Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal (2008) find that French firms appear to adjust quicker than 
Japanese firms.   
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2.8 Conclusion 
 
This chapter presents a review of the literature related to the trade-off theory 
of capital structure.  In Section 2.1, it introduces trade-off theory.  According to 
trade-off theory, firms have leverage targets and each firm chooses its target leverage 
by balancing the various benefits and costs of an additional dollar of debt (see, e.g., 
Modigliani and Miller 1963; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Myers 1977).  The greater 
the financial distress costs or the greater the agency problems the firm has to deal 
with, it can afford less debt.  The empirical implication is that leverage ratio should 
exhibit mean reversion to the target leverage as firm undertake leverage adjustment 
toward their target leverages.   
 
In testing trade-off theory, previous studies use discrete choice models of debt 
versus equity to examine whether or not firms have leverage targets.  Section 2.2 
reviews these empirical studies.  Using discrete choice models, a large body of 
empirical studies find supportive evidence of trade-off theory (Hovakimian, Opler, 
and Titman 2001; Leary and Roberts 2005; Alti 2006). 
 
Rather than looking at the choice of debt versus equity, another group of 
studies has been dedicated to investigating the validity of trade-off theory using 
partial adjustment models to focus on the average speed with which firms adjust 
toward their target leverages (see, e.g., Fama and French 2002; Flannery and Rangan 
2006; Kayhan and Titman 2007).  The further away the firms are from their target 
leverages, the higher the SOA is likely to be.  Therefore, the SOA exhibits the 
existence of leverage targets and quantifies the importance of maintaining target 
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leverage.  This discussion focuses on recent empirical studies using the partial 
adjustment model in Section 2.3, while paying attention to alternative estimation 
techniques that lead to differences in estimated SOA.  The review of empirical 
studies shows that the estimated SOAs vary in response to alternative estimation 
techniques, and this clearly indicates the potential importance of choosing an 
appropriate estimation method for the partial adjustment model.   
 
This chapter also discusses dynamic trade-off theory.  Academics argue that 
static trade-off theory lacks a comprehensive consideration of capital structure 
dynamics such as transaction costs.  In dynamic trade-off theory, a firm’s financing 
decision depends on the financing costs and benefits anticipated in the next period.  
The dynamic trade-off model considers that the role of time requires specific aspects 
that have been ignored in static trade-off theory, such as adjustment costs and 
endogenous investment.  Firstly, Section 2.4.1 discusses the prior research evidence 
that adjustment costs may prevent firms from instantly undertaking financing 
decisions that move toward their target leverages.  Secondly, Section 2.4.2 discusses 
the empirical studies examining linkages between corporate financing and 
investment decisions, which may prevent firms from constantly maintaining leverage 
ratios close to their target leverages. 
 
Chang and Dasgupta (2009) suggest that one of the reasons for variation in 
SOA estimates is that the leverage ratios are bounded between zero and one.  Given 
that leverage ratio is a fraction between zero and one, a firm with high (low) leverage 
may appear to be mean-reverted in the absence of target adjustment behaviour.  
Therefore, the SOA at which a firm reverts to target leverage remains controversial 
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in the literature.  Section 2.5 of this chapter covers the mechanical mean reversion.  
Section 2.6 discusses the modified partial adjustment model, in Hovakimian and Li 
(2011), which controls for the possibility of mechanical mean reversion.   
    
Many empirical studies (see, e.g., Fama and French 2002; Flannery and 
Rangan 2006) have found supportive evidence of target adjustment behaviour by 
showing that the estimated SOA is significantly different from zero.  However, they 
assume firms adjust at the same rate.  It is likely that estimated SOAs are 
heterogeneous across firms because firms facing differential firm-specific adjustment 
costs may follow different paths toward their target leverages.  Section 2.7 discusses 
a number of studies (see, e.g., Dang, Kim, and Shin 2012; Faulkender et al. 2012) 
that address cross-sectional heterogeneity in adjustment speeds and raises the 
important issue of how rapidly the leverage adjustment takes place.  Table 2.1 shows 
a chronological summary of the estimated SOAs discussed in this chapter.    
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Table 2.1: Estimated SOA in empirical studies of capital structure 
Data Article Estimator 
Estimated SOA (per year) 
Book leverage Market leverage 
US Taggart (1977)38 GLS 13% a  
US Jalilvand and Harris (1984)36 GLS 37.36% a  
US Auerbach (1985) OLS 27.4% b; 30.4% a  
UK Ozkan (2001) Difference GMM39 51.5% c; 56.9% b  
US Fama and French (2002) FM 10% b,d ;18% b,e 7% f,d; 15% f,e 
US Flannery and Rangan (2006) 
FM  13.3% f 
Fixed effects  38% f 
IV40  34.4%; 36.4% g 
US Kayhan and Titman (2007)41 OLS 41% in 5 years b 35% in 5 years f 
US Titman and Tsyplakov (2007) OLS  7.1% h 
                                                             
38  Taggart (1977) and Jalilvand and Harris (1984) utilize GLS procedure, where contemporaneous disturbances across the equations may be assumed to have non-zero 
correlation.   
39  Ozkan (2001) carries out the Arellano and Bond’s (1991) difference GMM estimation. 
40  Flannery and Rangan (2006) employ Anderson and Hsiao’s (1981) instrumental-variable estimator. 
41  Kayhan and Titman (2007) estimate the SOA with standard OLS regressions and use bootstrapping technique to determine the statistical significance of the estimated 
SOA. 
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Data Article Estimator 
Estimated SOA (per year) 
Book leverage Market leverage 
US Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008)42 
OLS 13% a; 17% a  
Fixed effects 36% a; 39% a  
System GMM 22% a; 25% a  
International Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal (2008) System GMM  11.07% f; 39.35% f 
US Byoun (2008) 
OLS 22.17% a; 22.58% b 21.47% i; 21.57% f 
Mixed effects 23.96% a; 39.47% b 21.75% i; 32.27% f 
US Huang and Ritter (2009) LD 17% b 23.2% f 
US Harford, Klasa, and Walcott (2009)43 
Evolution of leverage 
deviations 
 between 15.3% and 24.5% f 
Australia Koh, Durand, and Watson (2011) OLS -5.03%
 b,j; 8.21% b,m;  
12.84% b,l; 22.31% b,k 
 
US Hovakimian and Li (2011) 
OLS 9.7% b  
Fixed effects 8.8% b  
US Elsas and Florysiak (2011) 
Fixed effects  39.1% 
DPF  26.3% 
                                                             
42  Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) and Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal (2008) employ Blundell and Bond’s (1998) system GMM estimator. 
43  Harford, Klasa, and Walcott (2009) measure the SOA using the median leverage deviation values over the first five years subsequent to large acquisitions paid for 
with cash.  The SOA are 24.5 percent, 23.3 percent, 17.8 percent, 18.7 percent, and 15.3 percent, respectively, over the one, two, three, four, and five years 
subsequent to large acquisitions. 
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Data Article Estimator Estimated SOA (per year) Book leverage Market leverage 
US Faulkender et al. (2012) System GMM 21.9% 22.3% 
UK Dang, Kim, and Shin (2012) 
IV44  53% f 
Difference GMM  59% f 
US Warr et al. (2012)45 
FM 33.25% b 35.36% f 
System GMM 27.70% b  29.25% f 
International Öztekin and Flannery (2012)46 
System GMM between 4.03% and 40.61% b between 10.87% and 52.86% f 
LSDVC 47 between 3.65% and 43.25% b between 4.56% and 51.64% f 
US McMillan and Camara (2012) 
FE IV 48  53% f,n; 58%f,o 
Difference GMM  48% f,n; 54%f,o 
LSDVC  34% f,n; 41%f,o 
 
 
                                                             
44  Dang, Kim, and Shin (2012) employ Anderson and Hsiao’s (1982) instrumental-variable estimator. 
45  To reduce concerns of endogeneity, Warr et al. (2012) estimate SOA over the year following the stock mispricing estimation. 
46  For each country, its estimated SOA is presented in Table 2 on page 93 of Ӧztekin and Flannery (2012). 
47  Ӧztekin and Flannery (2012) employ the Bruno and Giovanni’s (2005) biased corrected least squares dummy variable (LSDVC) to estimate the SOA, for each 
country, using book and market leverage. 
48  McMillan and Camara (2012) suggest that the fixed effect instrumental variables (FE IV) estimator tends to perform better with unbalanced panel data without 
generating too many instruments. 
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a Long term debt scaled by book assets. 
b Book debt scaled by book assets. 
c Preferred capital is included in the total debt, scaled by book assets. 
d Dividend payer. 
e Non dividend payer. 
f Book debt scaled by market value of assets. 
g Only for firms with the middle 50% of leverage ratio. 
h Face value of debt scaled by the market value of equity plus face value of debt. 
i Long term debt scaled by market value of assets. 
j Firms that issue debt. 
k Firms that issue equity. 
l Firms that issue both debt and equity. 
m Firms that issue neither debt nor equity.  
n Domestic corporations. 
o Multinational corporations. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
PECKING ORDER THEORY 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Pecking order theory is an alternative view of capital structure.  According to 
pecking order theory, firms adopt a hierarchical order of financing preferences where 
internal financing is preferred over external financing (Myers and Majluf 1984; 
Myers 1984).  If external financing is needed, firms pursue ‘safe’ debt financing first, 
then ‘risky’ debt.  Equity financing is considered as a last financing resort.  
Therefore, a firm’s capital structure is driven by its net cash flows, rather by the costs 
and benefits of debt as predicted by trade-off theory (discuss in detail in Chapter 2) 
or market timing behaviour (discuss in Chapter 4). 
 
The origin of pecking order theory lies in the adverse selection model of 
Myers and Majluf (1984).49  However, a number of studies have shown that other 
frictions can generate similar hierarchies of financing.  For instance, Altinkilic and 
Hansen (2000) find that transaction costs can generate pecking order hierarchy.  
                                                             
49  In Myers and Majluf (1984), adverse selection costs stemming from asymmetric information 
between managers and outside investors motivate pecking order behavior.  Managers have 
superior information about the true value of the firm’s assets and growth opportunities, while 
such information is undisclosed to outside investors.  Given that outside investors have 
limited information, managers are more likely to finance the investment with overvalued 
equity.  If managers act this way, it will convey negative information to the market and the 
price will drop at the announcement.   
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Issuance costs increase between debt and equity financing so that internal financing 
is cheaper than external financing, while debt is cheaper than equity when external 
financing is undertaken.  Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) find that firms prefer debt 
to equity issuance because the financing costs for equity issuance are higher, and 
equity is issued only when firms are so financially constrained that their debt 
capacity is full.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that the agency conflict 
between parties that manage a firm’s resources and those that own the firm can lead 
to a pecking order financing hierarchy.  Funding with debt can align the interest of 
managers and shareholders by forcing managers to disgorge cash flow to meet fixed 
obligations.  La Porta et al. (1997) point out that the agency costs of equity could 
generate a similar pecking order financing hierarchy.  Similarly, Stiglitz (1973) 
shows that corporate taxes can generate similar predictions, in which debt is 
preferred to equity.  Lambrecht and Myers (2012) find that firms follow pecking 
order financing hierarchy, but are not reliant on asymmetric information and adverse 
selection.   
 
Given that pecking order financing hierarchy can be generated in other ways 
than Myers and Majluf’s (1984) adverse selection model, this chapter is organized 
around a framework to provide an overview of previous research evidence on 
pecking order theory.  The following sections review the literature of the pecking 
order model based on adverse selection costs and, agency costs, and discuss the 
respective empirical tests of pecking order theory. 
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3.2 Adverse selection costs 
 
The original motivation for pecking order behaviour comes from the adverse 
selection models developed by Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984), who are 
in turn influenced by an earlier study by Donaldson (1961).  Donaldson (1961) 
observes that managers prefer to fund new investments with retained earnings.  After 
exhausting the supply of retained earnings, they issue debt.  They issue equity only 
after the ability to secure debt is exhausted.   
 
Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that pecking order behaviour is motivated 
by adverse selection costs stemming from asymmetric information between 
managers and outside investors.  The key idea is that managers have superior 
information about the true value of the firm’s assets and growth opportunities and 
that such information is not disclosed to outside investors.  Traditionally, outside 
investors require managers to explain the investment details when they need 
external financing, but managers do not like this process as it would expose them 
to investor monitoring.  Given that outside investors have limited information, 
managers are more likely to finance the investment with overvalued equity.  Such 
actions will convey negative information to the market and the price will drop.   
 
Three sources of funding available to firms are retained earnings, debt and 
equity.  When there is asymmetric information between managers and investors, a 
firm raising external capital to fund a new project faces an adverse selection 
problem, however funding it with retained earnings avoids this problem.  Thus, due 
to adverse selection considerations, firms adopt a hierarchical order of financing in 
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which internal financing is preferred over external financing.  Firms therefore 
finance new investments firstly with retained earnings, which involve no asymmetric 
information problem, then with debt in increasing order of risk.  Finally, equity is 
used as a last resort to avoid the distortion of investment decisions or minimize the 
adverse selection costs of security issuance that arise as a result of information 
asymmetry between better-informed managers and less-informed outside investors 
(Myers and Majluf 1984; Myers 1984). 
 
A number of studies examine different aspects of adverse selection problems.  
In their adverse selection model, Myers and Majluf’s (1984) assume a one-sided 
asymmetric information situation in which managers have superior information.  
Eckbo, Giammarino, and Heinkel (1990) find that, in a model of takeovers, the two-
sided asymmetric information situation between acquirers and targets can lead to the 
firm’s preference for a combination of stock and cash over retained earnings.  Eckbo 
and Masulis (1992) extend the basic adverse selection model to allow for current 
shareholders to participate in rights offers and underwriter quality certification.  They 
find that adverse selection costs between shareholders and outside investors can be 
proportionally reduced according to the degree of current shareholder participation in 
the rights issue or by costly underwriting fees.   
 
In contrast, a number of studies show that information asymmetry may not 
lead to a financing preference for debt over equity, a finding which is inconsistent 
with pecking order theory.  For instance, Viswanath (1993) shows that the pecking 
order hypothesis does not always hold.  He suggests that when the potential loss of 
future projects is too great, managers may opt to issue equity to finance a current 
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investment even though they have the options of issuing debt or using cash.  
Furthermore, Ravid and Spiegel (1997) suggest that uncertainty between potential 
investors and entrepreneurs can lead to equity and riskless debt issues.  Fulghieri 
and Lukin (2001) also find that firms preferring equity over debt which is concerned 
with the costs of information production, the precision of the information-production 
technology, and the extent of the information asymmetry.   
 
This section provides an overview of previous research evidence relating to 
adverse selection costs.  Pecking order financing hierarchy can also be generated by 
agency cost between shareholders and debt-holders, and the next section reviews 
the literature on pecking order models based on agency costs. 
 
 
 
3.3 Agency costs 
 
Agency-based models associate the costs of debt with asset substitution (see, 
e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976; Jensen 1986) and underinvestment (see, e.g., Myers 
1977).  Asset substitution and underinvestment problems arise because of agency 
problems, which exist between shareholders and debt-holders.  Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) suggest that in good times shareholders tend to accept high risk 
projects with large payoffs.  The increased level of risk affects the debt-holders 
because it places them at more risk without providing them with additional 
compensation, and increases the chance of firm defaulting on its debt.  Hence, the 
firm’s increase in value may benefit only the shareholders, as the debt-holders 
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require only a fixed return.  Myers (1977) argues that shareholders may require 
managers to undertake projects only if the expected benefits exceed the payments to 
debt-holders.  Underinvestment problems arise because managers may give up 
positive net present value (NPV) projects if all the expected benefits are paid to the 
debt-holder and leaving little or no return to the shareholders.   
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose an agency cost model of financial 
distress.  When there is no separation between corporate ownership and control, 
entrepreneurs bear, and gain, all the costs and benefits of their decisions.  Agency 
costs arise when entrepreneurs sell some of their stock to outside investors.  Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) suggest that debt financing can help overcome the agency costs 
of external equity in two ways.  Firstly, employing debt instead of equity financing 
implies that less equity will be issued for capital funding and it helps constrain 
managerial discretion.  Secondly, employing debt financing rather than equity helps 
to mitigate problems of free cash flow by imposing fixed obligations on the use of 
the firms’ cash flow.   
 
The preceding and present sections both show that pecking order behaviour 
arises in the presence of adverse selection costs and agency costs between 
shareholders and debt-holders.  However, these sections do not provide an overview 
of recent literature that examines pecking order behaviour.  The following section 
reviews the recent empirical studies related to pecking order theory. 
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3.4 Tests of the pecking order theory  
 
A series of related studies begins with Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), who 
examine whether pecking order theory is sufficient to explain the time-series patterns 
of firms’ financing decisions.  In the pecking order model, a substantial amount of 
variation in net debt issue should be explained by the financial deficit.50  If firms 
meet their financial deficits by relying on debt issue, then the estimated slope 
coefficient, bPO (coefficient of financial deficit), should be one.51  Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers (1999) find a coefficient of 0.75 which strongly supports the pecking order 
theory that new debt issues are associated with financial deficits.   
 
There are a number of studies which provide supportive evidence of pecking 
order theory.  Leary and Roberts (2005) find evidence that firms are less likely to 
conduct external financing when they have sufficient internal funds.  Firms utilize 
external capital when they need to outlay large investments.  Gomes and Phillips 
(2012) show that the asymmetric information affects firm issuance decisions 
differently in the public and private markets.  Depending on security issuances in the 
public market, they find support for the idea that the probability of equity issue 
declines with asymmetric information while it increases with public debt.  This 
indicates that firms issue debt to avoid asymmetric information problems. 
 
Bharath, Pasquariello, and Wu (2009) find that firms with large adverse 
selection problems tend to issue 30 percent more debt than firms with less adverse 
                                                             
50  Financial deficit is measured as the sum of capital expenditures, change in working capital, 
dividend payments, and current portion of long term debt at the beginning period minus 
operating cash flows after interest and taxes.   
51  bPO is an estimated slope coefficient in Equation (2) on page 224 in Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers (1999). 
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selection problems.  Lemmon and Zender (2010) consider a firm’s debt capacity.  
Generally, when a firm is constrained by debt it issues equity.  When a firm is 
unconstrained it should issue debt.  They suggest that those firms with rated debt 
are unconstrained by debt capacity while firms without rated debt are constrained.  
Lemmon and Zender (2010) find that the coefficient of financing deficit for 
firms with rated debt is larger than for firms without rating.  Their findings suggest 
that firms without rated debt are small high growth firm; such firms are debt capacity 
constrained and therefore issue equity to finance their financial deficits.  An 
alternative explanation is that firms with substantial growth opportunities are more 
likely to be small and young firms and adopt a low leverage to control the 
underinvestment problems (see, e.g., Myers 1977; Hovakimian, Hovakimian, and 
Tehranian 2004).  Furthermore, de Jong, Verbeek, and Verwijmeren (2011) find that 
pecking order theory is a better descriptor of firms’ issuance decisions than trade-off 
theory.  Dong et al. (2012) find that the pecking order of financing is more likely to 
be observed among undervalued Canadian firms.   
 
In contrast, a number of studies cast doubt on pecking order theory.  Helwege 
and Liang (1996) and Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1996) find that firms access capital 
markets to raise external funds but do not follow pecking order theory.  Note that the 
evidence in Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) is based on only a small sample of 157 
firms between 1971 and 1989, but Frank and Goyal (2003) test pecking order theory 
on a large cross-section of over 50,000 US listed firms.  They provide evidence that 
although external financing is heavily used by these firms, net equity issues appear to 
track the financial deficit more closely than net debt issues, which is inconsistent 
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with the predictions of pecking order theory.  Thus, they conclude that pecking order 
theory does not explain broad patterns in the data.   
     
Fama and French (2005) also find that firms appear to issue or repurchase 
equity each year, and that many firms that repurchase equity have financial deficits, 
which violates pecking order theory.  Kayhan and Titman (2007) find that although 
pecking order behaviour has a long term effect on observed capital structures, 
financing choices over long time intervals offset this effect.  Leary and Roberts 
(2010) find evidence that pecking order is unable to account for more than half the 
observed financing decisions.  Although they find little evidence for pecking order 
theory, such behaviour appears to be driven by incentive conflicts rather than 
information asymmetry.  de Jong, Verbeek, and Verwijmeren (2010) find that 
although smaller firms have the highest potential for asymmetric information, they 
do not follow pecking order theory.   
 
 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter presents a review of literature related to the pecking order of 
capital structure.  In Section 3.1, it introduces pecking order theory.  According to 
this theory, firms adopt a hierarchical order of financing preferences where internal 
financing is preferred over external financing (Donaldson 1961; Myers and Majluf 
1984).  If external financing is needed, firms pursue ‘safe’ debt financing first, then 
‘risky’ debt financing.  Equity financing is considered as a last financing resort.   
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The origin of pecking order theory lies in the adverse selection model of 
Myers and Majluf (1984) and is discussed in Section 3.2.  Myers and Majluf (1984) 
suggest that adverse selection costs, stemming from asymmetric information between 
managers and outside investors motivate pecking order behaviour.  A firm may fund 
a new project with its retained earnings to avoid the problem of asymmetry 
information between managers and investors.  Hence the firm finances new project 
first with retained earnings, then with debt in increasing order of risk, and finally 
with equity which is a last resort to avoid the distortion of investment decisions. 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose an agency cost model of financial 
distress, as discussed in Section 3.3.  Agency costs of equity arise when 
entrepreneurs sell some of their stock to outside investors.  Debt financing can help 
overcome the agency costs of external equity in two ways: by helping to constrain 
managerial discretion and by imposing fixed obligations on the use of firms’ cash 
flow in order to mitigate free cash flow problems.   
 
Section 3.4 provides an overview of recent literature that examines pecking 
order behaviour.  There are a number of studies that provide supportive evidence of 
pecking order theory (see, e.g., Shyam-Sunder and Myers 1999; Leary and Roberts 
2005).  Although pecking order theory gained attention in the 1990s, a number of 
studies have in turn found contradictory evidence of the theory.  A number of studies 
cast doubt on pecking order theory (see, e.g., Fama and French 2005; Kayhan and 
Titman 2007).  More importantly, pecking order financing hierarchy can also be 
generated from assumptions other than the adverse selection costs in Myers and 
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Majluf (1984).  Pecking order theory has fallen out of favour and thus it has become 
more difficult to explore its validity.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
MARKET TIMING MODEL 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Market timing is one of the primary factors that shape financing decisions.  
The market timing model does not appear to contradict trade-off theory.  Both 
models predict that firms issue equity when their market performance is high.  The 
market timing model states that firms have incentives to issue equity when their 
market valuations are relatively higher than their book values or past market values 
(Taggart 1977; Baker and Wurgler 2002).  Most direct tests of market timing 
behaviour are based on the positive relationship between market valuation, or past 
stock returns, and equity issuance activities.  There is well-documented evidence that 
firms time their security issuance decisions according to equity markets.  Firms tend 
to issue equity when the cost of equity is low, or when market values are relatively 
higher than their book values or past market values.  This chapter provides a brief 
review of the literature relating to equity market timing.  
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4.2 Tests of equity market timing   
 
Equity market timing mainly involves investors’ perceptions of mispricing.  
Equity market timing predicts a positive relationship between market valuations and 
equity issuance activities because managers may take advantage of equity mispricing 
by issuing equity when they perceive its stock is relatively cheap.   
 
Early studies which detect market timing behaviour on the basis of the past 
stock returns include Taggart (1977), Marsh (1982), Jalilvand and Harris (1984), 
Asquith and Mullins (1986), and  Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald (1991).  Taggart 
(1977) demonstrates that firms’ financing decisions are heavily influenced by market 
conditions and by their past histories of security prices.  Jalilvand and Harris (1984) 
find that when firms’ stock prices are relatively higher than their historical levels, 
there is a higher probability that they will fund their remaining financing needs with 
equity.  Asquith and Mullins (1986) find that firms tend to issue equity following a 
rise in their stock prices.  Hovakimian, Hovakimian, and Tehranian (2004) support 
the premise that high stock returns increase the probability of equity issue.  Gomes 
and Phillips (2012) find that market timing behaviour is an important characteristic 
of public equity markets and demonstrate that the probability of a firm issuing equity 
increases with higher stock return in the previous year.     
 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998), and 
Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) focus on the market-to-book ratio to capture 
market timing attempts, and find that equity issuances coincide with high market 
valuations of equity.  Rajan and Zingales (1995) find that firms with high market-to-
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book ratios hold low debt and suggest that firms time the market by issuing equity 
when their prices are perceived to be high.  Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) 
find that the probability of an IPO is positively influenced by the stock market 
valuation of other firms in the same industry. 52  Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman 
(2001) confirm that firms with higher current stock prices relative to their past stock 
prices are more likely to issue equity than debt.   
 
The evidence that low (high) long-term performance follows equity issues 
(repurchases) distinctly supports equity mispricing, and such asymmetric effects 
imply managers’ timed equity issues.  If managers exploit equity mispricing, net 
equity issues will be positively related to market-to-book ratios.   For this reason, it is 
well-known that a firm’s market to book ratio is negatively related to its future equity 
performance, as shown in La Porta (1996), La Porta et al. (1997), Frankel and Lee 
(1998), and Denis and Sarin (2001).  Investors in firms with higher market-to-book 
ratios tend to be more optimistic and usually do not fully assimilate all the 
information conveyed in equity issuance announcements.  Investors are more likely 
to overestimate such a firm’s future earnings performance when formulating prices.  
They slowly realize that earnings growth rates are lower than initially expected and 
this explains the lower subsequent returns.  
 
The following studies find that firms issuing equity have poor subsequent 
performance.  Masulis and Korwar (1986), Asquith and Mullins (1986), Spiess and 
Affleck-Graves (1995), and Graham and Harvey (2001), and Hovakimian, Opler, and 
Titman (2001) find evidence of market timing with seasoned equity; firms that 
                                                             
52  Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) employ a large database of private firms in Italy. 
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conduct seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) have high share valuations before the SEO 
but experience poor long-term performance afterwards.  Other studies such as Ritter 
(1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995), Ritter and Welch (2002), Jegadeesh (2000) 
indicate that firms experience long-term underperformance after IPOs.  This 
evidence goes back to Lerner (1994) who focuses on a biotechnology industry and 
shows that industry market-to-book ratios have a substantial effect on the decision to 
go public.  He reports returns of 10 percent and -5 percent respectively in the sixty 
days before and after the offers.  The reverse is true for equity repurchases, as 
Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) demonstrate; those firms with low 
market-to-book ratios that announce open market share repurchases outperform firms 
with the opposite characteristics in the four years following the announcement.   
 
Although numerous studies find that market valuation negatively predicts 
post-equity issuance performance, equity market timing is potentially consistent with 
the market timing view based on time-varying asymmetric information about assets-
in-place (Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald 1992), dynamic adverse selection model 
(Lucas and McDonald 1990), and adverse selection arguments in which firms 
exercise growth options through equity issuance  (Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino 
2006; Li, Livdan, and Zhang 2009).   
 
Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald (1992) suggest that firms can control the 
magnitude of adverse selection costs, they will choose a time to issue equity when 
there is relatively little information asymmetry.  Therefore, the probability of issuing 
equity increases with low information asymmetry.  Lucas and McDonald (1990) 
explain in their model that when firms are undervalued they postpone issuing equity 
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to finance a profitable project.  While they wait, their stock prices increase in 
response to favourable news of the profitable project at hand.  The firms then raise 
funds through equity financing, therefore equity issuances are preceded by stock 
price run-ups.  Li, Livdan, and Zhang (2009) and Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino 
(2006) demonstrate that subsequent stock performance should be lower in firms that 
exercise growth options through equity issuance, because risky growth options are 
converted into less risky assets. 
 
Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993) and Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) find 
that the effects of announcement following equity issues are better during business 
cycle expansions and significantly greater during high volume equity issuing periods 
than during low periods.  Similarly, Jung et al. (1996) find that, although the market-
to-book ratios and stock prices for equity issuers are higher than for debt issuers, 
there is no evidence that equity issuers experience a more negative post-issuance 
performance than debt issuers do.  Their study suggests an agency perspective and 
argues that the agency costs of debt for firms with better investment opportunities are 
higher, therefore the probability of issuing equity increases with investment 
opportunities if managers pursue growth objectives.  Equity is valuable for 
shareholders in a firm with better investment opportunities.   
 
In an influential study, Baker and Wurgler (2002) ask how equity market 
timing affects capital structure.  If equity market timing has only a short-term impact 
on capital structure and firms subsequently rebalance away the effects of market 
timing decisions, market timing would have no persistent effect on capital structure 
over long time horizons.  Whether or not market timing attempts have a lasting 
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impact on capital structure is the key point of contention in Baker and Wurgler 
(2002).  They measure the EFWA (External Finance Weighted-Average) market-to-
book ratio, which summarizes the relevant historical variation in market valuation.53  
They find that the explanatory power of EFWA market-to-book ratios increases with 
the time horizon and it remains highly significant even when the market timing 
variable alone is lagged ten years.  These results lead Baker and Wurgler (2002) to 
conclude that managers prefer to raise capital when the market values are high 
relative to the book values.  More importantly, capital structure is the cumulative 
result of attempts to time equity markets rather than the result of dynamic 
adjustments toward the target leverage. 
 
Similarly, Welch (2004) puts forth the inertia theory and presents evidence 
that firms tend to issue (repurchase) equity following a increase (decrease) in stock 
price, implying that leverage ratios are likely to be negatively related to past stock 
returns.  Firms with high stock returns are likely to have high growth opportunities so 
they may prefer to fund these opportunities with equity.  They also suggest that firms 
fail to rebalance their capital strucures in response to shocks on the market value of 
their equity, hence equity price shocks have a long-lasting effect on firms’ capital 
structures similar to the implications of market timing.   
 
Since the publication of Baker and Wurgler (2002), a wide body of literature 
records evidence consistent with market timing behaviour.  Henderson, Jegadeesh, 
and Weisbach (2006) find evidence that equity issues tend to occur in ‘hot’ markets 
and that post issuance returns are generally low following equity issues.  Elliott, 
                                                             
53  The EFWA market to book ratio is defined on page 12 in Baker and Wurgler (2002). 
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Koëter-Kant, and Warr (2007) find a strong positive relationship between equity 
market mispricing and the proportion of the firm’s financing deficit that is funded 
with equity.  Huang and Ritter (2009) demonstrate that the propensity to issue equity 
increases by 14.7 percent and 9.9 percent, respectively when either Tobin’s Q or the 
past market-adjusted return for a firm increases from one standard deviation below to 
one standard deviation above its sample value.  Dong et al. (2012) find that firms 
issue (repurchase) equity when their shares are overvalued (undervalued) only when 
firms are not financially constrained.   
 
A potential criticism of Baker and Wurgler (2002) findings is that the 
market-to-book ratio indicates mis-valuation based on public information only but 
ignores the probability that managers have private information which allows them to 
time their equity issues.  Jenter (2005) finds supportive evidence that market-to-book 
ratio is also a strong indicator of insider trading and documents more equity issues 
among firms with high market-to-book ratios.  Furthermore, Chang, Dasgupta, and 
Hilary (2006) support the view that Baker and Wurgler’s (2002) market timing 
variable best explains the capital structures for firms with fewer analysts.   
 
Leary and Roberts (2005) find that the market timing or equity stock price 
effect on leverage revealed by Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Welch (2004) is more 
likely to be due to adjustment costs, and demonstrate that the effect of equity issues 
on firms’ leverage is erased within two to four years by debt issues.  This is 
inconsistent with the conclusion in Baker and Wurgler (2002).  Hovakimian (2006) 
further comments on Baker and Wurgler’s (2002) finding that although firms have 
the incentive to time the market, the effects of equity transactions on capital structure 
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are small and transitory and this indicates that equity timing issues transactions are 
unlikely to be responsible for long-lived effects of market-to-book ratios on firms’ 
capital structure.   
 
Alti (2006) suggests that the effects of market timing are short-lived for IPO 
firms by showing that the effect of equity market timing on IPO firms’ leverage has 
vanished by the end of the second year.  Similarly, DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz 
(2010) find that equity issuers are not in fact firms with more investment 
opportunities and that those firms with high market-to-book ratios fail to issue stock, 
which is inconsistent with the market timing model.  Using international data, Kim 
and Weisbach (2008) show that when firms have higher market-to-book ratios, 
insiders are more likely to take advantage of the high valuations to sell off some of 
their shares.   
 
 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
 
This chapter reviews the previous evidence of the market timing model.  
First, it introduces the market timing model in Section 4.1.  A brief review of 
literature related to equity market timing is presented in Section 4.2.  Early studies 
detect market timing behaviour on the basis of the past stock returns (Jalilvand and 
Harris 1984; Asquith and Mullins 1986; Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald 1991).  
Subsequent studies focus on the market-to-book ratio to capture market timing 
attempts, and find that equity issuances coincide with high market valuations of 
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equity (Rajan and Zingales 1995; Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales 1998; Hovakimian, 
Opler, and Titman 2001). 
 
A firm’s market-to-book ratio is well known to be negatively related to its 
future equity performance.  If managers exploit equity mispricing, net equity issues 
will be positively related to market-to-book ratios, but low (high) long-term 
performance follows equity issues (repurchases) (see, e.g., Ritter and Welch 2002; 
Graham and Harvey 2001).  Such asymmetric effects imply managers’ time equity 
issues.   
 
An influential study by Baker and Wurgler (2002), find that managers prefer 
to raise capital when market values are high relative to book values.  More 
importantly, capital structure is the cumulative result of attempts to time equity 
markets rather than the result of dynamic adjustments toward the target leverage.  
Since the publication of Baker and Wurgler (2002), a wide body of literature finds 
evidence consistent with market timing behaviour.  On the other hand, a number of 
studies also find evidence inconsistent with market timing behaviour.   
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CHAPTER 5 
 
LEVERAGE ADJUSTMENT IN EXTREMIS: THE 
CASE OF ACQUISITIONS 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Trade-off theory postulates that firms have optimal debt-to-equity ratios that 
balance the marginal tax benefits of debt financing against the marginal costs of 
financial bankruptcy.  Firms therefore seek to achieve target mixtures of debt and 
equity, and act to minimize short-term deviations from these targets.  Empirical 
evidence to corroborate this notion of trade-off theory has been inconclusive.54  In 
this chapter, I use a sample of Australian firms experiencing leverage deviations, and 
a new empirical methodology to confirm that firms pursue target leverage. 
 
The capital structure of a firm engaging in M&A activity will most probably 
deviate from its target leverage, due to the financing transactions necessitated by the 
acquisition.  I examine the leverage and financing of a sample of Australian firms 
making acquisitions between 2000 and 2010 and provide evidence that either 
reductions or increases in leverage caused by acquisition prompt firms to actively 
                                                             
 Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at the 2012 Financial Markets and Corporate 
Governance Conference and the joint conference of the 2012 Asian Finance Association and 
the Taiwan Finance Association. 
54  See Chang and Dasgupta (2009) for a review of problems associated with empirical tests of 
trade-off theory of capital structure in Section 2.5. 
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rebalance their capital structures toward leverage targets.  Further, confirming the 
predictions of trade-off theory, I find that although acquirers experience significant 
changes in leverage during the acquisition year, the effect is transitory.  I extend the 
literature by linking the characteristics of firms to their rates of leverage adjustment.  
In contrast to most studies of leverage adjustments that draw inferences from 
estimated SOAs across all firms, I estimate leverage adjustment rates for individual 
firms and link them to their characteristics.   
 
The results add to the ongoing debate on the validity of trade-off theory and, 
by utilizing a recent technique addressing biases in estimating the SOA (Hovakimian 
and Li 2011), the results are unaffected by the econometric issues bedevilling 
previous analyses.  Furthermore, the empirical design (similar to that of Harford, 
Klasa, and Walcott (2009)) of leverage changes surrounding takeovers enables me to 
provide insights into the active rebalancing of capital structures. 
 
I find that acquirers, regardless of the way in which they finance the 
acquisitions, actively rebalance their leverage by incorporating 41 percent to 63 
percent of the leverage deviation immediately following the acquisition.  The 
leverage deviation caused by acquisition financing makes the firms to move back 
towards target leverage.  The estimated SOA for mixed acquirers is higher than 
acquirers who utilize only cash or stock.  The results for the mixed acquirers support 
the dynamics trade-off capital structure models of Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner 
(1989) and Leland (1994). 
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An investigation of the relationship between firm characteristics and the rate 
at which the firms adjust toward their target leverages reveals that size, cash reserves 
and profitability play key roles in leverage adjustment.  I also find that firm 
characteristics affect adjustment rates differently depending on whether a firm is 
over- or underleveraged.    
 
Section 5.2 discusses the trade-off theory and the leverage adjustment process 
it predicts.  This section also discusses empirical issues associated with tests of target 
leverage.  Section 5.3 provides details of the data and variables used in this chapter.  
Section 5.4 explains the measurement of speed of leverage adjustment in this 
chapter.  Sections 5.5.1 and 5.5.2 examine whether or not firms pursue target 
leverage and investigates how leverage evolves before and after acquisitions.  
Section 5.5.3 reports the way in which firm-specific characteristics affect firms’ 
adjustment rates toward the target leverage.  Section 5.6 concludes this chapter.  
 
 
 
5.2 Target adjustment behaviour 
 
A number of studies (see, e.g., Flannery and Rangan 2006; Kayhan and Titman 
2007) have found evidence that, when firms undertake leverage adjustments, they 
tend to move toward their target leverage.  Leary and Roberts (2005) and Harford, 
Klasa, and Walcott (2009) find that leverage adjustment is dynamic and converges 
toward the target leverage after accounting for adjustment costs.  These studies 
utilize traditional target adjustment models to examine whether firms’ leverages shift 
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toward their target leverages in the long run.  The most prominent test of the target 
adjustment model can be specified as: 
 
 
Levi,t - Levi,t-1 = α + λ(Lev*i,t – Levi,t-1) + εi,t                                     [5.1] 
 
 
The coefficient of the target leverage (Lev*i,t), λ, may be interpreted as the 
SOA.  λ will be greater than zero if firms adjust their leverages to the target leverage.  
Furthermore, higher estimates of λ imply that firms move more quickly toward the 
target leverage.  However, Chang and Dasgupta (2009) demonstrate that the SOA 
estimates from this target adjustment model are indistinguishable from estimates 
derived using randomly generated inputs.  Therefore, random changes in data could 
be interpreted as purposeful adjustments to the target leverage.  Studies using 
traditional target adjustment models which support the notion that firms have 
leverage targets are now controversial.   
 
Hovakimian and Li (2011) present a methodology to estimate SOA via a two-
stage process that addresses Chang and Dasgupta’s (2009) critique.  Hovakimian and 
Li (2011) suggest a two-step method to avoid the issue of look-ahead bias and the 
effect of mechanical mean reversion.  The first stage uses historical fixed firm effects 
regressions to estimate the target leverage.  The second stage is a modified partial 
adjustment model that uses the estimate of the target leverage from stage one, which 
potentially corrects for the mean reversion.  It also improves the ability to reject the 
target adjustment hypothesis when firms do not behave in a way which follows the 
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target leverage.  I utilize Hovakimian and Li’s (2011) methodology in order to 
eliminate the bias in favour of target adjustment behaviour and avoid the risk of 
generating spuriously significant estimates of SOA when firms do not follow the 
target leverage.   
 
Following Hovakimian and Li (2011), the first stage is a historical fixed firm 
effects regression to estimate the target leverage based on firm characteristics.  This 
takes the following form:  
 
 
BLi,t = α + βXi,t-1+ νi + εi,t                                                             [5.2] 
 
 
In Equation [5.2], the vector of independent variables, X, is the determinant 
of capital structure considered in previous literature (see, e.g., Fama and French 
2002; Kayhan and Titman 2007; Koh, Durand, and Watson 2011), and ε is the 
residual term.  The second stage of Hovakimian and Li’s (2011) approach is to 
include the estimate of target leverage, BL*i,t+1, obtained from Equation [5.2] to 
model the deviation from the target leverage, Equation [5.3].  Given that high 
leverage ratios could potentially make the sample studied in this paper more 
susceptible to the mean reversion bias, I follow Hovakimian and Li’s (2011) 
approach by dropping acquirers with book leverage ratios (BL) exceeding 0.8.  The 
leverage deviation is estimated as:  
 
 
Page 73 LEVERAGE ADJUSTMENT IN EXTREMIS: THE CASE OF ACQUISITIONS 
 
Page 73 
 
BLi,t+1 – BLi,t = α + λ1BL*i,t+1 + λ2BLi,t + εi,t+1                              [5.3] 
  
 
Equation [5.3] above corrects for the mechanical mean reversion found by 
Chang and Dasgupta (2009) by including a specific proxy for the target leverage.  
According to Hovakimian and Li (2011), any statistical significance of (1 - λ2) may 
be due to mechanical mean reversion.  Therefore, in all my subsequent empirical 
analyses I report the values of λ1 and refer to it as the SOA.  A positive SOA 
represents an adjustment speed that is moving toward the direction of the target 
leverage, whereas a negative SOA indicates adjustment in the opposite direction.  
Considering the levels of adjustment speed, a high estimate of SOA implies that 
firms on average undertake a relatively more rapid adjustment. 
 
Koh, Durand, and Watson (2011) utilize Hovakimian and Li’s (2011) 
methodology and provide evidence that Australian firms have leverage targets and 
take advantage of firm characteristics to raise capital in ideal circumstances.  Like 
Koh, Durand, and Watson (2011) I adopt the modified partial adjustment model used 
by Hovakimian and Li (2011) but, unlike Koh, Durand, and Watson (2011) I 
examine Australian acquirers.  If Koh, Durand, and Watson’s (2011) arguments are 
sound I should find that the sample of acquirers, which potentially have larger 
shocks to their leverage, have faster estimates of SOA than the sample of all firms 
studied Koh, Durand, and Watson (2011). 
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5.3 Data and sample characteristics 
 
Using the Zephyr database from Bureau van Dijk, I compile a list of merger 
and acquisition transactions completed in Australia from 2000 to 2010.  For each 
observation in the acquisition sample I collect accounting data from the Morningstar 
DatAnalysis Premium database for the period 1996 to 2010.  The definitions of the 
variables used in this chapter are presented in Table 5.1.  These definitions follow 
those used in previous studies such as Fama and French (2002) and Hovakimian and 
Li (2011).  All variables are scaled by total assets except for profitability (PROFIT) 
and depreciation (DEP) which are scaled by lagged total assets.  
 
The sample selection is summarized in Table 5.2.  Panel A of Table 5.2 
shows that the initial sample starts with 2,185 acquisition observations.  Because I 
examine the effects of acquisition payment methods on capital structure decisions, I 
collect the acquisitions that are paid for with cash only, equity only, or a mix of cash 
and equity. I define ‘cash acquirers’ as those acquirers who offer cash only to settle 
their acquisition transactions, ‘stock acquirers’ as those who pay with equity only 
and ‘mixed acquirers’ as those who pay with a combination of cash and equity.55  
 
                                                             
55  My sampling procedure is similar to Harford, Klasa, and Walcott (2009) but I do not restrict 
my sample by requiring the target size to be at least 20 percent of the acquirer size. In 
contrast to the US market, the Australian market is composed of relatively small firms. In 
addition, since my primary focus is on the SOA, rather than leverage change, I do not impose 
the size restriction. 
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Table 5.1: Variable sources and definitions 
Accounting data are collected from the Morningstar DatAnalysis Premium database.  The accounting data in Panels A, B, C and D are collected from Balance 
Sheet, Ratio Analysis, Profit and Loss and Sundry Analysis, respectively. 
 
Variable Definitions 
Panel A: Balance Sheet  
Book equityi,t Retained profitsi,t + Paid in share capitali,t 
Book debti,t Total assetsi,t – Book equityi,t 
Book leveragei,t (BL) Total debti,t/Total assetsi,t 
Market-to-Book ratioi,t (M/B) (Book debti,t + Market equityi,t)/Total assetsi,t 
Firm Sizei,t (Ln(TA)) Natural logarithm of Total assetsi,t 
Market value of assetsi,t Book Debti,t + Market equityi,t 
CASHi,t  (Cashi,t + Current investmenti,t)/Total assetsi,t 
Investmenti,t (INV) (Current investmenti,t + Non-current investmenti,t)/Total assetsi,t 
Net debt issuedi,t (d/A) (Total debti,t – Total debti,t-1)/Total assetsi,t 
Net equity issuedi,t (e/A) [(Book equityi,t – Book equityi,t-1) – (Retained profitsi,t – Retained profitsi,t-1)]/Total assetsi,t 
New retained earningsi,t (RE/A) (Retained profitsi,t – Retained profitsi,t-1)/Total assetsi,t 
  
Panel B: Ratio Analysis  
Market equityi,t Share outstandingi,t*Year end share pricei,t 
Share Returni,t (Year end share pricei,t – Year end share pricei,t-1)/Year end share pricei,t-1 
Average Share Returni,t (AVE RETURN) (Share returni,t-1 + Share returni,t)/2 
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Variable Definitions 
Panel C: Profit and Loss  
Profitabilityi,t (PROFIT) Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisationi,t(EBITDA)/Total assetsi,t-1 
Average Profitabilityi,t (AVE PROFIT) [(EBITDAi,t-2/Total assetsi,t-3) + (EBITDAi,t-1/Total assetsi,t-2) + (EBITDAi,t/Total assetsi,t-1)]/3 
Sizei,t (REV) Operating Revenuei,t/Total assetsi,t 
  
Panel D: Sundry Analysis  
Asset Tangibilityi,t (PPE) Net plant, property and equipmenti,t/Total assetsi,t 
Depreciationi,t (DEP) (Depreciationi,t + Amortizationi,t)/Total assetsi,t-1 
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Table 5.2: Sample selection for Australian M&A data 
                                                             
56  1,284 acquisitions – (888 + 126 + 22 + 15) acquisitions = 233 acquisitions are conducted by 
acquirers who conducted one acquisition in a year. 
The sample is collected from the Zephyr database from Bureau van Dijk.  The final 
sample consists of 309 Australian firms completing an acquisition from 2000 to 2010.  
Accounting variables are taken from the Morningstar DatAnalysis Premium database.  
  
Panel A: Sample selection 
Criteria   N 
Number of acquisition observations  2,185 
Less:      
      Acquirers where the ASX code is unavailable  
      (privately held or data  unavailable) (896) 
      Acquirers from financial and utilities sector  (5) 
   
Sample observations  1,284 
 
Panel B: Year wise distribution 
 Number of acquisitions conducted by acquirers  
Acquisition year One Two  Three Four or more Total 
2000 51 2 1 1 62 
2001 61 5 2 1 81 
2002 53 4 - - 61 
2003 100 17 1 1 142 
2004 104 23 5 2 176 
2005 96 26 3 1 161 
2006 70 9 2 2 102 
2007 113 11 4 5 178 
2008 95 15 2 1 136 
2009 52 3 - - 58 
2010 93 11 2 1 127 
Final Sample N 888 252 66 78 1,284 % 69.2% 19.6% 5.1% 6.1%  
       
 1,284 
Less:   
Acquirers with multiple acquisition transactions each year56 (233) 
Acquirers with multiple acquisition transactions over the sample 
period (387) 
Acquirers with book leverage ratio (BL) exceeds 0.8 (4) 
Acquirers with profitability ratio (PROFIT) greater than 1 or less 
than -1 (138) 
Acquirers with market-to-book ratio (M/B) exceeds 10 (7) 
Acquirers without accounting data between years ± 2,  
relative to acquisition year, t = 0 (206) 
     
Final sample  309 
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Following previous capital structure studies (see, e.g., Hovakimian, Opler, 
and Titman 2001; Koh, Durand, and Watson 2011), I exclude privately-held firms.57  
Furthermore, I exclude financial firms from the sample (e.g. banks, diversified 
financial, insurance and real estate industry groups) because their leverage ratios are 
subject to regulatory oversight and this will likely cause them to behave differently 
from other firms in managing their leverage ratios.  Accordingly, I delete 41 percent 
of the sample, which leaves me with a sample of 1,284 acquisitions.  Panel B shows 
that 69.2 percent of the sample of 1,284 acquirers make only one acquisition over the 
sample period.  In addition, 19.6 percent, 5.1 percent and 6.1 percent of the sample 
comprises acquirers who conduct two, three and four or more acquisitions 
respectively over the sample period.  I select firms making only one acquisition 
during the sample period, because it is important to remove acquirers making 
multiple acquisitions to avoid estimation biases in the cross sectional regressions 
(Harford, Klasa, and Walcott 2009; Klasa and Stegemoller 2007).  I also acquire 
accounting data for each firm during the two years before and after the acquisition to 
examine leverages in pre- and post-acquisition periods. 
 
Following Hovakimian and Li (2011), I exclude acquirers whose BL exceeds 
0.8 to avoid biases arising from the mechanical mean reversion of leverage ratios in 
                                                             
57  Only 18.45% of the sample consists of public-market acquisition.  There are insufficient 
observations (57) to observe the capital structure of the target in the analysis. 
  
Panel C: Sample firms by the method of payment 
 
 Cash acquirers Stock acquirers Mixed acquirers Total 
N 130 80 99 309 
% 42.1% 25.9% 32.0% 100% 
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extreme cases (Chang and Dasgupta 2009).  Consistent with previous capital 
structure studies such as Baker and Wurgler (2002) in the US market and Koh, 
Durand, and Watson (2011) for the Australian market, I exclude acquirers whose 
market-to-book ratio (M/B) exceeds ten and whose profitability ratio (PROFIT) is 
greater than one or less than negative one.  Following these criteria, the final sample 
for the analysis comprises 309 acquisitions.   Panel C in Table 1 shows that there are 
130 (42.1 percent of the sample) cash acquirers, 80 (25.9 percent) stock acquirers 
and 99 (32 percent) mixed acquirers in the final sample of 309 acquisitions.   
 
Table 5.3 reports the descriptive statistics of acquirers’ characteristics in the 
pre-acquisition year.  The variable of REV suggests that cash acquirers appear to be 
larger (1.0863) than stock acquirers (0.4931), while stock acquirers appear to be 
smaller than mixed acquirers (0.9344).  Both cash acquirers (0.0862) and mixed 
acquirers (0.0746) have higher levels of profitability than stock acquirers (-0.0783).  
This is consistent with the notion that more profitable firms move toward higher 
levels of leverage, due to expected bankruptcy costs decreasing and debt interest tax 
shields increasing with increases in profitability (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976; 
DeAngelo and Masulis 1980).  Therefore, it is not surprising that cash acquirers have 
higher book leverage (0.1775) than other acquirers (mixed acquirers = 0.1576; stock 
acquirers = 0.1184).  On the other hand, the lower cash balance (0.1466) for cash 
acquirers, indicates that they prefer to hold proportionally less cash, as they are likely 
to have better access to capital markets (Opler et al. 1999).  Of the firm 
characteristics considered in Table 5.3, cash, profitability, size and average stock 
return play important roles and vary across the acquisition categories in the year prior 
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to acquisitions.  These characteristics are explored further in the cross sectional 
analyses of SOAs.          
 
Table 5.4 presents a correlation matrix for the sample.  The relationship 
between leverage (BL) and asset tangibility (PPE), profitability (PROFIT) and firm 
size (Ln(TA)) is positive, and there is a negative relationship between leverage and 
growth opportunities (M/B).  These results are consistent with previous evidence 
(Titman and Wessels 1988; Rajan and Zingales 1995).  The correlation coefficients 
between book leverage and determinants are relatively low, hence multicollinearity 
should not be a major problem. 
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Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics of Australian M&A sample 
Table 5.3 reports the averages and standard deviations (S.D.) in parenthesis of acquirers’ characteristics in the pre-acquisition year.  Book leverage (BL) is total 
debt divided by total assets.  Profitability (PROFIT) is earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization, divided by lagged total assets.  Firm size 
(Ln(TA)) is the natural logarithm of total assets.  Market-to-book ratio (M/B) is book debt plus market equity, divided by total assets.  Asset tangibility (PPE) is 
net plant, property and equipment, divided by total assets.  CASH equals the sum of cash and current investment, divided by total assets.  Average share return 
(AVE RETURN) is the average of the past 2 years’ share returns (measured in percent).   REV is the operating revenue divided by total assets.  Average 
profitability (AVE PROFIT) is the average of 3 years’ profitability (PROFIT).  *, **, and *** denote statistical significance of the difference between cash 
acquirers and stock acquirers at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels respectively.  X, XX, and XXX denote statistical significance of the difference between cash 
acquirers and mixed acquirers at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels respectively.  #, ##, and ### denote statistical significance of the difference between stock 
acquirers and mixed acquirers at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels respectively 
 
 N  BL PROFIT Ln(TA) M/B PPE CASH REV AVE RETURN 
AVE 
PROFIT 
Cash 
acquirers 130 
Average 0.1775 0.0862 18.8902XXX 1.7555 0.2681 0.1466X 1.0863 0.3310 0.0911 
S.D. (0.1493) (0.2175) (2.2865) (1.1303) (0.2334) (0.2073) (1.0958) (1.1773) (0.1927) 
            
Stock 
acquirers 99 
Average 0.1184*** -0.0703*** 17.1108*** 1.7934 0.1631*** 0.2652*** 0.4931*** 0.4172 -0.0679*** 
S.D. (0.1543) (0.2876) (1.7288) (1.3252) (0.2175) (0.2858) (0.6509) (1.5743) (0.2736) 
            
Mixed 
acquirers 80 
Average 0.1576## 0.0746### 17.8785### 2.0305 0.2224## 0.1989 0.9344### 0.7069## 0.0468### 
S.D. (0.1612) (0.2556) (2.2916) (1.3822) (0.2373) (0.2107) (1.2749) (1.7869) (0.2134) 
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Table 5.4: Correlation matrix 
Table 5.4 reports the correlation coefficients between the book leverage ratio and determinants.  Coefficients of correlation that are 
significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level are marked with *, ** and ***, respectively. 
 
 BL PROFIT Ln(TA) M/B 
BL 1    
PROFIT 0.2945*** 1   
Ln(TA) 0.4589*** 0.5096*** 1  
M/B -0.1300*** -0.0766*** -0.1254*** 1 
PPE 0.3544*** 0.2724*** 0.3742*** -0.0567*** 
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5.4 Measuring the speed of leverage adjustment 
 
As discussed earlier in Section 5.2, I use the Hovakimian and Li (2011) 
measure of SOA surrounding the acquisition year.  This is a departure from the 
methodologies traditionally employed to estimate SOA and allows a valid estimation 
of SOA in the light of Chang and Dasgupta’s (2009) critique.  In the first stage, 
historical fixed firm effects regressions based on firm characteristics are employed to 
estimate the target leverage.58  This takes the following form:  
 
 
BLi,t+1 = α + β1M/Bi,t + β2Ln(TA)i,t + β3PROFITi,t + β4PPEi,t + 
β5DEPi,t + β6IndDummy + νi + δi,t+1                                              [5.4] 
 
 
I measure book leverage ratio (BL) as the total debt scaled by the total assets 
and use it as my measure of leverage.  The subscripts i and t denote firm and time 
and δ is the residual term.  I estimate the target leverage for every firm in the sample 
by running annual regressions of book leverage in year t+1 on the capital structure 
determinants in year t considered in prior literature (e.g., Fama and French 2002; 
Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman 2001; Kayhan and Titman 2007; Koh, Durand, and 
Watson 2011).  The second stage is to input the target leverage proxy, BL*i,t+1, into 
Equation [5.3] to estimate the average speed of leverage adjustment toward the target 
leverage for all financing groups.  I describe below the independent variables 
                                                             
58  Equation [5.4] (on page 83 of the dissertation) reflects not only the characteristics of the 
acquirers before the acquisitions, but also the merged firms after the acquisitions.  Therefore, 
the estimate of target leverage in the post-acquisition year incorporates acquisition effects 
and characteristics of target firms.  The SOAs account for both impacts caused by 
acquisitions and the characteristics of target firms.     
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appearing in Equation [5.4] and the definitions of these determinants are presented in 
the Table 5.1.  
 
M/B: Firms with potentially profitable investment opportunities have an 
incentive to avoid raising funds through debt; this maintains financial 
flexibility.  Hovakimian, Hovakimian, and Tehranian (2004) support the 
premise that high stock returns increase the probability of equity issue.  
Therefore, the target leverage is likely to be lower for these firms.  To capture 
the effect of growth opportunities on leverage, I use the market-to-book ratio 
(M/B) for the firms to proxy for this effect.   M/B is defined as book debt plus 
market equity divided by total assets. 
 
Ln(TA): Larger firms are more diversified, tend to have less volatile cash 
flows and have greater access to debt markets (Rajan and Zingales 1995).  
Therefore, large firms can afford more debt and can increase leverage.  To 
capture the effect of firm size on leverage, I include the natural logarithm of 
total assets. 
 
PROFIT: According to trade-off theory, high profitability could be associated 
with high target leverage.  More profitable firms may have higher tax savings 
from debt, lower financial distress costs, and find interest tax shields more 
valuable (e.g., DeAngelo and Masulis 1980).  If target leverage is important, 
they will issue debt rather than equity and have higher leverage ratios.  
Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) find, in a sample of firms that raise 
significant amounts of new capital, that those with high (low) past 
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profitability tend to issue debt (equity).  However, Kayhan and Titman (2007) 
find that firms which passively accumulate profit tend to invest more and thus 
have less cash to pay down debt.59  I use the ratio of earnings before interest, 
tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) over lagged total assets as an 
indicator of profitability (PROFIT).   
 
PPE: Firms with more tangible assets can use these assets as collateral to take 
on more debt (Frank and Goyal 2009).  To capture the role of tangibility, I 
use the ratio of net plant, property and equipment over total assets as an 
indicator of tangible assets (PPE). 
 
DEP: High tax rates increase the interest tax shields benefits of debt 
financing.  Firms are likely to borrow more when tax rates are higher.  
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) argue that depreciation tax deductions, or 
investment tax credits, are substitutes for the interest tax shields benefits of 
debt financing.  I include an indicator of depreciation and amortization over 
lagged total assets (DEP) to capture the effect of the interest deductibility.   
 
IndDummy: Finally, I also include industry dummies (IndDummy) to control 
for industry effects not captured in Equation [5.4] by other independent 
variables.   
 
 
 
                                                             
59  Studies that incorporate adjustment costs (e.g., Leary and Robert, 2005; Strebulaev, 2007) 
show a negative relation between profitability and observed leverage which could be 
consistent with the dynamic trade-off theory.   
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5.5 Empirical analyses 
5.5.1 Capital issues surrounding acquisitions 
 
This subsection analyses a firm’s financing activity in response to the shock 
to capital structure due to acquisition.  This allows me to look closely at the 
interaction between the change in leverage caused by the acquisition and the firm’s 
attempts to move toward the target leverage.  Table 5.5 reports the changes in net 
financing over the period between years -2 and +2, where the acquisition year is 
zero.  I report changes in financing activities from three possible sources of capital 
for a public firm: net debt issued (d/A), net equity issued (e/A) and change in retained 
earnings (RE/A).  Following convention, a firm is classified as a net issuer if it issues 
debt or equity greater than five percent of the previous year’s total assets 
(Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman 2001).   
 
The source of financing in all forms (equity, debt and retained earnings) is 
noticeably different in the acquisition year compared to the years surrounding it.  
This supports my conjecture that acquisitions act as a shock to the acquirers’ capital 
structures.  Net debt issued in the acquisition year for cash acquirers is 0.1572 and is 
relatively higher when compared to those observed in the years before or after the 
acquisition year: this indicates that cash acquirers finance their acquisitions via debt.  
The net equity issued in the acquisition year is 0.4130 for stock acquirers and is also 
higher than the corresponding values in the years surrounding the acquisition year.  
Taken together, the results confirm that cash acquirers appear to use debt to finance 
their acquisitions while stock acquirers pay with equity.   
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Table 5.5: Capital issues surrounding acquisitions 
 
 
 
5.5.2 Leverage adjustments surrounding acquisitions 
 
Table 5.6 shows the SOA, leverage and change in leverage of acquirers 
between years -2 and +2, where the acquisition year is zero.  Table 5.6 provides SOA 
estimates for subgroups based on the financing method employed for the acquisition.  
Grouping according to the financing method allows me to examine leverage 
adjustments conditional on the anticipated direction of leverage rebalancing.  The 
estimate of SOA in the acquisition year is significantly larger than the corresponding 
values in years surrounding the acquisition, implying that acquirers are cognizant of 
Table 5.5 shows net equity issued, net debt issued and newly retained earnings between year -2 
and year +2, where the acquisition year is zero.  Following Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman 
(2001), an acquirer is defined as a net issuer if it issues debt or equity greater than five percent of 
pre-issue total assets.  Net equity issue (e/A) is measured as the change in total debt divided by 
total assets.  Net debt issue (d/A) is measured as the change in book equity minus the change in 
retained earnings, divided by total assets.  Newly retained earnings (RE/A) is measured as the 
change in retained profits divided by total assets.  *, **, and *** denotes the significance of any 
difference between the acquisition year and other years surrounding it at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
confidence levels respectively.     
 
   Years relative to acquisition 
   -2 -1 0 +1 +2 
       
Cash 
acquirers 
N=130 
  e/A 0.2593 0.2472 0.2897 0.2579 0.2954 
  d/A 0.1310 0.1398 0.1572 0.1554 0.1285 
  RE/A -0.0384 -0.0858 -0.0483 0.0145 0.0019 
        
Stock 
acquirers 
N=99 
  e/A 0.3221 0.3544 0.4130 0.3071** 0.3008* 
  d/A 0.1350 0.1557 0.1298 0.1245 0.1320 
  RE/A -0.2259 -0.2391 -0.1612 0.1953 -0.2662 
        
Mixed 
acquirers 
N=80 
  e/A 0.2903 0.2847 0.3266 0.2881 0.2845 
  d/A 0.1375 0.1671 0.1344 0.1537 0.1360 
  RE/A -0.1646*** -0.0890 -0.0583 -0.1159 -0.2313** 
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leverage effects caused by the acquisition and make leverage adjustments 
immediately after the acquisition.   
 
I find that the general pattern of active leverage adjustment movement holds 
for all financing groups.  In the acquisition year, the estimates of SOA are 0.4162, 
0.4884 and 0.6334 for cash, stock and mixed acquirers, respectively.60  The SOA 
appears to be particularly strong for mixed acquirers.  Specifically, mixed acquirers 
appear to close, on average, 63.34 percent of the gap between actual and target 
leverages in the acquisition year.  On the other hand, cash and stock acquirers adjust 
to close 41.62 percent and 48.84 percent respectively of the leverage gap in the 
acquisition year, at relatively slower speeds than mixed acquirers.  A likely 
explanation for the greater activity of mixed acquirers in their leverage adjustment is 
                                                             
60  The measurement of the speed of leverage adjustment (SOA) is discussed in Sections 5.2 (on 
page 70) and 5.4 (on page 83).  For each acquirer in the sample, I collect accounting data for 
the period 1996 to 2010.  Following Hovakimian and Li’s (2011) approach, Equation [5.4] is 
estimated using all the historical data, for each acquirer, available at a point in time in order 
to avoid look-ahead bias.  For example, my first step is to run Equation [5.4] for the firm-year 
observations for 1996 and 1997 (using at least 2 years) to obtain the target leverage for 1998.  
My second step is to run Equation [5.3] to obtain the SOA (λ1) for 1998.  I then re-run 
Equation [5.4] for the firm-year observations for 1996, 1997 and 1998 to obtain the target 
leverage for 1999 and re-run Equation [5.3] to obtain the SOA for 1999.  Next, I re-run 
Equation [5.4] for the firm-year observations for 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999 to obtain the 
target leverage for 2000 and then re-run Equation [5.3] to obtain the SOA for 2000.  I repeat 
the first and second steps until I complete both Equations [5.3] and [5.4] for all firm-years 
observations between 1996 and 2010.  Given Equation [5.3] is estimated annually on cross-
sectional data, the reported SOAs are the average of λ1 estimates between 1998 and 2010. 
  
The following example illustrates the measurement of SOA in the acquisition year (t = 0).  
Firm X has completed an acquisition transaction in year 2005.  The measurement of SOA in 
year 2005 is measured as follows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
   
Per-acquisition years Post-acquisition years 
t = 0 t = -1 
2005 2004 1996 2010 2006 
t = 1 
Acquisition year 
The first step is to estimate a proxy 
for target leverage for 2005 using the 
capital structure determinants (on 
page 83) from 1996 to 2004. 
The second step is to run Equation [5.3] to 
obtain the SOA (λ1) in 2005, acquisition year. 
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that they can select an appropriate mix of debt and equity financing that will bring 
them closer to their target leverages, therefore they appear to adjust more quickly 
than other acquirers (Hovakimian, Hovakimian, and Tehranian 2004). 
 
Table 5.6: Leverage adjustments surrounding acquisitions 
Table 5.6 shows the means of speed of leverage adjustment estimates (SOA), Fama-Macbeth t-
statistics, the average of book leverage and changes in book leverage (measured in percent) and 
number of acquirers between year -2 and year +2, where the acquisition year is 0.  The SOA is equal to 
the average of λ1 in the following equation: 
 
 
BLi,t+1 – BLi,t = α + λ1BL*i,t+1 + λ2BLi,t + εi,t+1                                                                                                          
 
 
The specification is discussed in Section 5.2.  The reported t-statistics are Fama-Macbeth t-statistics 
(Newey West heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance adjusted).  *, ** and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels respectively.  Y, YY, and YYY denote 
statistical significance of the difference between cash acquirers and stock acquirers at the 10%, 5% and 
1% confidence levels respectively.  X, XX, and XXX denote statistical significance of the difference 
between cash acquirers and mixed acquirers at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels respectively.  #, 
##, and ### denote statistical significance of the difference between stock acquirers and mixed acquirers 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels respectively. 
       
  Year relative to acquisition 
  -2 -1 0 +1 +2 
       
Cash 
acquirers 
 
N = 130 
SOA 0.3150***,YY 0.1359 0.4162**,Y 0.3191***,Y 0.4728 
t-stat 5.33 0.89 2.28 3.50 0.21 
      
BL 0.1844YYY 0.1775YYY 0.1946YYY 0.2047 YYY 0.2121 YYY 
ΔBL -6.28% -4.02% 9.74% 5.23% 3.76% 
       
Stock 
acquirers 
 
N = 99 
SOA 0.4348## 0.1366 0.4884**,# 0.3563***,# 0.2831# 
t-stat 1.26 0.66 2.27 4.58 1.72 
      
BL 0.0925### 0.1184## 0.1077## 0.1145### 0.1307### 
ΔBL -6.04% 34.20% -10.32% 4.08% 12.18% 
       
Mixed 
acquirers 
 
N = 80 
SOA 0.0957 0.2306* 0.6334** 0.5466 0.0404X 
t-stat 0.53 1.92 2.85 0.90 0.25 
      
BL 0.1479 0.1576 0.1544XXX 0.1795 0.1887 
ΔBL 10.25% 6.57% -2.58% 17.73% 5.34% 
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The estimated SOAs are higher than the rates reported in Koh, Durand, and 
Watson (2011), indicating the importance managers place on maintaining the target 
leverage: this is consistent with my expectation that the firms in my sample 
experience shocks on adjust faster than the average firm in the market.  Australian 
firms undertaking acquisition activity are more active in leverage adjustments and 
appear to adjust more quickly following the shock to their capital structures.  Also in 
keeping with my expectations, I find that there is there is a positive relationship 
between acquisition shocks to leverage and SOAs.  It is instructive to compare the 
results to the SOAs reported in Koh, Durand, and Watson (2011), who examine all 
Australian firms rather than acquisition transactions.  In effect, Koh, Durand, and 
Watson (2011) form control groups and find that equity issuers (SOA = 0.2231) wish 
to return to the target leverage more quickly than dual issuers (SOA = 0.1284) while 
debt issuers (SOA = -0.0503) appear to adjust away from their target leverages.   
 
The results in Table 5.6 also show that both cash and stock acquirers 
undertake leverage adjustments not only in the acquisition year, but also after the 
acquisitions. 61   In the post-acquisition year (t = 1), SOAs are 0.3191 for cash 
acquirers and 0.3563 for stock acquirers and both estimates are statistically 
                                                             
61  In Table 5.6, both cash acquirers and stock acquirers undertake leverage adjustments and 
appear to adjust more quickly following the shocks to their capital structure.  In the sample, 
the date that acquisition is completed can be before or after the fiscal year.  Hence, some 
acquirers have time to undertake financing decisions and move toward their target leverage.  
Some acquirers do not have time for leverage adjustment and their leverage may deviate from 
the target leverage due to the financing transactions necessitated by the acquisition.   
 
If the latter is true, the acquisition itself moves the acquirers away from their target leverage.  
I would expect that acquirers make an effort to reverse the effect of the acquisition on their 
leverage in year +1 (post-acquisition year).  The SOAs for cash acquirers (0.3191) and stock 
acquirers (0.3563) in year +1 are positive and statistically significant, indicating that 
acquirers have leverage targets.  Furthermore, these estimated SOAs are higher than the rates 
reported in Koh, Durand, and Watson (2011), indicating the importance managers place on 
maintaining the target leverage: this is consistent with my expectation that the firms in my 
sample experience shocks on adjust faster than the average firm in the market.            
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significant, suggesting that stock acquirers adjust more quickly than cash acquirers 
after the acquisition.  Comparing the estimated SOAs between cash acquirers (0.3150 
and 0.4162) and stock acquirers (0.3563 and 0.4884), stock acquirers tend to adjust 
more quickly on average than cash acquirers.  This observation is consistent with 
Byoun (2008) and Dang, Kim, and Shin (2012).  Byoun (2008) and Dang, Kim, and 
Shin (2012) find that high-growth firms are usually overleveraged with a financing 
deficit and they offset their leverage deviation (the difference between actual and 
target leverage) by making equity issues to avoid the large financial distress costs 
associated with having above-target leverage.  In the sample, stock acquirers have 
higher levels of M/B ratios than cash acquirers, indicating larger growth 
opportunities for stock acquirers.  Stock acquirers appear to take their pre-acquisition 
leverage deviations into account when structuring their acquisitions.  The acquisition 
transactions provide stock acquirers with opportunities to rebalance their capital 
structures.  Therefore, they appear to adjust more quickly than other acquirers.    
 
Moving from the SOA to the change in leverage, I find that the percentage 
change in leverage is noticeably different in the acquisition year for cash and stock 
acquirers.  For example, the leverage change in the acquisition year is positive for 
cash acquirers (9.74 percent) while the corresponding change for the stock acquirers 
is negative (-10.32 percent).  These directional changes, conditioned on the method 
of financing of acquisitions, confirm my postulated link between the form of 
financing and leverage change.  While it is clear that stock acquirers undergo 
downward change in leverage, the evidence of leverage change shows that cash 
acquirers issue debt to finance their acquisitions and experience an upward change in 
leverage.  The leverage change in the pre-acquisition year is positive (34.2%) for the 
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stock acquirers, indicating stock acquirers issue a substantial amount of debt before 
conducting the acquisitions.  This is consistent with Myers (1977) who shows that 
firms with high investment opportunities should use stock as their chosen method of 
payment, either to save cash or to avoid incurring a debt overhang problem.    
 
Under trade-off theory, firms should undertake leverage adjustment following 
shocks to their capital structures.  In the context of acquisitions, if an acquirer pays 
for an acquisition with cash (equity), I would expect that it to make an effort to 
reverse the effect of the acquisition on its leverage by issuing equity (debt) or retiring 
debt (repurchasing equity).  In other words, the acquirer should engage in a leverage-
increasing (leverage-decreasing) acquisition transaction to decrease (increase) 
leverage in order to rebalance its capital structures toward the target leverage.  It is 
evident that the effect of acquisition-induced leverage is a transitory component of 
the acquirer’s capital structure.  It is also evident that immediately subsequent to the 
acquisitions, stock acquirers increase their leverages by 4.08 percent and 12.18 
percent during the post-acquisition years, consistent with target adjustment behaviour 
and the empirical evidence in Leary and Roberts (2005) and Flannery and Rangan 
(2006).  
 
For cash acquirers, the general level of debt is comparatively higher both 
prior to, and following, the acquisition year, that of stock and mixed acquirers.  Book 
leverage ranges from 0.1775 to 0.2121 for cash acquirers, while the corresponding 
range for stock acquirers is between 0.0925 and 0.1307.  This can be explained by 
the fact that cash acquirers are generally larger, with high tangibility and 
profitability, and less severe asymmetric information (Harris and Raviv 1991).  
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Therefore, cash acquirers are able to borrow at more favourable interest rates and 
have better access to capital markets (Ferri and Jones 1979).  The cost of external 
financing is likely to be relatively less for cash acquirers, hence they prefer to sustain 
higher debt levels.  This result is also consistent with the empirical work presented 
by Flannery and Rangan (2006) who argue that large firms face less external pressure 
(e.g. banks enforcing relatively tight covenants) to undertake leverage adjustment 
than smaller firms and, consequently, they adjust less rapidly.    
 
For the subgroup of firms using mixed financing, the results in Table 5.6 do 
not convey any consistent or clear pattern.  Since the directional effects of mixed 
forms of financing on the level of leverage are neither clear in theory nor apparent in 
our analysis, I do not use results from this subgroup to draw inferences regarding 
leverage change.  Nonetheless, I include this sample in my later analyses to draw 
implications regarding the SOA.  Overall, the findings in Table 5.6 support the 
argument that Australian acquirers have leverage targets, and also support trade-off 
theory.   
 
 
 
5.5.3 Adjustment rate and firm characteristics 
 
So far, I have provided general evidence to support my conjecture that 
acquirers have leverage targets and they adjust more readily in the acquisition year.  
However, some acquirers may adjust more quickly than others.  In this section I 
study how firm characteristics can explain variations in leverage adjustment rates.  
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Such an analysis is potentially important to understanding why some acquirers adjust 
more quickly than others.  Studies by Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) and 
Elsas and Florysiak (2011) suggest that firm characteristics not only reflect 
fundamental determinants of target leverage, but also affect the issuing 
(repurchasing) firm’s debt versus equity choice.  Hence, these firm characteristics 
may also determine the pressure to stay close or deviate from the target leverage.   
 
I begin my analysis by defining a cross sectional variable ARi,t as  
 
 
ARi,t = Log ��𝐵𝐿𝑖,𝑡− 𝐵𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1𝐵𝐿𝑖,𝑡∗ − 𝐵𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1��                                                             [5.5] 
 
 
where BLi,t and BLi,t-1 are the values of book leverage for firm i at time t and t-1, 
respectively.  BL*i,t is the expected leverage in year t as predicted by Equation [5.4] 
and used in [5.3].  Therefore, the numerator of [5.5] represents ‘the actual change in 
leverage’.  The denominator of [5.5] represents the change that should be observed if 
the firm is to achieve its target.  If ARi,t is 1, the firm will have perfectly achieved its 
target leverage in one year.  I use the absolute value of this ratio as our focus is on 
the speed of this adjustment rather than the direction of adjustment.  Assuming that 
firms adjust their leverage according to trade-off theory, ARi,t in absolute value, 
measures the reaction speed of a firm in adjusting to a target leverage whether the 
firm is over- or underleveraged.  I take a logarithm transformation to account for 
outliers and firms with no adjustments. 
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I sort and rank the acquirers into two groups based on ARi,t, which I classify 
as fast or slow adjusters.  Fast adjusters are the firms above the median value of ARi,t 
and the slow adjusters are below the median value of ARi,t.  In our sample, 51 firms 
have no change in leverage from t-1 to t and thus drop out of the sample leaving 129 
firms in each group.62  For each adjustment group, I conduct a set of regressions for 
each type of acquisition financing (cash, stock, and mixed).  The regression takes the 
form: 
 
 
ARi,t = αi,t + ∑ 𝛽𝑗 ∗  𝑋𝑖,𝑡−14𝑗=1  + ∑ 𝛽𝑗 ∗  𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗8𝑗=5  OVERi,t-1 + β9 
OVERi,t-1 + β10 WAVEi,t + µi,t                                               [5.6]                                                    
 
 
Xi,t-1 is a vector of lagged firm-specific variables that are known to impact firm 
leverage dynamics.  Our choice of these variables is determined by previous 
literature (Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman 2001; Flannery and Rangan 2006; 
Faulkender et al. 2012) but exclude variables already used to estimate leverage 
deviation in Equation [5.4].  I include a dummy variable (OVERi,t-1) to represent 
overleveraged firms in the year prior to leverage adjustment.  Firms are 
overleveraged if their leverage ratios are higher than target leverage.  Faulkender et 
al. (2012) and Harford, Klasa, and Walcott (2009) show, respectively, that firms in 
general, and acquirers in particular, are more likely to reduce leverage deviations.  I 
interact OVERi,t-1 with my primary variables of interest (Xi,t-1).  I also include a 
                                                             
62  Because of missing values, there are only 114 acquisitions for analysis of fast adjusters and 112 
acquisitions for slow adjusters, rather than 129 acquisitions for each group.     
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dummy variable (WAVEi,t) to control for acquisition wave.  WAVEi,t is one when the 
number of acquisitions in a calendar year is greater than the average of all 
acquisitions over the sample period (Duong and Izan 2012).   
 
The rationale and measurement of variables for the vector of independent 
variables, Xi,t-1, are as follows. 
 
AVE RETURN: Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) find that high stock 
returns are associated with improved growth opportunities.  They find that 
high stock returns are associated with the issuance of equity rather than debt, 
and the retirement of debt rather than repurchase of equity.  This is consistent 
with Myers (1977) who finds that high-growth firms are likely to adopt a low 
leverage policy to control underinvestment problems.  Higher equity 
valuations make it more enticing for an overleveraged firm to close its 
leverage gap when the firm has sufficient cash flow to do so (Faulkender et 
al. 2012).  Therefore, I would expect to find that firms that are overleveraged 
and whose past share returns are higher will adjust more rapidly by issuing 
equity and/or repurchasing debt.  I measure the past two-year stock returns to 
consider whether acquirers which are overleveraged take advantage of higher 
stock prices to adjust quickly to close their leverage gaps.  AVE RETURN is 
defined as the average of the past two years’ annual percentage share 
returns.63  
 
                                                             
63  Capitalisation adjustments (such as right issues) are not available. 
Page 97 LEVERAGE ADJUSTMENT IN EXTREMIS: THE CASE OF ACQUISITIONS 
 
Page 97 
 
REV: Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989) and Leary and Roberts (2005) 
suggest that capital structure adjustments involve transaction costs which are 
smaller for large firms.  Larger firms face lower default risk and have better 
access to debt markets (e.g., Frank and Goyal 2009).  Therefore, larger firms 
can undertake a more rapid adjustment than smaller firms, because their cost 
of external financing is lower.  However, an opposite prediction can also be 
justified.  Flannery and Rangan (2006) find evidence that larger firms tend to 
adjust more slowly than smaller firms.  Large firms tend to use public debt 
which is more expensive to adjust; therefore they have less incentive to adjust 
their capital structures, but external pressure to do so.  To control for 
acquirers’ size (REV), I use operating revenue divided by total assets.64   
 
AVE PROFIT: Profitable firms are likely to have available retained earnings 
so they are less likely to suffer from severe financial constraints.  These firms 
also have an incentive to take advantage of debt interest tax shields and are 
able to issue securities at a low cost.  Therefore, more profitable firms are 
more likely to make adjustments more quickly.  Less profitable firms, or the 
other hand, are likely to have limited internal funds.  Such firms potentially 
face financial instability and constraints which prevent them from making fast 
leverage adjustments.  Dang, Kim, and Shin (2012) suggest that less 
profitable firms are more leveraged.  Therefore less profitable firms have 
more incentive to revert toward their target leverages in order to avoid 
                                                             
64  Leverage ratios are specified in book value terms following the approach adopted in almost 
all paper in corporate finance.  Book value facilities the comparison of the accounting based 
metrics used in the dissertation as well as the literature in this area.  For example, Lin, Zhang, 
and Zhu (2009) and Koh, Durand, and Watson (2011) use the operating revenue divided by 
total assets as indicators of firm size.   
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financial distress.  I measure the average past profitability as the average of 
the past three years of profitability.   
 
CASH:  When cash flows are low or external financing is expensive, firms 
with sufficient cash holdings can make sure they have sufficient funds to 
meet unexpected contingencies or exploit profitable investment opportunities 
(Opler et al. 1999).  Therefore, overleveraged firms have more incentive to 
undertake leverage adjustment when cash is available.  CASH is the sum of 
cash and current investment scaled by total assets.  
 
 
 
5.5.3.1 Fast acquirers 
 
Table 5.7 presents the results of multivariate analyses for fast acquirers.  That 
is, firms where ARi,t is higher than the median.  Our discussion starts with the 
variable OVER.  I find that none of the acquirers in the mixed category is 
overleveraged and hence estimates for the coefficients of OVER and the interaction 
terms are not available.  The positive coefficients of OVER indicate that 
overleveraged acquirers are likely to adjust more quickly.  This result is consistent 
with the empirical evidence of Harford, Klasa, and Walcott (2009), Dang, Kim, and 
Shin (2012), and Faulkender et al. (2012): to avoid financial distress costs firms tend 
to make adjustments more quickly when they are overleveraged.  The coefficient 
estimates of the variable OVER are particularly strong for cash acquirers (1.5380), 
suggesting that overleveraged acquirers undertake quick adjustments when 
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acquisitions are paid for with cash.  Overall, the results for the variable OVER are 
supportive of the prediction of trade-off theory.  When firms are overleveraged, they 
are more likely to place importance in maintaining their target leverage and hence 
they will increase the SOA. 
 
Table 5.7: Analysis of fast adjusters 
Table 5.7 presents the parameter estimates using the adjustment rate as a dependent variable.  
The regression follows an OLS model analysing the acquirers that adjust more quickly in the 
acquisition year.  The specification is discussed in Section 5.5.3.  All accounting variables 
are measured in the pre-acquisition year, except the high acquisition wave dummy variable 
(WAVE), which is measured in the acquisition year.  The overleveraged dummy (OVER) 
equals one when the book leverage is higher than the target leverage, and 0 otherwise.  The 
average share return (AVE RETURN) is the average of the past two years’ share returns 
(measured in percent).   REV is the operating revenue divided by total assets.  The average 
profitability (AVE PROFIT) is the average of three years’ profitability (PROFIT).  Cash 
(CASH) equals the sum of cash and current investment divided by total assets.  The high 
acquisition wave dummy (WAVE) equals one when the number of merger and acquisition 
observations in the calendar year is higher than the sample average, and zero otherwise.  The 
t-statistics are calculated following White standard errors and covariance is adjusted in 
italics.  *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels 
respectively. 
 
 Cash acquirers Stock acquirers Mixed acquirers 
Constant -0.8781*** -0.9364***   0.1781   -3.40 -2.28 0.39 
    
OVER 1.5380*** 1.1030***    7.75 6.76    
    
AVE RETURN 0.3136*** 0.0633     0.1805***   2.48 0.33     7.47   
    
REV -0.0344   0.3110**     -0.3717**   -0.39 2.53 -2.58   
    
AVE PROFIT -0.0372    -1.2958* -0.5287 -0.03 -1.82 -0.86   
    
CASH -0.4592 -0.2440 0.4587    -0.66 -0.51 0.77 
    
WAVE 0.0616    -0.1358      -0.4268   0.33   -0.37 -1.00    
    
AVE PROFIT*OVER 4.3531***   35.6014***  3.8 49.93  
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Next, I examine the analogous effects of past share returns on adjustment 
rates.  Higher stock returns are associated with higher growth opportunities and firms 
with higher returns are likely to issue equity rather than debt.  The findings support 
Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001).  I find that acquirers are likely to adjust 
leverage more quickly, presumably by issuing equity when their stock returns are 
high.  The statistically significant positive coefficients of the variable AVE RETURN 
for cash and mixed acquirers are 0.3136 and 0.1805, respectively, revealing that 
firms in both subgroups find higher stock prices valuable and hence increase their 
adjustment speed.   
 
I also examine the impact of asset size on the adjustment rate.  The negative 
coefficient of the variable REV for cash acquirers is statistically insignificant, 
revealing that cash acquirers are not likely to adjust more quickly when they are 
relatively larger.  The statistically significant positive coefficient (0.3110) for stock 
acquirers indicates that large stock acquirers are more likely to adjust at a quicker 
rate than small stock acquirers, which is consistent with the cost of issuing equity is 
higher for small firms (Smith 1977).  However, the statistically significant negative 
    
CASH*OVER 3.2461*** 71.3917***  4.68    148.2  
    
AVE RETURN*OVER -0.3643*** 1.1580***  -2.89 6.08  
    
REV*OVER -2.0936*** -8.3244***  -23.52 -67.79  
    
Adjusted R2 0.4002 0.2348 0.2971 
    
N 52 33 29 
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coefficient of the variable REV for mixed acquirers (-0.3717) suggests that large 
mixed acquirers are more likely to adjust at a slower rate than small mixed acquirers.  
This finding is supportive of Flannery and Rangan’s (2006) argument that the 
external pressure on larger firms to adjust their leverage is not as intense as the 
pressure on smaller firms.                
 
The coefficients for the interaction variable of AVE PROFIT and OVER are 
positive and statistically significant (cash acquirers = 4.3532; stock acquirers = 
35.6014), showing the positive effect of past profitability on the adjustment rate 
when acquirers are overleveraged.  This evidence supports the idea that more 
profitable firms are likely to have higher levels of retained earnings and are less 
likely to suffer from financial constraints.  As a result, their financial flexibility and 
adjustment benefits (i.e., ability to issue securities at low cost) allow them to adjust 
more quickly. 
 
The positive and statistically significant coefficients of the interaction 
variable of CASH and OVER suggest that overleveraged cash (3.2461) and stock 
acquirers (71.3917) tend to adjust at a faster pace when they hold high levels of cash.  
These estimates appear to be consistent with the notion that overleveraged firms have 
more incentive to undertake leverage adjustment when excess cash is available.  In 
addition, I observe that the coefficient of the interaction variable of CASH and OVER 
is particularly strong for stock acquirers as well.  A comparison between the 
interaction coefficients of cash and stock acquirers implies that stock acquirers tend 
to adjust more quickly than cash acquirers when they are overleveraged with higher 
past profitability or larger cash reserves.  In general, acquirers who are overleveraged 
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have to issue equity or retire debt to achieve their target leverages, while 
overleveraged stock acquirers have the ability to offset their leverage gaps by 
financing their acquisitions with equity.  Our results imply that stock acquirers 
manage to take their pre-acquisition leverage gap into account when structuring their 
financing decisions.  Given that they are already overleveraged before the 
acquisitions, and that equity financed transactions should lower the leverage gap, 
they should find higher profitability or larger cash reserves more valuable; they will 
adjust more quickly than overleveraged cash acquirers. 
 
The negative and statistically significant coefficients of the interaction 
variable of REV and OVER suggest that cash (-2.0936) and stock acquirers (-8.3244) 
which are overleveraged in the pre-acquisition year tend to adjust at a slower pace 
when they are relatively larger.  These results suggest that larger firms, due to the 
fact that they have access to public debt, have less incentive as well as external 
pressure to adjust their capital structures (Flannery and Rangan 2006).  For these 
firms the benefits of reducing the deviation from the target leverage are probably less 
than the financial distress costs of being overleveraged.65 
 
The positive coefficients of AVE RETURN for cash and mixed acquirers 
indicate that higher stock prices help firms to adjust to target leverage quickly.  This 
is consistent with Faulkender et al. (2012): higher market valuations make it more 
enticing for overleveraged firms to adjust quickly towards their target leverages.  
However, the opposite signs of the coefficients of the interaction term AVE RETURN 
and OVER for stock versus cash acquirers (1.1580 versus -0.3643) indicate that 
                                                             
65  See Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989) and Leary and Roberts (2005) for evidence that 
financing behaviour is related to adjustment costs. 
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target adjustment behaviour differs according to the method of financing when firms 
are overleveraged.  It is possible that cash acquirers who already have significant 
debt levels due to the acquisition find it more difficult to take advantage of market 
conditions than stock acquirers do.  The evidence for stock acquirers is consistent 
with Warr et al. (2012).  Firms that are overleveraged adjust more rapidly to their 
target leverage when their equity is overvalued. 
 
 
 
5.5.3.2 Slow adjusters  
 
I now turn our attention to the regression analyses of acquirers adjusting 
relatively slowly (characterized as slow adjusters) in Table 5.8.  In this sample, none 
of the acquirers is overleveraged, therefore the variable OVER and the interaction 
terms are dropped from regression Equation [5.6].  This complements the result 
reported in Table 5.8, that underleveraged firms have less incentive to undertake 
adjustment.   
 
Discussion of results in Table 5.8 is limited, as most of the results are 
consistent with the results for fast adjusters reported in Table 5.7 and discussed in the 
previous sub-section.  The analysis of slow adjusters confirms my argument that 
large firms adjust more slowly: large firms have less volatile cash flows and the 
consequence of being away from their target leverages is less severe, ceteris paribus 
(Flannery and Rangan 2006).  The coefficient of the variable REV is positive and 
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statistically significant (1.0305) for stock acquirers only, suggesting that larger firms 
tend to adjust more slowly than smaller firms. 
 
Table 5.8: Analysis of slow adjusters 
 
 
The CASH variable produces a statistically significant positive coefficient (at 
the 10% level) of 1.7418 for stock acquirers only.  This suggests that stock acquirers 
Table 5.8 presents the parameter estimates using the adjustment rate as a dependent variable.  
The regression follows an OLS model analysing the acquirers adjusting more slowly in the 
acquisition year.  The specification is discussed in Section 5.5.3.  All accounting variables 
are measured in the pre-acquisition year, except the high acquisition wave dummy variable 
(WAVE), which is measured in the acquisition year.  The average share return (AVE 
RETURN) is the average of the past two years’ share returns (measured in percent).   REV is 
the operating revenue divided by total assets.  The average profitability (AVE PROFIT) is the 
average of three years’ profitability (PROFIT).  Cash (CASH) equals the sum of cash and 
current investment divided by total assets.  The high acquisition wave dummy (WAVE) 
equals one when the number of merger and acquisition observations in the calendar year is 
higher than the sample average, and zero otherwise.  The t-statistics are calculated following 
White standard errors and covariance adjusted in italics.  *, ** and *** denote significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels respectively. 
 
 Cash acquirers Stock acquirers Mixed acquirers 
Constant -2.7821***   -4.7789*** -4.1346*** -8.46 -7.02   -5.78 
    
AVE RETURN -0.0252 0.0174     0.1139 -0.73    0.04 1.02 
    
REV 0.1206   1.0305**     0.1079     0.93 2.49    1.06 
    
AVE PROFIT -0.1462 -0.9605 0.6531    -0.14 -1.25   0.33 
    
CASH -1.0622     1.7418* 0.8360  -0.95    1.76     0.60    
    
WAVE -0.2672   -0.3519   0.8691 -1.01 -0.67 1.43 
    
Adjusted R2 -0.0344 0.0011 -0.0760 
    
N 52 33 27 
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who are adjusting more slowly appear to be less willing to adjust their leverage when 
they hold higher levels of cash reserves.  When firms have adequate amounts of cash 
for their normal operations, they are less likely to undertake external financing.  They 
prefer to maintain cash balances when the benefits of cash balances outweigh the 
costs of external financing (Opler et al. 1999).  An alternative explanation could be 
that the benefits of cash holdings might be higher than leverage adjustment costs, 
causing the leverage adjustments to proceed at a slower pace (Leary and Roberts 
2005). 
 
 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
If trade-off theory is an adequate model of corporate capital structure, firms 
will adjust leverages to reach their target leverage.  The further away firms are from 
their target leverage, the greater their SOA will be.  Acquisition activities can drive 
firms away from their target leverage.  This chapter exploits this idea and, utilizing a 
sample of Australian acquirers from 2000 to 2010, confirms that Australian acquirers 
adjust their leverages in a way which implies that they have leverage targets.  In 
addition, the extreme leverages, arising out of acquisition financing, are associated 
with high SOAs.66  
 
This utilization of individual firms’ adjustment rates, ARi,t, allows 
consideration of subtleties determining individual firms’ SOAs.  I consider the 
                                                             
66  The estimated SOA presented in this chapter are all greater than those reported in Koh, 
Durand, and Watson (2011). 
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adjustment rate in the acquisition year and find that separately analysing higher and 
lower adjustment rates allows me to draw out the finer structure of leverage 
adjustment and speed at individual firm level.  Further, utilizing variables commonly 
used to explain capital structure, the adjustment rate model allow me to draw 
inference on motivations of firms as well as on the applicability of a range of capital 
structure theories.  I find that firm-specific characteristics can provide evidence 
supporting the hypothesis that acquirers adjust more quickly to approach their target 
leverages when they are overleveraged.  These findings confirm that when firms 
adjust leverages they are cognizant of their leverage targets.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
LEVERAGE HETEROGENEITY AND 
ASYMMETRIC SPEED OF ADJUSTMENT 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Many studies have attempted to address the question of whether firms pursue 
target leverage by estimating the speed with which firms adjust toward their target 
leverages (Fama and French 2002; Flannery and Rangan 2006; Kayhan and Titman 
2007; Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender 2008).  They generally document evidence that 
firms adjust toward targets.  This behaviour is consistent with trade-off theory.  
However, a limitation of these studies is that they impose the same adjustment speed 
on all sample firms.  They do not consider that firms facing different leverage 
adjustment costs may take different paths toward their target leverages.67   
 
Recent studies have investigated the sources of leverage adjustment costs and 
found that transaction costs (see, e.g.,Leary and Roberts 2005; Strebulaev 2007),  
firm-specific characteristics (see, e.g., Drobetz and Wanzenried 2006; Dang, Kim, 
and Shin 2012; Hanousek and Shamshur 2011), financial deficits/surpluses (Byoun 
                                                             
 At the time of submission, a version of this chapter had been accepted for presentation at the 
2013 Asian Finance Association Conference.  This chapter will also be presented at the 2013 
Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand (AFAANZ) Conference.    
67  See Section 2.7 for a review of studies that address heterogeneity in speeds of leverage 
adjustment. 
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2008) and cash flow and financial constraints (Faulkender et al. 2012) are associated 
with the costs and the benefits of leverage adjustments.  Such influences may affect 
the strategies firms adopt to reach their targets.  However, they fail to consider 
whether a firm’s leverage level is itself a determinant of both its speed of adjustment 
and the importance, or relevance, of the influences on leverage adjustment.   
 
According to trade-off theory, high leverage ratios are associated with high 
financial costs (Kraus and Litzenberger 1973).  If firms have substantial debt relative 
to their assets, their financial distress costs potentially outweigh the interest tax 
shield benefits of debt.  Firms with high leverage face higher levels of financial 
distress costs and greater agency conflicts issues than those with low leverage.  Such 
firms are under pressure to decrease their leverage ratios, thus implying more 
incentive for them to undertake leverage adjustment toward the target leverage. 
 
Analysing US firms for the period 1961 to 2010 allows us to analyse whether 
the differential levels of leverage are related to the adjustment.  I find that the 
estimated SOAs appear to vary with firms’ leverage levels.  Firms with high leverage 
adjust toward their target leverages by offsetting, on average, between 7.15 percent 
and 17.06 percent of the deviation from their target leverages each year.  In contrast, 
firms with low leverage move toward their target leverages by offsetting only, on 
average, between 3.16 percent and 4.21 percent of the leverage deviation each year.  
Using the estimated SOAs, I find support for trade-off theory: firms with high 
leverage decrease their leverage ratios to reduce their financial distress costs.   
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I also investigate the way in which firm-specific characteristics interact with 
differing levels of leverage to influence SOA.  Firms with high leverage are found to 
be larger with more tangible assets.  Firms with low leverage, on the other hand, are 
likely to be high-growth and highly profitable firms.  Therefore it is likely that these 
characteristics apply pressure in different ways for them to undertake leverage 
adjustment.   
 
This investigation of the sensitivity of firms’ leverage to firm-specific 
characteristics highlights the importance of considering the level of leverage when 
considering capital structure theories.  For example, both high and low leveraged 
firms tend to utilize higher profitability to reduce their leverage ratios.  This is 
consistent with pecking order theory (Titman and Wessels 1988).  On the other hand, 
firms with medium leverage increase their debt.  This is consistent with trade-off 
theory.  Further, the effects of market-to-book ratio are stronger for high leveraged 
firms than low leveraged firms: when firms are relatively more leveraged they issue 
more debt when market valuations are high.  These findings highlight the fact that 
the way in which different characteristics systematically affect firm’s adjustment to 
its target leverage is conditional on its level of leverage. A number of studies have 
considered how the characteristics of firm affect capital structure and adjustments to 
leverage targets, yet these studies tend to ‘lump’ in an undifferentiated group rather 
than analyse sub-samples based on their leverage.  This chapter reveals that such an 
approach misses nuances in the data.   
    
The remainder of this chapter is as follows.  Section 6.2 describes the data 
sources and provides the summary statistics of the sample.  Section 6.3 introduces 
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the modified partial adjustment model framework used to estimate firms’ SOAs 
toward target leverage.  Section 6.4.1 analyses whether the SOAs differ when firms 
are differentiated according to their leverage ratios.  Section 6.4.2 examines the ways 
in which firms manage their leverage ratios in approaching the target leverage.  
Section 6.4.3 compares the leverage variations between firms that can be explained 
by their different characteristics.  Section 6.5 concludes this chapter.  
 
 
 
6.2 Data  
6.2.1 Sample selection 
 
Using the Compustat and Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
database from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS), I collect firms’ annual 
accounting data between the period 1961 to 2010 and construct an unbalanced panel 
of 200,183 firm-year observations.  The definitions of the variables used in this 
chapter are presented in Table 6.1.  These definitions follow previous capital 
structure studies such as Hovakimian and Li (2011) and Lemmon, Roberts, and 
Zender (2008). 
 
I apply a number of data restrictions.  First, I exclude firm-year observations 
with values of total assets or sales less than one million dollars to mitigate the 
potential effect of outliers.  Second, my research design requires the calculation of 
changes in leverage ratios and use of firm’s lagged leverage ratios, hence only firms 
with at least two years of continuous leverage ratio are retained in the sample.  
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Following Hovakimian and Li (2011), I also exclude firm-year observations where 
leverage ratio (BL) is greater than 0.8 to avoid biases arising from the mechanical 
mean reversion of leverage ratios in extreme cases (Chang and Dasgupta 2009).  I 
also exclude firm-year observations where profitability ratio (PROFIT) is greater 
than one or less than negative one68 and market-to-book ratio (M/B) exceeds ten69.  
Finally, firms operating in the financial sector (e.g. banks, insurance and life 
assurance firms and investment trusts) and firms in the utility sector (e.g. electricity, 
water and gas) are excluded from the sample because their leverage ratios differ from 
the leverage of other firms in the sample and are determined by other features of the 
market.   
 
Table 6.2 illustrates the screening process for the firm-year observations, 
leaving a final sample of 131,662 firm-year observations for analysis.  Using this 
final sample, I sort firms into deciles each year according to their leverage ratios in 
that fiscal year.70  Decile 10 incorporates firms with the highest leverage; Decile 1 
incorporates firms with the lowest leverage.  To facilitate comparison, I further 
                                                             
68  I do not trim or winsorize my sample to remove the extreme firm-year observations, I 
therefore exclude firm-year observations where PROFIT is greater than one or less than 
negative one. The practical consequences of this decision are limited and I outline these in 
more detail in Footnote 72.  
69  To reduce the effect of outliers, I exclude observations where M/B exceeds ten which have 
been considered by Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Hovakimian (2006), and others.  As I 
noted in footnote 59, the consequences of this decision are limited and I outline these in more 
detail in Footnote 72. 
70  Using the final sample of 131,662 firm-year observations from each year from 1961 to 2010, 
I sort into deciles each year according to their leverage ratios in that fiscal year.  For 
example, there are 2882 firm-year observations in 1978.  These 2882 firm-year observations 
are sorted into deciles according to their leverage ratios in 1978.  In 1979, there are 2801 
firm-year observations and these observations are then sorted into deciles according to their 
leverage ratios in 1979.  I repeat the sorting procedure until I complete all firm-years 
observations between 1961 and 2010.        
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Table 6.1: Variables sources and definitions for US accounting data 
 
Table 6.1 details the variable construction for analysis. Accounting data are collected from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat 
database between 1961 and 2010. The names in parentheses refer to the annual Compustat item name and CRSP item name. 
 
Variables Definitions 
Market Equityi,t  Close share Pricei,t (Item PRC) x Outstanding common sharei,t (Item SHROUT) 
Preferred Stocki,t 
Redemption valuei,t (Item PSTKRV) if available, else liquidating valuei,t (Item PSTKL) if available, else par 
valuei,t (Item PSTK) 
Book Equityi,t 
Stockholders' equityi,t (Item SEQ) + deferred taxes and investment tax crediti,t (Item TXDITC) - Preferred 
Stocki,t 
Market Assetsi,t Total liabilitiesi,t (Item LT) + Market Equityi,t 
Book Debti,t Total assetsi,t (Item AT) - Book Equityi,t 
Leveragei,t (BL) (Short term debti,t (Item DLC) + Long term debti,t (Item DLTT)) scaled by total assetsi,t (Item AT) 
Firm Sizei,t (Ln(TA)) Natural logarithm of Total assetsi,t (Item AT), adjusted for inflation 
Tangibilityi,t (PPE) Plant, property and equipment expensei,t (Item PPENT) scaled by total assetsi,t (Item AT) 
Market-to-Book ratioi,t (M/B) (Total assetsi,t (Item AT) - Book equityi,t + Market equityi,t) scaled by total assetsi,t (Item AT) 
Research & Developmenti,t (R&D) Research & Development expensei,t (Item XRD) scaled by salesi,t (Item SALE) 
Profitabilityi,t (PROFIT) Operating income before depreciationi,t (Item OIBDP) scaled by total assetsi,t-1 (Item AT) 
Depreciationi,t (DRP) Depreciation and Amortisationi,t (Item DP) scaled by total assetsi,t-1 (Item AT) 
Cash Flow Volatilityi,t (Volatility) Standard deviation of historical operating income, requiring at least three years of historical data 
Dividend payeri,t (DivPayer) A dummy variable equals to one if firm paid out dividends (Item DVT) during a fiscal year, otherwise zero 
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Table 6.2 presents the breakdown of the total sample firm-year observations. The sample is an unbalanced panel data which consists of 131,662 firm-year 
observations over the period 1961-2010. 
 Sample 
 Initial Excluded Remaining 
Number of firm-year observations 200,183   
    
Less:    
Firm-year observations with total assets less than 1 million  (727)  
Firm-year observations with sales less than 1 million  (8,018)  
Firm-year observations with book leverage ratio (BL) greater than 0.8  (2,163)  
Firm-year observations without 2 years of contiguous book leverage ratio  (17,493)  
Firm-year observations with market-to-book ratio (M/B) greater than ten  (1,091)  
Firm-year observations with profitability (PROFIT) greater than one  (287)  
Firm-year observations with profitability (PROFIT) less than negative one  (18,685)  
Financial firms (SIC code 6000 – 6900) and utilities firms (SIC code 4900 – 4999)  (20,057)  
    
Firm-year observations in the final sample   131,662 
 
 
 
Table 6.2: Sample selection for US data 
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categorize the deciles into three broad groupings.71  Deciles 1, 2 and 3 refer to firms 
with low leverage, Deciles 4, 5, 6 and 7 refer to firms with medium leverage, and 
Deciles 8, 9 and 10 refer to firms with high leverage.  I estimate the SOA for each 
decile using the modified partial adjustment model in Section 6.3. 
 
 
 
6.2.2 Summary statistics 
 
Table 6.3 presents the summary statistics of the sample firms’ characteristics.  
Overall, the findings in Table 6.3 are consistent with Hovakimian and Li (2011) 
except in the maximum values of the research and development ratio (R&D) and the 
depreciation ratio (DEP).72   
 
                                                             
71  A transition matrix is created to address the question whether the deciles are stable.  The 
transition matrix shows the movement of firms over 1 year, 3 years and 5 years.  For 
instance, 78.5% of the firms in Decile 1 remains in the same decile next year, 60.2% of the 
firms remain still in Decile 1 over 3 years and 50.8% over 5 years.  For Decile 10, 74.9% of 
the firms remains in the same decile in a year, 55.8% over 3 years and 45.7% over 5 years.  
Transition matrix is presented in Appendix B.    
72  Hovakimian and Li (2011) trim their accounting variables at one percent of both tails of the 
distribution.  Hence, their maximum value of the R&D and the DEP are 1.2 and 0.213, which 
are lower than our observed maximum values (R&D = 85.891, DEP = 10.119) in Table 6.3.  
Firms have high R&D because they are operating in high research and development intensity 
sector and invest heavily on research and development for future operational needs (e.g. in 
the industry of manufacturing pharmaceutical products, medical equipment, measuring and 
control equipment).  I also find that those firms operating in the industry of entertainment 
services, petroleum and natural gas, electronic equipment, measuring and control equipment 
are holding a large amount of fixed assets, the fixed assets will lose value over time and will 
need to be replaced, therefore these firms manage to write off portions of their fixed asset’s 
value over time and appear to have high level of depreciation.   
 
To confirm that I have employed Hovakimian and Li’s (2011) approach and that my 
departures from it are only trivial.  I replicated their study (which uses data from 1970 to 
2007).  I followed the sample selection procedure in Hovakimian and Li (2011) but not trim 
as they did.  Overall the findings in Table 6.3 are consistent with Hovakimian and Li (2011) 
except in the maximum values of the research and development ratio and the depreciation 
ratio.  I find SOA equals 8.47%, which is very close to the SOA reported in Hovakimian and 
Li (2011), 8.8%.  Therefore, the impact of trimming is minor.   
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Table 6.4 reports the correlation coefficients between leverage ratio and the 
determinants used to estimate a proxy for target leverage in Equation [6.1].  The 
relationships between leverage (BL) and asset tangibility (PPE), firm size (Ln(TA)), 
industry median leverage (IND MEDIAN BL) and depreciation (DEP) are positive, 
and there is a negative relationship between leverage and growth opportunities 
(M/B), unique product (R&D) and profitability (PROFIT).  These results are 
consistent with previous evidence (e.g. Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995) and indicate that these variables are appropriate to model firms’ 
target leverages.  Furthermore, the correlation coefficients between book leverage 
and determinants are relatively low, therefore multicollinearity should not be a major 
problem. 
 
Table 6.5 presents descriptive statistics of the deciles’ characteristics.  Firms 
with high leverage have higher levels of tangible assets (Decile 10 = 0.413) and are 
larger (Decile 10 = 5.227) than firms with lower leverage.  Larger firms, or firms 
with greater asset tangibility, may be expected to hold higher levels of leverage as 
their tangible assets can serve as collateral thus increasing debt capacity.  These 
findings are consistent with Titman and Wessels (1988) and Hovakimian, 
Hovakimian, and Tehranian (2004) who show that debt issuers hold more tangible 
assets and are significantly larger.  The lower research and development ratio (Decile 
10 = 0.061) and profitability ratio (Decile 10 = 0.111) for firms with high leverage 
suggest that they face tight cash flows and therefore invest less on research and 
development.   
 
 
Page 116 LEVERAGE HETEROGENEITY AND ASYMMETRIC SPEED OF ADJUSTMENT 
 
Page 116 
 
Table 6.3: Summary statistics for US sample 
 
  
Table 6.3 presents the summary statistics for the determinants used to estimate a proxy for target leverage. The sample is an unbalanced panel data which 
consists of 131,662 firm year observations over the period 1961-2010. Leverage ratio (BL) is (short term debt + long term debt)/total assets. Firm size 
(Ln(TA)) is the natural log of total assets, adjusted for inflation. Tangibility (PPE) is the property, plant and equipment scaled by total assets. Market-to-Book 
ratio (M/B) is (total assets – book equity + market equity)/total assets. R&D is the research and development expenses scaled by sales. Profitability (PROFIT) 
is operating income before depreciation scaled by lagged total assets. Depreciation (DEP) is depreciation and amortization scaled by lagged total assets. 
 
Variables Mean Median S.D. Min Max N 
BLt 0.225 0.210 0.178 0.000 0.800 131,662 
Ln(TA)t 4.954 4.746 2.089 0.038 13.627 131,662 
PPEt 0.312 0.263 0.221 0.000 1.000 131,557 
M/Bt 1.616 1.237 1.173 0.042 9.988 108,784 
R&Dt 0.090 0.000 0.894 0.000 85.891 131,662 
PROFIT t 0.133 0.141 0.167 -0.999 1.000 131,662 
DEPt 0.052 0.043 0.055 0.000 10.119 131,632 
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Table 6.4: Correlation matrix for US sample 
Table 6.4 reports the correlation coefficients between the book leverage ratio and determinants.  Coefficients of correlation that are significantly different from 
zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level are marked with *, ** and ***, respectively. 
 
 BL Ln(TA) PPE M/B R&D Ind median leverage PROFIT 
BL 1       
Ln(TA) 0.1409*** 1      
PPE 0.3067*** 0.2022*** 1     
M/B -0.2743*** 0.1269*** -0.1836*** 1    
R&D -0.0580*** -0.0248*** -0.0756*** 0.1097*** 1   
Ind median 
leverage 
0.3620*** 0.0757*** 0.3912*** -0.3006*** -0.1351*** 1  
PROFIT -0.0132*** 0.1824*** 0.1645*** 0.0677*** -0.2269*** 0.1798*** 1 
DEP 0.0610*** 0.0278*** 0.3516*** 0.0344*** -0.0241*** 0.0268*** 0.1577*** 
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Table 6.5: Summary statistics for deciles 
Table 6.5 presents the mean and the standard deviations of determinants of each decile. The sample is an unbalanced panel data which consists of 131,662 
firm year observations over the period 1961-2009. Each calendar year, firms are ranked into deciles based on the leverage ratio. Deciles 1, 2 and 3 refers to 
firms with low leverage, Deciles 4, 5, 6 and 7 refers to firms with medium leverage and Deciles 8, 9 and 10 refers to firms with high leverage. Leverage ratio 
(BL) is (short term debt + long term debt)/total assets. Firm size (Ln(TA)) is the natural log of total assets, adjusted for inflation. Tangibility (PPE) is the 
property, plant and equipment, scaled by total assets. Market-to-Book ratio (M/B) is (total assets – book equity + market equity)/total assets. R&D is the 
research and development expenses, scaled by sales. Profitability (PROFIT) is operating income before depreciation, scaled by lagged total assets. 
Depreciation (DEP) is depreciation and amortization, scaled by lagged total assets.  *, **, and *** denote statistical significance of the difference between 
Decile 1 and Decile 10 at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels respectively.   
 
Variables  Decile 1 Decile 2 Decile 3 Decile 4 Decile 5 Decile 6 Decile 7 Decile 8 Decile 9 Decile 10 
BLt 
Mean 0.003*** 0.028 0.071 0.123 0.178 0.231 0.284 0.344 0.421 0.570 
S.D. (0.007) (0.031) (0.049) (0.050) (0.043) (0.036) (0.031) (0.031) (0.036) (0.080) 
Ln(TA)t 
Mean 3.876*** 4.326 4.607 4.874 5.190 5.359 5.442 5.368 5.272 5.227 
S.D. (1.593) (1.627) (1.866) (2.034) (2.166) (2.218) (2.227) (2.215) (2.169) (2.043) 
PPEt 
Mean 0.210*** 0.218 0.254 0.288 0.316 0.337 0.350 0.361 0.377 0.413 
S.D. (0.186) (0.182) (0.184) (0.191) (0.201) (0.209) (0.219) (0.229) (0.238) (0.261) 
M/Bt 
Mean 2.227*** 2.177 1.878 1.687 1.502 1.439 1.372 1.317 1.284 1.306 
S.D. (1.623) (1.626) (1.375) (1.220) (0.995) (0.897) (0.822) (0.758) (0.685) (0.716) 
R&Dt 
Mean 0.134*** 0.201 0.149 0.120 0.069 0.049 0.044 0.034 0.039 0.061 
S.D. (0.818) (1.195) (1.058) (0.891) (0.728) (0.492) (0.474) (0.562) (0.871) (1.374) 
PROFITt 
Mean 0.150*** 0.129 0.132 0.134 0.138 0.141 0.140 0.133 0.125 0.111 
S.D. (0.219) (0.221) (0.198) (0.178) (0.156) (0.138) (0.129) (0.126) (0.127) (0.138) 
DEPt 
Mean 0.043*** 0.048 0.050 0.052 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.054 0.054 0.057 
S.D. (0.041) (0.061) (0.046) (0.051) (0.040) (0.049) (0.043) (0.040) (0.044) (0.053) 
            
N  13,146 13,167 13,172 13,174 13,159 13,180 13,177 13,169 13,170 13,148 
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Firms with low leverage appear to be more profitable (Decile 1 = 0.150) and 
have higher market-to-book ratios (Decile 1 = 2.227) than firms with high leverage.  
This is consistent with Frank and Goyal (2009) who find that more profitable firms 
have higher market valuations and therefore use less debt.  Additionally, firms with 
higher market-to-book ratios are expected to have lower leverage ratios because they  
can raise capital through equity issues when the market values of their assets are 
relatively higher than their book values (see, e.g., Baker and Wurgler 2002). 
 
 
 
6.3 Speed of leverage adjustment estimation 
 
Using the partial adjustment model, many empirical studies find evidence in 
favour of firms’ adjustment toward their target leverages (Jalilvand and Harris 1984; 
Flannery and Rangan 2006; Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman 2001).  However, Chang 
and Dasgupta (2009) demonstrate that the estimated SOA from the standard partial 
adjustment model are indistinguishable from estimates derived using randomly 
generated inputs.  Therefore, random changes in data could be interpreted as 
purposeful adjustments to the target leverage due to mean reversion, i.e. the leverage 
ratio is bounded between zero and one.  Studies using the partial adjustment model 
which support the notion that firms have leverage targets are now controversial. 
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Hovakimian and Li (2011) present a modified methodology to estimate SOA 
via a two-stage process that addresses Chang and Dasgupta’s (2009) critique. 73  
Hovakimian and Li (2011) suggest a two-step method to avoid the issue of look-
ahead bias and the effect of mechanical mean reversion (a detailed discussion is 
presented in Section 2.6).  The first step is to use historical fixed firm effects 
regressions to estimate the target leverage for each firm in the sample.  The second 
step is a modified partial adjustment model that uses the estimate of the target 
leverage from stage one.  I utilize Hovakimian and Li’s (2011) approach in order to 
eliminate the empirical bias in favour of target adjustment behaviour and avoid the 
risk of generating spuriously significant estimated SOAs when firms do not follow 
the target leverage.   
 
The first stage of the Hovakimian and Li’s (2011) methodology is a historical 
fixed firm effects regression to estimate a proxy for the target leverage based on firm 
characteristics variables, which takes the following form: 
 
 
BLi,t+1 = β1M/Bi,t + β2PROFITi,t + β3Ln(TA)i,t + β4PPEi,t + β5R&Di,t + 
β6R&D dummy + β7DEPi,t + β8Ind median leveragei,t + νi +  
                δi,t+1                                                                                                                                    [6.1] 
 
  
where, BLi,t+1 is the leverage ratio for firm i in year, t+1 and δ is the residual term.   
We measure leverage ratio (BL) as the total debt scaled by the total assets and use it 
                                                             
73  Hovakimian and Li (2011) suggest that the modified partial adjustment model can potentially 
corrects for the mean reversion and improves the ability to reject the target adjustment 
hypothesis when firms do not behave in a way which follows the target leverage. 
Page 121 LEVERAGE HETEROGENEITY AND ASYMMETRIC SPEED OF ADJUSTMENT 
 
Page 121 
 
as our measure of a firm’s leverage ratio.  The independent variables used in 
Equation [6.1] are the determinants of capital structure considered in the previous 
literature that are related to the trade-off between the costs and benefits of debt and 
equity (Fama and French 2002; Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman 2001; Kayhan and 
Titman 2007; Rajan and Zingales 1995; Hovakimian and Li 2011; Lemmon, Roberts, 
and Zender 2008).  The independent variables appearing in Equation [6.1] are 
described below and the definitions of these determinants are presented in Table 6.1. 
 
Market-to-book ratio (M/B) is a commonly-used proxy for firm’s growth 
opportunities.  Trade-off, pecking order theory, and the market timing model 
provide different interpretations of growth opportunities.  Trade-off theory 
predicts that firms with greater growth opportunities reduce leverage.  A higher 
M/B indicates more attractive growth options in the future.  In the market 
timing model, firms with greater growth opportunities tend to raise funds by 
issuing equity when their stock prices are relatively high (see, e.g., 
Hovakimian, Hovakimian, and Tehranian 2004).  In contrast, pecking order 
theory implies that firms with more growth opportunities should accumulate 
more debt over time.  Thus, pecking order theory positively associates growth 
opportunities and leverage.  To capture the effect of growth opportunities on 
leverage, M/B is defined as book debt plus market equity divided by total 
assets.  
 
Profitability (PROFIT): Highly profitable firms are less likely to face financial 
constraints.  Trade-off theory suggests that more profitable firms are likely to 
have more retained earnings resulting in higher financial flexibility.  More 
Page 122 LEVERAGE HETEROGENEITY AND ASYMMETRIC SPEED OF ADJUSTMENT 
 
Page 122 
 
profitable firms have more incentive to take advantage of debt interest shield 
benefits.  Therefore more profitable firms should have more debt.  On the other 
hand, pecking order theory argues that more profitable firms should use their 
retained earnings to support their operations and investments.  If pecking order 
theory holds, higher profitability should result in less leverage (Frank and 
Goyal 2009; Rajan and Zingales 1995).  I use the ratio of earnings before 
interest, tax, depreciation and amortization divided by lagged total assets as an 
indicator of PROFIT.   
 
Firm size (Ln(TA)): Large firms are more diversified and have easier access to 
debt markets; external financing costs are therefore lower for them (Titman and 
Wessels 1988).  Thus, trade-off theory predicts that larger, more mature firms 
will tend to hold more debt.  On the other hand, pecking order theory predicts 
an inverse relation between leverage and firm size because large firms are 
better known and have had the opportunity to retain earnings.  To capture the 
effect of firm size on leverage, I include the natural logarithm of total assets. 
 
Tangibility (PPE): Tangible assets, such as property, plant, and equipment, are 
easier for valuations than intangible assets.  Hence, firms with higher level of 
tangible assets may use them as collateral to take on more debt (Rajan and 
Zingales 1995).  The ratio of net plant, property and equipment divided by total 
assets is included to capture the role of tangibility on leverage.   
 
Research and development (R&D): Firms that make large discretionary 
expenditures such as R&D expenses have more intangible assets and 
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consequently have lower leverage.  Firms with more intangible assets in the 
form of R&D expenses have incentive to issue capital via equity financing 
(Flannery and Rangan 2006).  I capture the role of firm’s intangible assets on 
leverage by including the ratio of net research and development expense 
divided by sales. 
 
Research and development dummy (R&D dummy): Since not every firm in the 
sample reports R&D, an indicator dummy takes the value of one if the firm 
reports R&D, and zero otherwise.   
 
Depreciation and amortization (DEP): Firms are likely to take on more debt 
when the tax rates are higher.  DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) suggest that 
depreciation tax deductions or investment tax credits are substitutes for the tax 
shield benefits of debt.  To capture the effect of interest deductions on debt, an 
indicator of depreciation and amortization divided by lagged total assets is 
included.  
 
Industry median leverage ratio (Ind median leverage): Bradley, Jarrell, and 
Kim (1984) document that firm’ leverage ratios are strongly related to industry 
classification.  I therefore include industry median leverage ratios to control for 
industry effects in Equation [6.1].74 
 
 
                                                             
74  Following Hovakimian and Li (2011), I employ industry median leverage to control for 
industry effects not captured in Equation [6.1] by other independent variables.  
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BL*i,t+1 = 𝛽1�M/Bi,t + 𝛽2�PROFITi,t + 𝛽3�Ln(TA)i,t + 𝛽4�PPEi,t + 𝛽5�R&Di,t + 
𝛽6�R&D dummy + 𝛽7�DEPi,t + 𝛽8�Ind median leveragei,t         [6.2] 
 
 
Equation [6.2] states that BL*i,t+1 is the predicted target leverage obtained from 
Equation [6.1].  The second stage of Hovakimian and Li’s (2011) methodology is to 
include the target leverage proxy, BL*i,t+1 to estimate the SOA, using the modified 
partial adjustment model in Equation [6.3].75  
 
 
BLi,t+1 – BLi,t = α + λ1BL*i,t+1 + λ2BLi,t + εi,t+1                                        [6.3] 
 
 
Equation [6.3] corrects for the mechanical mean reversion found by Chang 
and Dasgupta (2009) by including a specific proxy for the target leverage.  
According to Hovakimian and Li (2011), any statistical significance of (1- λ2) may 
be due to mechanical mean reversion.  Therefore, in all subsequent empirical 
analyses I report the values of λ1 and refer to it as the SOA. 76  A positive λ1 
                                                             
75  Equation [6.1] is estimated using all the historical data, for each decile, available at a point in 
time in order to avoid look-ahead bias.  For example, my first step is to run Equation [6.1] for 
each decile using observations in 1961 and 1962 (using at least 2 years) to obtain the target 
leverage for 1963.  My second step is to run Equation [6.3] to obtain the SOA for 1963.  I 
then re-run Equation [6.1] for each decile using observations in 1961, 1962 and 1963 to 
obtain the target leverage for 1964, and re-run Equation [6.3] to obtain the SOA for 1964.  
Next, I re-run Equation [6.1] for each decile using observations in 1961, 1962, 1963 and 
1964 to obtain the target leverage for 1965 and then re-run Equation [6.3] to obtain the SOA 
for 1965. 
76  I repeat the first and second steps until I complete both Equations [6.1] and [6.3] for each 
decile using all firm-years observations between 1961 and 2010.  Following the first step 
(Equation [6.1]), there are there are target leverage proxies between 1961 and 2010.  The 
second step, Equation [6.3] is estimated annually on cross-sectional data, the reported SOAs 
are the average of λ1 estimates between 1961 and 2010. 
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represents a SOA that is moving toward the direction of the target leverage, whereas 
a negative λ1 indicates a leverage adjustment in the opposite direction from the 
target leverage.  Considering the levels of adjustment speed, a high estimate of λ1 
implies that firms, on average, undertake a relatively more rapid adjustment. 
 
 
 
6.4 Empirical analyses 
6.4.1 Heterogeneity in the speeds of leverage adjustment 
 
This section discusses the estimated SOAs for the sample firms.  The speed 
with which firms adjust toward their target leverages exhibits the existence of 
leverage targets and, importantly, quantifies the importance of maintaining target 
leverage.  The SOA is likely to be positive, and the further away the firms are from 
their target leverage, the higher it is likely to be.  Specifically, the magnitude of the 
SOA reveals firms’ target adjustment behaviour; in each period, a firm closes a 
certain fraction of the deviation from the target leverage.   
 
Panel A of Table 6.6 reports the SOA estimate for the entire sample.  Panel A 
shows that firms have leverage targets but that they move toward them slowly.  The 
result shows that firms adjust 7.63 percent of the gap between actual and target 
leverages each year which is comparable to the estimated SOA of 8.8 percent in 
Hovakimian and Li (2011).  This suggests that firms take about thirteen years to 
move toward their target leverages and implies that moving toward their targets is 
not a high priority.   
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According to trade-off theory, each firm manages to reach its value-
maximizing target leverage, and hence undertakes leverage adjustment to minimize 
the deviations when it is away from its target leverage.  There is empirical evidence 
that when firms undertake leverage adjustments they tend to move towards their 
target leverages (Jalilvand and Harris 1984; Flannery and Rangan 2006; Hovakimian, 
Opler, and Titman 2001).  Furthermore, firms adjust towards target leverage only 
spasmodically, when the benefits of being close to the target leverage outweigh the 
costs of such adjustment (Leary and Roberts 2005; Strebulaev 2007; Harford, Klasa, 
and Walcott 2009; Gungoraydinoglu and Öztekin 2011).   
 
Speeds with which firms adjust toward target leverage are associated with 
firms’ cash flows, financial constraints and market timing considerations  
(Faulkender et al. 2012), firm-specific characteristics (Drobetz and Wanzenried 
2006; Dang, Kim, and Shin 2012), financial deficits/surpluses (Byoun 2008) and the 
institutional and legal arrangements across countries (Öztekin and Flannery 2012).  I 
suspect that the SOA depends not only on the determinants that have been 
documented in the literature, but also on the degree of financial distress costs facing 
the firm.   
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Table 6.6: Speeds of adjustment to target leverage 
Following the methodology of Hovakimian and Li (2011), Table 6.6 presents the Fama-
Macbeth mean and t-statistics for coefficient estimates for α, 𝜆1 and 𝜆2. The reported 
coefficient estimates are the averages obtained from annual cross sectional partial adjustment 
regressions – a detailed discussion is presented in Section 6.3.  Panel A presents the average 
SOA across all firms in the sample. Panel B reports the average SOA for each decile in the 
sample. The t-statistics in α, 𝜆1 and 𝜆2 are adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity 
using the Newey-West (1987) approach. Coefficient estimates significantly different from 0 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels are denoted as *, ** and *** respectively. 
 
Panel A: Full Sample 
  α 𝜆1 𝜆2 
Mean  0.0158*** 0.0763*** -0.1296*** 
t-stat.  6.55 6.46 -18.08 
     
Panel B: Deciles 
  α 𝜆1 𝜆2 
Decile 1 Mean 0.0163*** 0.0421*** 0.6645 t-stat. 12.13 4.20 1.06 
Decile 2 Mean 0.0252*** 0.0316*** 0.1699 t-stat. 6.81 2.79 -1.22 
Decile 3 Mean 0.0257*** 0.0337** -0.0533 t-stat. 5.28 2.05 -0.76 
Decile 4 Mean 0.0171 0.0510*** -0.1146 t-stat. 1.38 2.90 -1.54 
Decile 5 Mean 0.0212 0.0518*** -0.1206 t-stat. 1.50 3.00 -1.57 
Decile 6 Mean 0.0212 0.0674*** -0.1455** t-stat. 1.33 3.20 -2.42 
Decile 7 Mean -0.0173 0.0851*** -0.0329 t-stat. -1.18 4.16 -0.61 
Decile 8 Mean -0.0133 0.0715*** -0.0491 t-stat. -0.64 3.78 -0.78 
Decile 9 Mean -0.0098 0.1106*** -0.0872** t-stat. -0.64 6.81 -2.37 
Decile 10 Mean 0.0384*** 0.1706*** -0.2135*** t-stat. 2.92 9.34 -9.42 
 
 
Firms with high leverage are under pressure to decrease their leverage ratios to 
reduce their potential financial distress costs, implying that they should undertake 
quicker adjustment than those with low leverage to maximize the value of the firm.  
Dang, Kim, and Shin (2012) suggest that firms with low profitability are typically 
high leveraged, which may result in large bankruptcy and liquidation costs, hence 
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they undertake quicker adjustment toward their target leverages.  Therefore, the need 
to adjust toward the target leverage, to lower their debt levels and, more importantly, 
to avert bankruptcy, is stronger for financially distressed firms because the 
consequent the financial distress costs and costs of deviating from the target leverage 
will be smaller.  On the other hand, firms with low leverage are expected to incur 
higher costs of external financing and therefore appear to adjust at a slower pace than 
those with high leverage.  I expect to find differences in the SOA between firms with 
different levels of leverage because the leverage level provides a good indicator for 
the level of costs of debt that firms face.   
 
The SOA estimates are presented in Panel B of Table 6.6, where I present 
results for firms grouped into 10 deciles by leverage from lowest (Decile 1) to 
highest (Decile 10). 77   The estimated SOAs for each decile are all significantly 
positive.  Firms follow their target leverages and the leverage level does matter in the 
leverage adjustment process.  The near-monotonic positive association between 
firms’ leverage levels and their estimated SOAs provides evidence of pronounced 
heterogeneity.  The estimated SOAs are particularly strong for firms with high 
leverage (Deciles 8, 9 and 10).  Firms with high leverage (Deciles 8, 9 and 10) 
appear to adjust between 7.15 percent and 17.06 percent of the deviation from the 
target leverage each year.  Firms with medium leverage (Deciles 4, 5, 6 and 7) adjust 
by between 5.10 percent and 8.51 percent of the leverage gap each year, whereas 
firms with low leverage (Deciles 1, 2 and 3) adjust only between 3.16 percent and 
4.21 percent of the leverage deviation each year.  These estimates are consistent with 
                                                             
77  The adjustment speed regression specified in Equation [6.1] is then run separately on each 
decile.  For example, Faulkender et al. (2012) estimate the SOA for each subset in their 
sample.  Flannery and Rangan (2006) run separate regressions on subsamples.  This method 
assumes that firms can move from one decile to another through time, for example, a firm in 
Decile 1 later moves to Decile 2, or a firm in Decile 8 moves to Decile 6 next year).      
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my expectation that firms with higher leverage face higher levels of financial distress 
costs and greater agency conflicts issues.  Firms behave as if they have targets but 
their SOA toward these targets is conditional on their leverage.  Hence, firms with 
higher leverage undertake more rapid adjustment to avoid the potentially large 
financial distress costs.   
 
Table 6.6 demonstrates heterogeneity in the adjustment speeds, confirming 
previous findings that firms do not adjust at the same rate.  Heterogeneous leverage 
adjustment speeds are driven by different levels of leverage.  It could be that 
financial distress costs are important drivers of leverage adjustment.  Firms appear 
to be keener and adjust at faster rates when they are under pressure to reduce their 
financial distress burdens.  Thus, accounting for firms’ leverage levels provides new 
evidence that the SOA is conditional on the degree of financial distress costs facing 
the firm.  However, the estimated SOA do not incorporate information about how 
firms manage their leverage ratios over time; this is further investigated in the next 
section.   
 
 
 
6.4.2 The evolution of leverage 
 
Under the trade-off framework, the classic argument is that when the costs of 
debt are greater than the benefits, firms respond to lower the financial distress level 
by decreasing their leverage ratios.  Therefore, I would expect clear evidence that 
firms with high leverage lower their debt levels to achieve target leverage when their 
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financial distress costs outweigh the interest tax shield benefits of debt.  Firms with 
low leverage, on the other hand, can afford to take on more debt because of their low 
levels of financial distress.  I suspect that firms with different levels of leverage 
manage their leverage ratios this way, assuming that they follow their target 
leverages (according to their estimated SOAs).  Hence, studying the evolution of 
leverage for the cross-section of firms by predicting leverage ratios for each decile 
based on their SOAs, allows me to provide insights as in whether firms with high 
(low) leverage decrease (increase) their leverage ratios to approach their target 
leverages, as predicted by trade-off theory.  
 
This hypothesis is tested by modifying the partial adjustment model in 
Equation [6.3].  The modification process is shown below.  
 
 
BLi,t+1 – BLvi,t = α + λ1BL*i,t+1 + λ2BLi,t + εi,t+1                                      [6.3] 
 
BLi,t+1 – BLi,t = α + λ1BL*i,t+1 + λ2BLi,t                                                  [6.4]  
 
𝐵𝐿𝚤,𝑡+1�  = α + λ1BL*i,t+1 + λ2BLi,t + BLi,t                                                [6.5] 
 
 
Using the partial adjustment model in Equation [6.3], I neglect the residual 
term, εi,t+1 to get Equation [6.4].  I then re-arrange Equation [6.4] to obtain the 
reduced-form partial adjustment model in Equation [6.5].  In Equation [6.5], for each 
decile in my sample, I start with its long run average leverage ratio (BLi,t), long run 
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average target leverage proxy (BL*i,t+1), and estimated SOA (λ1 and λ2 in Table 6.6) 
to simulate a path of future leverage ratios (𝐵𝐿𝚤,𝑡+1� , namely, the predicted leverage 
ratio) spanning 30 years.  During the simulation process, I track the leverage 
evolution between deciles.  When a decile’s predicted leverage ratio crosses the 
barrier of another decile’s long run average leverage ratio, its estimated SOA will be 
substituted by the estimated SOA of the corresponding decile.   
 
Figure 6.1 represents the predicted leverage ratios obtained from the simulation 
process.  The predicted leverage ratios are presented in Appendix A.  The initial 
predicted leverage ratio for firms with high leverage (e.g. Decile 10) and firms with 
low leverage (e.g. Decile 1) are 53.53 percent and 2.68 percent respectively.  The 
convergence occurs in the first few years as shown by the flattening slopes in Deciles 
1 and 10.  In the subsequent 30 years, the predicted leverages between firms with 
high leverage (Deciles 8, 9 and 10) and low leverage (Deciles 1, 2 and 3) merge 
toward a moderate level of leverage.  As presented in Figure 6.1, the predicted 
leverage ratio of Decile 10 drops from 53.53 percent to 24.40 percent over 30 years 
whereas the predicted leverage ratio of Decile 1 increases from 2.68 percent to 25.21 
percent.  Taken together, the predicted leverage evolution in Figure 6.1 infers that 
firms with high leverage are required to lower their debt levels to achieve their target 
leverage, whereas firms with low leverage increase their debt levels which bring 
them closer to their target leverages.  This appears to support the prediction of trade-
off theory. 
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The level of convergence on the predicted leverage ratios in Figure 6.1, where 
by design, firms adjust toward their target leverages, does not appear to be random.78  
Firms with high (low) leverage reduce (increase) their leverage ratios in the short 
run.  In particular, firms with high leverage appear to be more inclined to lower their 
leverage ratios than firms with low leverage.   Figure 6.1 indicates that the estimated 
SOA plays an important role in explaining the convergence of leverage ratios.  In 
other words, the capital structure adjustment toward the target leverage is, at least in 
part, the driver of the variation in capital structure in the short-term.   
                                                             
78  The pattern I see is reminiscent of Figure 1 on page 1580 in Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender 
(2008) although my figure shows a lower long run propensity for firms to converge to a 
global target. 
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Figure 6.1: Predicted leverage evolution 
 
Figure 6.1 shows the predicted leverage ratio of estimating Equation [6.5] – refer to Section 6.4.2.  I form the predicted leverage evolution that evolves from 
decile’s initial long run average leverage ratio. Following the reduced-form partial adjustment model in Equation [6.5], I simulate a path of future leverage 
ratios spanning 30 years for each decile according to its estimated SOA presented in Table 6.6. 
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6.4.3 The effects of firm-specific characteristics on leverage ratios 
 
One implication of the heterogeneous adjustment speeds presented in Table 6.6 
is that the speeds with which firms adjust toward target leverage are related to their 
leverage levels.  However, Table 6.6 provides no information about what drives 
firms to adjust their leverage ratios toward the target leverage other than higher or 
lower leverage.  In this section, I investigate the impact of the firm-specific 
characteristics on leverage variation between firms with different levels of leverage.  
A number of studies have examined the effect of firm-specific characteristics on 
firms’ capital structure (see, e.g., Flannery and Rangan 2006; Frank and Goyal 
2009).  However, this chapter adds to the literature by examining the impact of firm-
specific characteristics on capital structure conditional on firms’ leverage levels.   
 
Clearly, firm characteristics factors have the power to explain firms’ leverage 
ratios.  I suspect that the firms with high leverage in the sample possess important 
firm-specific characteristics: they are typically larger, with greater tangible assets.  
Firms with low leverage, on the other hand, are likely to be high-growth and highly 
profitable firms.  Since firms carrying differential levels of leverage possess different 
firm-specific characteristics, and many of these characteristics in turn affect leverage 
ratios when firms follow their target leverages, it seems likely that these 
characteristics also constitute differential pressure to undertake leverage adjustment.   
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6.4.3.1 Empirical specification 
 
A thorough examination is necessary to explore the sensitivity of firms’ 
leverage ratios to the variation in firm-specific characteristics.  To examine the 
impact of firm-specific characteristics on leverage ratios for each decile, I propose 
Equation [6.6] which takes the following form:   
 
 
BLi,t = α + βXi,t-1 + γDecile + δDecile*Xi,t-1 + νt + εi,t                            [6.6] 
 
 
In Equation [6.6], ε is the residual term and νt is year fixed effects.79  Decile 
is a vector of dummy variable (Deciles 2 to 10) and takes a value of 1 if the firm 
corresponds to a particular decile in a given year, otherwise zero.  X is a vector of 
selected firm-specific characteristics factors (some factors are discussed in Section 
6.3).  The interaction variables, defined as the product between the given decile 
dummy and each selected firm-specific characteristic.  Specifically, the coefficients 
δ are the main interest.  The coefficients of δ capture the role that each selected 
firm-specific characteristic in each decile, whether or not it has differential or 
additional power in explaining the variation of firms’ leverage ratios.          
 
                                                             
79  Recent studies have suggested that regression after accounting for firm fixed effects provides 
no additional explanatory power to explain firms’ leverage ratios.  Lemmon, Roberts, and 
Zender (2008) illustrate that the capital structure determinants account for a very small 
fraction of the explained variation in leverage ratios when firm fixed effects are considered.  
Chang and Dasgupta (2011) demonstrate that firm fixed effects contribute as much as 95 
percent of the explained variation.  These findings raise the concern that the much of the 
capital structure determinants explanatory power comes from cross-sectional variation and 
the importance of these capital structure determinants will fall after controlling for firm fixed 
effects.  Therefore, we only control for year fixed effects in Equation [6.6]. 
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6.4.3.2 Analyses and results 
 
Table 6.7 reports the results of estimating Equation [6.6] for the interaction 
variables between the decile and the selected firm-specific characteristics.  The 
interaction terms, defined as the product between each decile dummy and firm-
specific characteristics, are designed to model how the effect of these firm-specific 
characteristics varies for each leverage decile.  
 
 
Table 6.7: The effects of firm-specific characteristics on deciles' leverage ratios 
Table 6.7 presents the results of estimating Equation [6.6] – refer to Section 6.4.3.1. The 
dependent variable is leverage ratio (BL), which is the ratio of total debt divided by total 
assets. Firm size (Ln(TA)) is the natural log of total assets. Market-to-Book ratio (M/B) is 
(total assets – book equity + market equity)/total assets. Tangibility (PPE) is the property, 
plant and equipment, scaled by total assets. Profitability (PROFIT) is operating income 
before depreciation, scaled by lagged total assets. Industry median leverage (Ind median 
leverage) is the median leverage in the industry and industry composition is determined by 
the forty-nine Fama-French industry definitions. Cash flow volatility (Volatility) is the 
standard deviation of historical operating income, requiring at least three years of historical 
data. Dividend payer (DivPayer) equals to one if firm paid out dividends during a fiscal year, 
otherwise zero. Year fixed (Firm fixed) effects denote whether the calendar year fixed (firm 
fixed) effects are included in the specification. The t-statistics are computed based on robust 
standard errors clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.   
 
 Coefficient t-stat. 
Constant 0.0049*** 2.65 
Ln(TA) 0.0051*** 13.97 
M/B 0.0001 0.31 
PPE -0.0052 -1.57 
PROFIT -0.0160*** -5.77 
Ind median leverage -0.0901*** -14.27 
Volatility 0.0000** -2.51 
DivPayer -0.0099*** -8.74 
   
Decile2*Constant 0.0235*** 8.17 
Decile2*Ln(TA) 0.0010*** -9.53 
Decile2*M/B -0.0003 -1.33 
Decile2*PPE 0.0038*** 2.17 
Decile2*PROFIT -0.0058*** 3.07 
Decile2*Ind median leverage -0.0199*** 9.35 
Decile2*Volatility 0.0000 0.99 
Decile2*DivPayer 0.0029*** 9.32 
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Decile3*Constant 0.0514*** 18.05 
Decile3*Ln(TA) -0.0016*** -13.94 
Decile3*M/B -0.0019*** -5.42 
Decile3*PPE 0.0159*** 4.67 
Decile3*PROFIT 0.0099*** 7.31 
Decile3*Ind median leverage 0.0647*** 18.46 
Decile3*Volatility 0.0000*** 2.68 
Decile3*DivPayer 0.0151*** 16.42 
   
   
Decile4*Constant 0.1057*** 40.76 
Decile4*Ln(TA) -0.0020*** -16.02 
Decile4*M/B -0.0026*** -6.67 
Decile4*PPE 0.0063*** 2.69 
Decile4*PROFIT 0.0162*** 8.59 
Decile4*Ind median leverage 0.0736*** 20.17 
Decile4*Volatility 0.0000 0.24 
Decile4*DivPayer 0.0163*** 17.61 
   
Decile5*Constant 0.1671*** 73.02 
Decile5*Ln(TA) -0.0015*** -16.32 
Decile5*M/B -0.0022*** -6.08 
Decile5*PPE 0.0045*** 2.60 
Decile5*PROFIT 0.0160*** 8.98 
Decile5*Ind median leverage 0.0451*** 18.42 
Decile5*Volatility 0.0000 0.64 
Decile5*DivPayer 0.0097*** 14.77 
   
Decile6*Constant 0.2239*** 106.82 
Decile6*Ln(TA) -0.0008*** -15.58 
Decile6*M/B -0.0001 -0.61 
Decile6*PPE 0.0006* 1.65 
Decile6*PROFIT 0.0001*** 4.77 
Decile6*Ind median leverage 0.0295*** 17.80 
Decile6*Volatility 0.0000** 2.03 
Decile6*DivPayer 0.0024*** 10.04 
   
Decile7*Constant 0.2765*** 130.84 
Decile7*Ln(TA) 0.0005*** -12.01 
Decile7*M/B 0.0008* 1.90 
Decile7*PPE -0.0002 1.44 
Decile7*PROFIT -0.0079** 2.28 
Decile7*Ind median leverage 0.0136*** 15.23 
Decile7*Volatility 0.0000** 2.38 
Decile7*DivPayer -0.0029*** 5.70 
   
Decile8*Constant 0.3342*** 144.79 
Decile8*Ln(TA) 0.0015*** -9.29 
Decile8*M/B 0.0017*** 3.59 
Decile8*PPE 0.0020** 2.02 
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Decile8*PROFIT -0.0045*** 2.90 
Decile8*Ind median leverage 0.0007*** 12.80 
Decile8*Volatility 0.0000 1.40 
Decile8*DivPayer -0.0068** 2.39 
   
Decile9*Constant 0.4090*** 145.50 
Decile9*Ln(TA) 0.0022*** -6.81 
Decile9*M/B 0.0026*** 3.97 
Decile9*PPE 0.0000 1.35 
Decile9*PROFIT -0.0130 0.59 
Decile9*Ind median leverage 0.0001*** 11.20 
Decile9*Volatility 0.0000* 1.65 
Decile9*DivPayer -0.0093 0.40 
   
   
Decile10*Constant 0.5388*** 74.73 
Decile10*Ln(TA) 0.0055 0.450 
Decile10*M/B 0.0035** 2.13 
Decile10*PPE 0.0251*** 4.18 
Decile10*PROFIT -0.0532*** -3.45 
Decile10*Ind median leverage -0.0123*** 4.11 
Decile10*Volatility 0.0000 0.10 
Decile10*DivPayer -0.0248*** -4.52 
   
Year fixed effect Yes 
Firm fixed effect No 
Adjusted R2 0.968 
AIC -4.126 
 
 
In order to draw a direct comparison, I also present the interaction coefficients δ in 
Figure 6.2.  In Figure 6.2, there are eight panels, with each panel presenting the 
constant term and estimated coefficients of the interaction variables throughout the 
deciles.  In each panel, the vertical axis indicates the coefficients δ, and the 
horizontal axis indicates the deciles. 
 
 
The estimated coefficients are the results of estimating Equation [6.6]. The dependent 
variable is book leverage ratio (BL), which is the ratio of total debt divided by total assets. 
Firm size (Ln(TA)) is the natural log of total assets. Market-to-Book ratio (M/B) is (total 
assets – book equity + market equity)/total assets. Tangibility (PPE) is the property, plant 
and equipment scaled by total assets. Profitability (PROFIT) is operating income before 
depreciation scaled by lagged total assets. Industry median leverage (Ind median leverage) is 
the median leverage in the industry and industry composition is determined by the forty-nine 
Figure 6.2: Model generated regressions coefficients 
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Fama-French industry definitions. Cash flow volatility (Volatility) is the standard deviation 
of historical operating income, requiring at least three years of historical data. Dividend 
payer (DivPayer) equals to one if firm paid out dividends during a fiscal year, otherwise 
zero. The t-statistics are computed based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level 
and reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the level of 
10%, 5% and 1% respectively.    
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My discussion starts with the constant terms, which indicate the base leverage 
of each decile in the sample.  As can be seen in Panel A in Figure 6.2, the magnitude 
of the base leverage increases as it shifts from low leverage firms (Deciles 1, 2 and 3) 
to high leverage firms (Deciles 8, 9 and 10).  The upward slope shows that the base 
leverage in Decile 1 (0.0049) is lower than the base leverage in Decile 10 (0.5388).  
These results are consistent with the findings in Table 6.5. 
 
Panel B shows the sensitivity of leverage to a change in firm size (Ln(TA) 
variable) across the deciles.  There is a concave relationship between the sensitivity 
of leverage and the deciles, suggesting that low leverage firms (Deciles 1 and 2) and 
high leverage firms (Deciles 7, 8 and 9) are more likely to increase their leverage 
ratios when their assets are larger.  In contrast, medium leverage firms (Deciles 4, 5 
and 6) appear to decrease their leverage ratios when their assets are larger.  The 
positive relationship between firm size and leverage (based on the statistically 
significant positive interaction coefficients) is consistent with the argument that 
larger firms have better access to capital markets (Titman and Wessels 1988).  
Additionally, larger firm size infers lower financial distress costs of debt, hence more 
debt that the firm can issue, indicating a positive relationship between firm size and 
leverage, according to trade-off theory.  The negative relationship between firm size 
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and leverage (based on the statistically significant negative interaction coefficients) 
appears to be consistent with pecking order, rather than trade-off theory.  Larger 
firms have been around longer and have had an opportunity to retain earnings.  
Hence there is less chance that a larger firm will issue debt, resulting in a negative 
relationship between leverage and firm size.   
 
Panel C displays the sensitivity of leverage to a change in market-to-book ratio 
(M/B variable) across the deciles.  Firms with low leverage (Decile 3) and medium 
leverage (Deciles 4 and 5) are more likely to decrease their leverage ratios when they 
have higher market-to-book ratios.  These findings appear to be consistent with 
Baker and Wurgler’s (2002) market timing model and Myers (1977).  Baker and 
Wurgler (2002) document that firms have less leverage because they exploit equity 
financing to take advantage of higher market values of share prices relative to book 
values, while Myers (1977) finds that high-growth firms are more likely to adopt a 
low leverage policy in order to control the underinvestment.  On the other hand, we 
observe that firms with high leverage (Deciles 8, 9 and 10) undertake progressively 
more debt issuing activity when their market-to-book ratios are higher.  This 
behaviour is consistent with the counter-cyclical pattern arguments of Korajczyk and 
Levy (2003).  One possible explanation for the positive sign of M/B variable for 
highly leveraged firms may be that when a firm is highly valued in the market, 
managers face favourable or lower costs when raising debt.   
 
In Panel D, a significant positive relationship between deciles and firms’ 
tangibility (PPE variable) is observed.  Two points concerning these results are of 
interest.  Firstly, firms are more likely to increase their leverage ratios when their 
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tangible assets are larger.  This is in line with trade-off theory: tangibility can be used 
as a security to lessen the agency cost of debt and mitigate the asset substitution issue 
(Rajan and Zingales 1995).  Secondly, the estimated interaction coefficients seem to 
be relatively larger in magnitude for firms in Decile 10.  
 
Panel E shows the sensitivity of leverage to a change in Profitability (PROFIT 
variable) across the deciles.  Unlike the firm size and market-to-book ratios, there is 
a convex relationship between the sensitivity of leverage and the deciles, indicating 
that firms with low leverage (Deciles 1 and 2) and high leverage (Deciles 8 and 9) 
are more likely to decrease their leverage ratios when their profitability is higher.  In 
particular, the interaction coefficients seem to be relatively larger for firms in Decile 
10.  The negative relationship between profitability and leverage (based on the 
statistically significant negative interaction coefficients) appears to support the 
premise that profitability is related to the availability of internal funds leading to less 
leverage.  An alternative view is that less profitable firms are more likely to be 
highly leveraged.  Both interpretations are consistent with pecking order theory 
(Myers and Majluf 1984).  On the other hand, the positive relationship for firms with 
medium leverage (Deciles 4, 5 and 6) appears to support the premise that, for firms 
in these deciles, profitability may be associated with free cash flow issues and hence 
results in more leverage (Jensen 1986).   
 
In Panel F, as in the profitability results, there is a near-convex relationship 
between the sensitivity of industry median leverage and the deciles; the leverage 
ratios of low leveraged firms (Deciles 1 and 2) are negatively associated with the 
median leverage ratios in their industry (Ind median leverage variable).  In the other 
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deciles, firms react positively to movement in the median leverage ratios in the 
industry, which appears to be consistent with previous studies (e.g. Lemmon, 
Roberts, and Zender (2008)).  The magnitude of the effect diminishes with higher 
leverage, suggesting that the impact of industry median leverage falls when firms’ 
leverage ratios are increasing.   
 
In Panel G, the sensitivities of leverage to a change in cash flow volatility 
(Volatility variable) are generally low and appear to differ in magnitude with 
different signs throughout the deciles.  Given the absence of a clear pattern, it is 
difficult to draw any conclusions.  I now turn to discuss the sensitivity of leverage to 
a change in the variable of dividend payer (Div payer variable) in Panel H.  Like 
profitability, the convex relationship indicates that firms with low leverage (Decile 1) 
and high leverage (Deciles 8 and 10) (based on the statistically significant negative 
interaction coefficients) do not increase their leverage ratios when they pay out 
dividends: they appear to have sufficient funds for their regular dividend payment 
and do not need to raise funds via external financing.  In contrast, the positive 
relationship between the variables of dividend payer and leverage (based on the 
statistically significant positive interaction coefficients) for firms with medium 
leverage (Deciles 4, 5 and 6) implies the opposite: firms in these deciles need to raise 
funds for their regular dividends, resulting in higher leverage ratios.   
 
When considering levels of leverage, the effects of firm characteristics appear 
asymmetric.  First, firms with different levels of leverage react differently to a 
change in firm-specific characteristics.  Secondly, high leverage and low leverage 
firms tend to act in a similar fashion: the larger the firms’ assets (include tangible 
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assets) and the lower their profitability, the more likely they are to increase their 
leverage ratios.  Third, the effects of tangibility, profitability, market-to-book ratios, 
and paying dividends on leverage are significantly stronger for firms in Decile 10 
(the firms with highest leverage ratios in the sample), indicating that they are highly 
sensitive to changes in these features.   
 
 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
If firms have leverage targets, they will act to move toward these targets.  I 
utilize a comprehensive database of US firms to study whether there is a relationship 
between firms’ leverage levels and the heterogeneity in SOA.  Firms with high 
leverage undertake significantly faster leverage adjustments than those with low 
leverage.  Such firms appear concerned about potentially large financial distress 
burdens caused by having high levels of debt.  They therefore revert to their target 
leverage at a faster pace.  This behaviour is consistent with the predictions of trade-
off theory.  Hence, accounting for firms’ leverage levels provides new evidence that 
the estimated SOA toward target leverage is conditional on the degree of financial 
distress costs facing the firm.      
 
Further, I investigate whether firm-specific characteristics have different 
effects and significance that can explain the variation leverage ratios between firms 
with different levels of leverage.  The analysis indicates that firms with different 
levels of leverage react differently to changes in firm-specific characteristics.  
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Interestingly, high and low leveraged firms tend to act in the same way: larger firms 
and less profitable firms are more likely to increase their leverage ratios.  I find that 
firms with high leverage appear to increase their leverage ratios when their market-
to-book ratios are high, which appears to contradict Baker and Wurgler’s (2002) 
market timing theory.  My results highlight the fact that important information is lost 
in capital structure studies when firms are lumped in an undifferentiated group rather 
than analysed in relevant sub-clusters. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Capital structure literature reflects an increasing interest in the concept of 
target leverage in trade-off theory.  This thesis presents analyses which seek to 
achieve a better understanding of whether or not firms pursue target leverage and, if 
so, why some firms adjust more rapidly than others.  The empirical analyses 
undertaken here cover two different geographic regions: Australia and the US.  
 
The empirical research on trade-off theory in Australia is very limited.  The 
only Australian study in this area is presented in Koh, Durand, and Watson (2011), 
whose study provides supportive evidence that firms have leverage targets.  This 
thesis extends the current literature and contributes to the ongoing general debate on 
the validity of the trade-off theory of capital structure in Australia by estimating the 
average speed with which firms adjust toward their target leverage in the context of 
Australia M&A activity.   
 
Earlier studies have generally assumed that firms adjust at a homogeneous 
rate. However, recent studies find evidence supporting heterogeneity in the SOA.  
This thesis examines asymmetric dynamic trade-off behaviour using a sample of US 
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firms by considering whether or not a firm’s leverage level is itself a determinant of 
both its SOA and the importance or relevance of particular influences on leverage 
adjustment.   
 
Chapter 2 discusses international and Australian literature related to trade-off 
theory.  Chapters 3 and 4 review the empirical studies related to pecking order theory 
and market timing model, respectively.  Chapter 5 examines whether Australian 
firms pursue target leverage by discussing firms whose structures are disrupted 
through a major corporate event: M&A activity.  Chapter 6 examines whether a 
firm’s leverage level is itself a determinant of both its SOA and the importance of the 
effects on leverage adjustment.  This chapter outlines the major findings in this thesis 
and discusses directions for future research. 
 
 
 
7.2 Summary of major findings 
 
The empirical analyses are presented in Chapters 5 and 6.  Chapter 5 tests 
whether firms pursue target leverage by using a sample of Australian firms engage in 
M&A activity.  The preliminary analysis indicates that the source of net equity issue, 
net debt issue, and retained earnings is noticeably different in the acquisition year 
from the years surrounding it.  This finding appears to support my conjecture that 
acquisitions act as a shock to the capital structure of acquirers.  Furthermore, when 
the sample is conditioned on the basis of financing methods to pay for the 
acquisition, acquirers appear to issue debt subsequent to equity-financed transactions.  
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This is consistent with trade-off theory.  I subsequently estimate the speed with 
which acquirers adjust toward their target leverages, using the modified partial 
adjustment model in Hovakimian and Li (2011).  Firms appear to actively rebalance 
their leverage by incorporating between 42 percent and 63 percent of the leverage 
deviation immediately following the acquisition.  More importantly, the estimated 
SOAs are higher than the rates reported in Koh, Durand, and Watson (2011), 
indicating the importance managers place on maintaining target leverage: firms in 
my sample experience shocks and therefore adjust faster than the average firm in the 
market.   
 
Given the evidence that some acquirers adjust more quickly than others, the 
subsequent stage of the analysis examines the way in which firm-specific 
characteristics can explain variations in leverage adjustment rates.  The estimation of 
leverage adjustment rates is designed to measure the reaction speed of an individual 
firm in adjusting to its target, which allows consideration of subtleties determining 
individual firms’ SOAs.  After controlling for the effect of market timing and 
acquisition wave, the results indicate that, firm size, cash reserves and profitability 
play key roles in leverage adjustment.  The results also show that these firm-specific 
characteristics affect the adjustment rates differently depending on whether a firm is 
over- or underleveraged.  Overall, the results confirm that when adjusting leverages, 
firms are cognizant of their target leverages. 
   
Given that heterogeneous leverage adjustment has recently gained attention in 
the literature, Chapter 6 presents an empirical analysis of the heterogeneous SOA 
among firms with different levels of leverage.  I adopt a sample splitting approach to 
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sort firms into deciles each year according to their leverage ratios in each fiscal year.  
According to trade-off theory, high leverage ratios are associated with high financial 
costs (Kraus and Litzenberger 1973).  If firms have substantial debt relative to their 
assets, their financial distress costs potentially outweigh the interest tax shield 
benefits of debt.  Firms with high leverage face higher levels of financial distress 
costs and greater agency conflicts issues than those with low leverage.  Such firms 
are under pressure to decrease their leverage ratios, thus implying more incentive for 
them to undertake leverage adjustment toward the target leverage.   
 
The preliminary analysis confirms my conjecture that the estimated SOAs vary 
with firms’ leverage levels.  The findings indicate that firms follow their target 
leverages and the leverage level does matter in the leverage adjustment process.  The 
near-monotonic positive association between firms’ leverage levels and their 
estimated SOAs provides evidence of pronounced heterogeneity.  The estimated 
SOAs are particularly strong for firms with high leverage.  Firms with high leverage 
appear to close between 7.15 percent and 17.06 percent of the deviation from the 
target leverage each year.  Firms with medium leverage adjust by between 5.10 
percent and 8.51 percent of the leverage gap each year, whereas firms with low 
leverage adjust to offset only 3.16 percent to 4.21 percent of the leverage deviation 
each year.  Firms behave as if they have targets but their SOAs toward these targets 
is conditional on their leverage.  Hence, firms with higher leverage undertake more 
rapid adjustment to avoid the potentially large financial distress costs.   
 
The subsequent stage of the analysis examines the evolution of leverage for the 
cross-section of firms by predicting leverage ratios based on their estimated SOAs, 
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which allows me to provide some insights into whether firms with high (low) 
leverage decrease (increase) their leverage ratios to approach their target leverages as 
predicted by trade-off theory.  The results show that firms with high (low) leverage 
reduce (increase) their leverage ratios in the short-term.  In particular, firms with 
high leverage appear to be more inclined to lower their leverage ratios than firms 
with low leverage.  Therefore, it highlights the fact that estimated SOAs play an 
important role in explaining the convergence of leverage ratios.   
 
Given that it is unclear what drives firms to adjust their leverage ratios toward 
the target leverage other than higher or lower leverage, I then investigate the impact 
firm-specific characteristics have on the leverage variation between firms with 
different levels of leverage.  The results show that, when considering levels of 
leverage, the effects of firm characteristics appear asymmetric.  Hence, it highlights 
the importance of considering the level of leverage when considering capital 
structure theories.  For instance, both high and low leveraged firms tend to utilize 
higher profitability to reduce their leverage ratios.  This is consistent with pecking 
order theory (Titman and Wessels 1988).  On the other hand, firms with medium 
leverage increase their debt.  This is consistent with trade-off theory.  Previous 
studies tend to ‘lump’ firms in an undifferentiated group rather than analyse sub-
samples based on their leverage.  Therefore, it reveals that this approach misses 
nuances in the data.   
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7.3 Directions for future research 
 
The main aim of this thesis is to quantify the magnitude of SOAs in Australia 
and US.  The findings establish that firms in Australia and the US do have leverage 
targets.  However, a few aspects of this thesis can be extended.  Given that the 
number of M&A observations in Australia is limited, a similar empirical design can 
be tested using US M&A data.  This will enable inferences to be drawn about 
adjustment differences toward the target leverage by Australian and US firms. 
 
The evidence in this thesis indicates that US firms with high leverage appear 
to adjust quicker than others.  For robustness check, one possible way around this is 
to classify firms according to their target leverage levels and investigate whether 
there are differences in behaviour between the groups.  Furthermore, it is still unclear 
why such firms move so quickly and how they adjust more quickly than firms with 
lower leverage ratios.  Although the findings suggest that these firms adjust to reduce 
their leverage ratios, there is potential for future research to explore how these firms 
reduce their leverage ratios and what the motivations for reducing leverage are.  
These ideas could be explored further using a sample of Japanese firms.  Given the 
nature of cross-holding and the long period of economic stagnation in the Japanese 
market, it would be interesting to establish whether they maintain high levels of 
leverage over time. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A – Predicted leverage ratios for deciles 
 
  Low leveraged firms Medium leveraged firms High leveraged firms 
  Decile 1 Decile 2 Decile 3 Decile 4 Decile 5 Decile 6 Decile 7 Decile 8 Decile 9 Decile 10 
Year 
1 0.0268 0.0633 0.0988 0.1361 0.1891 0.2344 0.2785 0.3322 0.4042 0.5353 
2 0.0672 0.1042 0.1253 0.1478 0.1988 0.2373 0.2732 0.3210 0.3889 0.5080 
3 0.1088 0.1304 0.1382 0.1581 0.2073 0.2398 0.2680 0.3103 0.3750 0.4865 
4 0.1347 0.1427 0.1496 0.1672 0.2149 0.2419 0.2631 0.3002 0.3622 0.4696 
5 0.1465 0.1536 0.1597 0.1753 0.2215 0.2437 0.2582 0.2905 0.3506 0.4563 
6 0.1570 0.1632 0.1686 0.1824 0.2273 0.2453 0.2536 0.2814 0.3400 0.4458 
7 0.1662 0.1718 0.1765 0.1930 0.2324 0.2466 0.2491 0.2760 0.3284 0.4376 
8 0.1744 0.1793 0.1835 0.2022 0.2356 0.2477 0.2447 0.2707 0.3173 0.4311 
9 0.1817 0.1902 0.1939 0.2104 0.2383 0.2487 0.2405 0.2657 0.3069 0.4261 
10 0.1923 0.1998 0.2031 0.2175 0.2407 0.2495 0.2365 0.2608 0.2969 0.4221 
11 0.2016 0.2082 0.2111 0.2238 0.2427 0.2502 0.2325 0.2560 0.2874 0.4189 
12 0.2098 0.2157 0.2182 0.2293 0.2444 0.2508 0.2287 0.2514 0.2784 0.4023 
13 0.2170 0.2222 0.2244 0.2342 0.2458 0.2514 0.2325 0.2470 0.2731 0.3872 
14 0.2234 0.2279 0.2298 0.2371 0.2471 0.2518 0.2357 0.2427 0.2679 0.3734 
15 0.2290 0.2329 0.2347 0.2397 0.2481 0.2522 0.2384 0.2386 0.2630 0.3608 
16 0.2339 0.2361 0.2375 0.2418 0.2490 0.2525 0.2407 0.2346 0.2582 0.3493 
17 0.2369 0.2387 0.2400 0.2436 0.2498 0.2528 0.2427 0.2307 0.2535 0.3388 
18 0.2394 0.2410 0.2421 0.2452 0.2505 0.2530 0.2444 0.2342 0.2490 0.3272 
19 0.2416 0.2430 0.2439 0.2465 0.2511 0.2532 0.2459 0.2371 0.2447 0.3163 
20 0.2435 0.2446 0.2454 0.2477 0.2515 0.2534 0.2471 0.2396 0.2405 0.3058 
21 0.2451 0.2460 0.2467 0.2487 0.2520 0.2535 0.2482 0.2418 0.2364 0.2959 
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  Low leveraged firms Medium leveraged firms High leveraged firms 
  Decile 1 Decile 2 Decile 3 Decile 4 Decile 5 Decile 6 Decile 7 Decile 8 Decile 9 Decile 10 
Year 
22 0.2464 0.2473 0.2478 0.2495 0.2523 0.2537 0.2491 0.2436 0.2325 0.2865 
23 0.2476 0.2483 0.2488 0.2502 0.2526 0.2538 0.2498 0.2452 0.2287 0.2775 
24 0.2486 0.2492 0.2496 0.2508 0.2529 0.2539 0.2505 0.2465 0.2324 0.2722 
25 0.2494 0.2499 0.2503 0.2513 0.2531 0.2539 0.2511 0.2477 0.2356 0.2671 
26 0.2501 0.2506 0.2509 0.2518 0.2533 0.2540 0.2515 0.2486 0.2383 0.2622 
27 0.2508 0.2511 0.2514 0.2522 0.2534 0.2541 0.2520 0.2495 0.2407 0.2574 
28 0.2513 0.2516 0.2518 0.2525 0.2536 0.2541 0.2523 0.2502 0.2427 0.2527 
29 0.2517 0.2520 0.2522 0.2528 0.2537 0.2541 0.2526 0.2508 0.2444 0.2483 
30 0.2521 0.2524 0.2525 0.2530 0.2538 0.2542 0.2529 0.2513 0.2458 0.2440 
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Appendix B – Transition matrix 
 
  To: 
  Decile 1 Decile 2 Decile 3 Decile 4 Decile 5 Decile 6 Decile 7 Decile 8 Decile 9 Decile 10 
From:             
Decile 1 
over 1 year 78.5% 7.3% 5.3% 3.5% 1.9% 1.2% 0.8% 0.6% 0.5% 0.3% 
over 3 years 60.2% 10.7% 9.3% 6.3% 4.2% 3.0% 2.2% 1.8% 1.3% 1.0% 
over 5 years 50.8% 12.0% 10.9% 7.8% 5.7% 4.1% 3.1% 2.2% 1.7% 1.6% 
            
Decile 2 
over 1 year 15.0% 54.1% 16.5% 6.1% 3.5% 1.9% 1.2% 0.8% 0.6% 0.3% 
over 3 years 19.5% 30.1% 19.0% 10.0% 7.2% 5.0% 3.8% 2.4% 1.8% 1.2% 
over 5 years 19.3% 21.1% 19.2% 11.8% 8.9% 6.8% 4.6% 3.6% 2.6% 2.0% 
            
Decile 3 
over 1 year 5.6% 13.9% 49.0% 16.8% 7.1% 3.5% 2.0% 1.0% 0.8% 0.4% 
over 3 years 9.4% 14.3% 28.5% 18.0% 11.6% 7.6% 4.4% 2.8% 2.1% 1.4% 
over 5 years 10.3% 12.4% 21.6% 18.8% 13.2% 9.3% 6.3% 3.7% 2.4% 2.0% 
            
Decile 4 
over 1 year 3.1% 3.3% 19.2% 41.1% 18.1% 7.8% 3.6% 1.9% 1.1% 0.7% 
over 3 years 6.0% 5.9% 17.8% 24.4% 17.7% 11.8% 7.1% 4.6% 3.0% 1.7% 
over 5 years 7.1% 6.2% 16.0% 19.9% 17.4% 12.6% 8.5% 5.8% 4.1% 2.4% 
            
Decile 5 
over 1 year 1.6% 1.5% 5.5% 21.1% 37.8% 18.7% 7.9% 3.3% 2.0% 0.7% 
over 3 years 3.6% 3.4% 9.5% 18.3% 22.6% 17.5% 11.6% 6.9% 4.2% 2.3% 
over 5 years 5.1% 4.3% 10.6% 16.4% 21.2% 18.5% 13.8% 0.9% 6.0% 3.3% 
            
Decile 6 
over 1 year 0.9% 0.9% 2.3% 6.7% 21.8% 36.7% 18.8% 7.6% 3.1% 1.2% 
over 3 years 2.4% 2.2% 5.2% 10.8% 18.9% 22.0% 17.5% 11.2% 6.5% 3.3% 
over 5 years 3.4% 2.8% 6.8% 11.5% 16.5% 18.9% 17.0% 11.5% 7.5% 4.0% 
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Decile 7 
over 1 year 0.6% 0.6% 1.1% 2.6% 6.7% 21.6% 37.7% 20.0% 7.0% 2.1% 
over 3 years 1.6% 1.5% 3.3% 6.0% 11.3% 18.6% 23.6% 18.1% 11.0% 4.9% 
over 5 years 2.5% 2.2% 4.4% 7.2% 11.7% 16.3% 20.1% 17.9% 11.2% 6.6% 
            
Decile 8 
over 1 year 0.3% 0.4% 0.6% 1.1% 2.5% 6.8% 22.0% 42.2% 19.5% 4.6% 
over 3 years 1.3% 0.9% 2.0% 3.4% 5.8% 11.4% 20.1% 27.7% 18.9% 8.6% 
over 5 years 1.9% 1.6% 2.8% 4.7% 7.5% 11.7% 18.8% 22.9% 18.6% 9.5% 
            
Decile 9 
over 1 year 0.3% 0.2% 0.3% 0.7% 1.1% 2.1% 5.8% 21.5% 50.8% 17.1% 
over 3 years 0.8% 0.7% 1.5% 2.3% 3.2% 5.5% 10.3% 22.4% 33.9% 19.4% 
over 5 years 1.6% 1.1% 2.0% 3.2% 4.5% 7.2% 11.3% 22.0% 29.3% 17.8% 
            
Decile 10 
over 1 year 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.6% 0.9% 1.6% 3.6% 17.3% 74.9% 
over 3 years 0.9% 0.5% 1.2% 1.5% 2.1% 2.9% 4.9% 8.0% 22.2% 55.8% 
over 5 years 1.5% 0.9% 2.1% 2.4% 3.1% 4.6% 6.3% 10.9% 22.6% 45.7% 
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